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Executive Summary 
Alaska relies on aviation more than any other state does. It is 615,2301 square miles—
representing 16 percent of the total U.S.—but it has only 13,628 miles of public roads.2 
Less than 10 percent of the state is accessible by road. Rivers are frozen for most of 
the year. But because Alaska is huge, has fewer than 650,000 people, and is divided by 
mountain ranges, the infrastructure and services that support aviation in most other 
states are lacking in many areas of Alaska. 
What is the Capstone Program? 
To help improve aviation safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in 
cooperation with industry, began testing new technology in the Yukon-Kuskokwim (Y-K) 
Delta region of southwest Alaska in 1999. The FAA contracted with the University of 
Alaska Anchorage’s Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) and Aviation 
Technology Division (ATD) to evaluate the benefits of the new safety program—known 
as Capstone. The program involves: 
1) Equipping commuter airlines, air taxis and selected part 91 operators3 with 
avionics that shows pilots their location and information about nearby terrain, 
other aircraft, and weather. 
2) Building ground stations that broadcast weather and flight information and that 
can provide radar-like surveillance of planes equipped with the new avionics. 
3) Installing weather observation stations and creating and publishing instrument 
approaches, in order to provide more weather information and enable pilots to 
land at isolated airports in poor weather. 
This technology is most likely to help prevent mid-air collisions and controlled-flight-into-
terrain (CFIT) accidents, which make up only a small part of the small-plane accidents 
in southwest Alaska but are the most likely to cause deaths. Aside from helping prevent 
accidents, the technology is designed to make it easier for pilots to fly—by making it 
easier to navigate, by providing more current weather information, and by making 
instrument landings possible when weather deteriorates. 
Why Test in Southwest Alaska? 
Communities in southwest Alaska are far from highways and depend heavily on 
aviation to transport people and cargo. The Capstone program focuses on the Y-K 
Delta’s primary transportation hub of Bethel, the smaller hubs of Aniak and St. Marys, 
and the villages those hubs serve (Figure ES-1, next page). More than 20 air taxi and 
                                            
1 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001, Table 343. 
2 Alaska DOT&PF, www.dot.state.ak.us/stwdplng/highwaydata/pub/cprm/2001cprm.pdf, Certified Public 
Road Mileage as of December 21, 2001.  Excludes Marine Highway miles. 
3 In 2000 and 2001, most of these were government agencies such as the State Troopers or USFWS that 
operate fleets of aircraft under part 91. 
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commuter airlines serve these places, mainly with aircraft seating fewer than 10 
passengers.  
Figure ES-1. Y-K Delta Communities and  
Selected Air Routes 
 
Like the rest of Alaska, the Y-K Delta has an accident rate considerably above the U.S. 
average. Pilots routinely face rapidly changing weather, flat-light and white-out 
conditions, fog, and ice fog. Also, weather information is limited. Before the Capstone 
program started, the Y-K Delta had only seven locations with regularly available 
weather information. Only Bethel, the major hub, has a manned weather station.  
Weather stations were 100 miles or more apart, before the Capstone program began, 
meaning that local weather information was often unavailable to pilots flying into many 
communities. Finally, pilots in this region often have to land with few navigational aids, 
at airports with short, unpaved runways; 90 percent of the airports in the region have 
gravel or dirt runways,4 and two thirds are less than 3,000 feet long. 
What’s the Status of Capstone So Far? 
As of December 2001, the FAA had equipped 140 aircraft in the Y-K Delta with 
Capstone avionics. That included about 85 percent of air taxi and commuter planes 
operating in the Y-K Delta. The FAA had also installed automated weather stations 
(AWOS) at nine airports and published non-precision instrument approaches—landing 
instructions—for ten airports. Six of the planned 11 ground stations that transmit 
                                            
4 FAA 5010 database 
100 miles 
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weather, traffic, and other information to aircraft in flight were also operating by the end 
of 2001, although at somewhat less than their final planned capabilities.  In mid-2002, 
the FAA was continuing to install the new avionics in planes and build ground stations. 
What is ISER Evaluating? 
ISER’s evaluation began in 1999 and will continue through 2005. We are primarily 
evaluating how well the Capstone program is meeting its central goal of improving 
aviation safety.  
What Did the Baseline Study Find? 
ISER first analyzed data for the period 1990-1999, before the Capstone program 
started. We quantified the scarcity of navigation aids and weather information for pilots 
flying in the Y-K Delta (as described earlier). We then looked at accidents and found 
that if the new technology had been installed on all aircraft in the test region during the 
1990s, it might have: 
•  Prevented about 1 in 7 of all accidents and nearly 1 in 2 fatal accidents, by 
mitigating all causes of the accidents. 
•  Helped pilots avoid more than half of all accidents and fatalities, by mitigating 
some but not all of the causes of the accidents. 
How Has Capstone Affected Safety? 
We can’t expect to see the full safety effects of the Capstone program yet, because the 
program was still being phased in during the period we evaluated. By mid-2002, almost 
all air taxi and commuter planes in the Y-K Delta had been equipped with Capstone 
avionics—but averaged over 2000 and 2001, only about half had the avionics. 
Also, as of mid-2002 the Bethel air control tower still lacked the equipment it needed to 
efficiently manage Capstone-equipped planes. Finally, as of mid-2002, the new weather 
reporting stations—while helpful—had not yet been tied in to the ground stations that 
send information to the Capstone-equipped planes. That means pilots could only get 
the weather information by telephone before they took off, or once they were within 
radio range. 
With that level of implementation, we would expect the Capstone equipment to have 
prevented only one in four controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) crashes and one in ten 
mid-air collisions. In an average year, there might be no such accidents. 
Still, we do have some preliminary results from this phase-in period: 
•  Aircraft equipped with Capstone avionics had fewer accidents in 2001 than 
similar aircraft not equipped with the new avionics (Figure ES-2, next page). 
Commuters and air-taxi operators in the Y-K Delta had 7 accidents with 
Capstone-equipped planes and 12 accidents with planes that did not have the 
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new avionics. However, it’s still too early to assess whether this is a systematic 
change that will continue, or just the result of chance variation. 
Figure ES-2.  Accident Rates for Capstone Equipped and Non-Equipped Aircraft,  





























•  The only fatal accident with a Capstone-equipped plane during 2000-2001 took 
place in Dillingham, which is outside the Y-K Delta. That plane crashed on take-
off in clear weather, not a type of accident that Capstone was designed to 
address. The NTSB investigation was not complete in mid-2002, but there is no 
evidence that the Capstone avionics could have prevented that crash. 
•  Pilots flying aircraft equipped with Capstone avionics had no accidents that were 
the result of poor runway conditions in 2000 and 2001. But 3 of the 12 accidents 
with planes lacking the new avionics–two landing and one take-off– did result 
from poor runway conditions (Figure ES-3, next page). We did not anticipate that 
Capstone avionics could reduce runway-related accidents. But pilots have told 
us that because they have Capstone equipment, they can identify other planes 
that have just landed at a particular airport—and then get in touch with the pilots 
of those planes and find out runway conditions. 
•  Of the seven Capstone-equipped planes that had accidents in the Y-K Delta in 
2000 and 2001, only one was of the type that the new technology should have 
prevented. That was a controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT) accident. But the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the pilot had disabled 
the avionics feature that might have helped him avoid the crash (NTSB Final 
Report ANC01LA046). Other accidents were five minor ones where pilots 
misjudged take-offs or landings and one in which the propeller came off during 
flight, but the pilot successfully landed. 
•  Additional weather stations and GPS approaches have encouraged Y-K Delta 
operators to pursue certification for instrument flight rules operations.  As the 
number of Y-K Delta airports with instrument approaches increased from 3 to 13, 
the number of IFR-certified commercial aircraft operating in the area rose from 8 
to 22 and will likely continue to increase. 
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Figure ES-3. Y-K Delta Commuter and Air Taxi Accidents, 2000 – 2001 










































Accident categories are explained in detail on page 20, figures 2-5 and 2-6. TCF=terrain 
clearance floor; CFIT=controlled flight into terrain 
We also surveyed pilots and operators in the Y-K Delta to ask their opinions about 
Capstone’s effectiveness and worked with the FAA when it surveyed and observed 
pilots and operators to find out how easy the equipment is to use. Those surveys found: 
•  Nearly half the 106 pilots ISER surveyed believe the program has made flying in 
the test area much safer. Most of the rest said it had improved safety somewhat. 
•  Operators who were reluctant to take part in the Capstone program in 1999 and 
2000 have now asked to be included. As of mid-2002, all small commercial 
operators based in or operating out of Bethel had agreed to participate. 
•  Pilots especially liked Capstone’s ability to warn them about terrain hazards and 
nearby traffic. They also liked having additional weather information. 
•  Capstone’s GPS, along with the published landing approaches at nine additional 
airports, have encouraged several operators to upgrade their capacity to fly 
under instrument flight rules (IFR). Being able to fly IFR means operators can fly 
safely under worse weather conditions. 
•  Pilots also noted potential problems with using Capstone: more time spent using 
avionics instead of looking at where the plane is going and more aircraft flying 
close together, because they are all using Capstone’s GPS to fly in a straight line 
between villages. But only about 15 percent saw these as major problems. 
•  Pilots reported that in the winter, when they’re wearing heavy gloves, they find it 
more difficult to push the buttons and turn the knobs on Capstone equipment. 
•  Pilots need thorough and repeated training as well as practice to use this 
equipment effectively. Learning to use the GPS takes time. Also, the equipment 
has so many functions—weather, traffic, flight planning—that pilots can’t master 
them all in one training session. 
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•  Operators provide pilot training, and the quality of that training varies—so some 
pilots are trying to use the Capstone equipment with only minimal training. 
•  The Capstone program is one of several attempts to improve aviation safety in 
Alaska. In the Y-K Delta these include improved maintenance facilities, 
increased management oversight, and increased pilot training. Capstone has 
played a significant role, by providing additional weather stations, GPS 
approaches, avionics, and training. We know other changes have also improved 
safety, but we can’t identify how much each is contributing. 
What Are Initial Recommendations? 
Capstone Phase I has not yet been fully implemented.  To fully realize Capstone’s 
potential benefits, the FAA must finish equipping the fleet as planned and building the 
ground infrastructure to support the system’s capabilities. Operators must continue to 
provide training and support for pilots to use the equipment effectively.  Our preliminary 
recommendations include: 
•  Continue the Capstone program.  Only when all the Capstone equipment is in place 
and pilots have been well-trained—and have used the equipment for a longer 
period—can we expect to see the full safety benefits. 
•  Market program to operators and pilots.  The Capstone program won’t see its full 
benefits unless pilots and operators support it and use all its capabilities. The FAA 
needs to continue to market the program to pilots and Flight Standards District 
Offices (FSDOs) need to assure pilots and operators that the technology won’t be 
used for enforcement. 
•  Ensure adequate pilot training.  Operators need to allocate time and money for 
thorough initial and continuing training.  FAA oversight could help to ensure this. 
Simulators with Capstone avionics would be a valuable addition to the pilot training. 
•  Expand GBT coverage. To get the most benefit out of data-link weather and other 
relevant information the Capstone program potentially makes available in the 
cockpit, pilots need to be able to access this information wherever they fly, and not 
just in a part of the Y-K Delta.  It’s important to increase the number of ground-
based transceiver stations so they cover at least the full Y-K Delta. 
•  Provide radar-like approach control services. To fully realize the potential benefits of 
radar-like services, the FAA should work to provide approach-control services for 
Bethel airport using Capstone’s capabilities. 
•  Require more operator feedback. The FAA should require future Capstone 
participants to provide more information on how often and where they fly, what 
training they provide, who their pilots are, and what their qualifications are. Lack of 
such information in the Y-K Delta hampers our ability to estimate safety benefits. 
Operators in Phase I of the program weren’t required to provide this information 
when they received the Capstone equipment.  
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1 Introduction 
Alaska relies on aviation more than any other state does. It is 615,2305 square miles—
representing 16 percent of the total U.S. —but it has only 13,628 miles of public roads6. 
Less than 10 percent of the state is accessible by road. Rivers are frozen for most of 
the year. But because Alaska is huge, has fewer than 650,000 people, and is divided by 
mountain ranges, the infrastructure and services that support aviation in most other 
states are lacking in many areas of Alaska. 
The FAA Alaska Region’s Capstone program is a joint initiative with industry to improve 
aviation safety and efficiency in Alaska, by using new tools and technology to provide 
infrastructure and services. The first phase of Capstone is in southwest Alaska, 
primarily in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta (Y-K Delta). The program involves: 
•  Equipping commuter airlines, air taxis and selected part 91 operators7 with 
avionics that shows pilots their location and information about nearby terrain, 
other aircraft, and weather. 
•  Building ground stations that broadcast weather and flight information and that 
can provide radar-like surveillance of planes equipped with the new avionics. 
•  Installing weather observation stations and creating and publishing instrument 
approaches, in order to provide more weather information and enable pilots to 
land at isolated airports in poor weather. 
This technology is most likely to help prevent mid-air collisions and controlled-flight-into-
terrain (CFIT) accidents, which make up only a small part of the small-plane accidents 
in southwest Alaska but are the most likely to cause deaths. Aside from helping prevent 
accidents, the technology is designed to make it easier for pilots to fly—by making it 
easier to navigate, by providing more current weather information, and by making 
instrument landings possible when weather deteriorates. 
To learn the benefits and limitations of these new tools and technologies, the Capstone 
program contracted with the University of Alaska Anchorage’s Institute of Social and 
Economic Research and the Aviation Technology Division to evaluate aviation safety 
changes in the Capstone area. This Capstone Interim Safety Report describes those 
changes through the end of 2001. 
1.1 The Yukon Kuskokwim Delta Region of the Capstone Area 
The Capstone Phase I area is a geographic region from 58° to 64° north latitude and 
155° to 167° west longitude (Figure 1-1, next page). Nearly all the Capstone ground 
systems and avionics are in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta. Bethel is the aviation center 
                                            
5 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2001, Table 343. 
6 Alaska DOT&PF, www.dot.state.ak.us/stwdplng/highwaydata/pub/cprm/2001cprm.pdf, Certified Public 
Road Mileage as of December 21, 2001.  Excludes Marine Highway miles. 
7 In 2000 and 2001, these were typically government agencies such as the State Troopers or USFWS that 
operate fleets of aircraft under part 91. 
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of the delta (see Figure 1-2). It is also the largest community in the Y-K Delta and the 
economic, governmental and cultural center of the region. Aniak to the northeast and 
St. Marys to the northwest are also economic and mail distribution hubs for the delta. 
Figure 1-1. The Capstone Area in Southwest Alaska 
 
Aviation activities are concentrated in Bethel, Aniak, and St. Marys, as shown in Figure 
1-2, next page. The hubs receive daily scheduled service from passenger and cargo 
carriers. The mainline passenger and cargo flights to Bethel originate in Anchorage, the 
largest hub airport in Alaska. These flights are on Boeing 737 and Beech 1900 
passenger aircraft and DC-6, Boeing 727, and EMB 120 Brasilia cargo craft.  
Since air is the only transportation system that can operate year-round, essentially all 
passengers and 95 percent of all cargo arrive via scheduled air service. Bethel, Aniak, 
and St. Marys are mail hubs for 52 smaller communities in the delta. Single-engine and 
light twin-engine aircraft such as Cessna 207, Cessna 208 Caravan, Cessna 172 and 
Twin Otter carry passengers and cargo to those smaller communities. 
An example of a typical flight would be a Boeing 737 combi (passengers and freight 
combined) operated by Alaska Airlines from Anchorage to Bethel, with 16,000 to 20,000 
pounds of freight and mail and about 50 passengers8. In Bethel, passengers, freight 
and mail headed for other communities would be transferred to the local carriers. A 
typical flight out of Bethel might be a Cessna 207 with 4 passengers and 300 pounds of 
mail going to Hooper Bay, Scammon Bay, and Chevak and then returning to Bethel. 
                                            
8 Personal communication, J.D. Hill, Anchorage Operations Office, Alaska Airlines., November 2002. 
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Figure 1-2. Air Routes in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta 
 
The economic, social, political, cultural, and regulatory factors affecting aviation safety 
in the Y-K Delta—and the Capstone-equipped aircraft flying there—are the focus of this 
report. The Capstone area includes communities outside the Y-K Delta—Iliamna, 
Unalakleet, Dillingham, King Salmon and McGrath— but the focus of Capstone activity 
is aircraft and flight activity based in Bethel, Aniak and St. Marys. 
Pilots in the Y-K Delta routinely face weather hazards: rapidly changing weather, flat 
light and white-out conditions, fog, and ice fog.9 These hazards are made worse by 
incomplete or unavailable weather information. Only Bethel has a manned weather 
observation station; the rest of the information routinely available to pilots is from 
automated stations. While this information is useful, the distance between observation 
stations—and the relative lack of local forecasts that combine information from multiple 
stations over time—mean that pilots routinely encounter unexpected bad weather. 
And besides those hazards, pilots with no low-altitude ATC radar coverage must fly with 
relatively few navigation aids, to airports with unpaved runways (90 percent are gravel 
or dirt).  These runways are often short (one third are less than 2,000 feet; two-thirds 
are less than 3,000 feet), and half have no lighting.  Most flights between Bethel and 
the surrounding villages are single-pilot flights, leaving the pilot to meet these varied 
challenges without help. 
Accident rates in the Y-K Delta area are similar to Alaska’s statewide rates, which are 
higher than national averages.  Alaska’s aircraft crash rate (crashes per 100,000 flight 
hours) for air taxi and general aviation flights during 1992-94 was 2.5 times higher than 
the U.S. average (FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, 1997).  From 1990 through 
                                            
9 These are described more completely in the Capstone Baseline Report, Chapter 7. 
100 miles 
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1999, commercial operators in the Capstone area had 204 accidents.  About one tenth 
of those accidents (20) were fatal accidents, accounting for 31 deaths. 
1.2 Capstone Program 
As we noted earlier, Capstone Phase I is equipping aircraft in the Y-K Delta with a new 
type of avionics that shows pilots their location, nearby terrain, other aircraft, and 
weather and flight information. Another part of the program is installing ground stations 
that broadcast weather and flight information and receive GPS-location messages (sent 
by aircraft), allowing radar-like surveillance and providing company managers with the 
ability to follow flights. Capstone is also installing weather observation stations at 
isolated village airports and creating non-precision instrument approaches that enable 
instrument flight rules (IFR) operations when weather conditions are inadequate for 
visual flight rules (VFR) operations.  Figure 1-3 illustrates these systems. 
Figure 1-3. Capstone Systems 
 
The Capstone avionics and ground systems are designed to help prevent many of the 
accidents that occur in rural Alaska and to use new technologies to help compensate 
for remote location and limited infrastructure.  The Capstone avionics has a GPS 
location sensor, on-board databases with digital maps that include information on 
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location centered on a moving map and thus be alerted to dangerously close terrain.  A 
universal access transceiver (UAT) broadcasts the aircraft’s location to the ground and 
to other Capstone-equipped aircraft. The UAT receives location information from other 
Capstone aircraft and displays that information, to warn pilots before there is a 
possibility of collision. The UAT can also receive messages from ground systems about 
locations of non-Capstone aircraft that are visible to radar, as well as weather maps and 
other flight information that are displayed to pilots to warn them about hazardous 
conditions and to aid in-flight planning. 
Capstone ground systems are designed to work with the avionics to help pilots manage 
and control aircraft more effectively.  Ground systems relay the locations of Capstone 
aircraft for air traffic controllers to use where radar coverage is not available; for tower 
operators to use for more rapidly locating planes; and for the companies that operate 
the aircraft to use in following the progress of their flights. 
Capstone is installing automatic weather observation systems (AWOS)10 at remote 
airports to tell pilots the conditions at possible destinations. These AWOS also help 
meet the safety and regulatory requirements for instrument operations, which can safely 
continue in poorer weather.  Capstone makes this possible by allowing for publication of 
FAA-approved, non-precision GPS approaches at these locations. 
The Capstone program was funded in October 1998, and the first avionics were 
installed in November 1999.  Phase I is scheduled to continue equipping aircraft 
through 2002 and to continue ground infrastructure improvements and data collection 
through 2004. 
1.3 Safety Evaluations 
This report assesses changes in aviation safety in the Capstone area from January 
2000 through December 2001 and provides a preliminary estimate of the safety 
benefits of Capstone. Equally important—since Capstone is an ongoing program and 
adjustments can be made—this report estimates whether individual elements of 
Capstone have or have not improved safety so far. 
This report builds on a previous report, Air Safety in Southwest Alaska – Capstone 
Baseline Safety Report (baseline report).11 The baseline report described aviation in the 
Capstone area from 1990-1999.  It characterized commercial operations (employees 
and training levels, aircraft and avionics) and facilities and services. The report 
estimated a rough “best-case scenario” for Capstone’s potential safety benefit by 
dividing historical accidents into broad categories of causes that Capstone might 
                                            
10 Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) stations measure, collect and disseminate current 
weather information.  They do not forecast weather.  They provide airport identifier, Zulu time, and current 
information on sky conditions, visibility, wind speed, wind direction, temperature, dew point, altimeter 
setting, density altitude, and wind gusts to pilots, usually by VHF radio. Hourly AWOS data is available by 
telephone. 
11 The Baseline report is available at http://www.alaska.faa.gov/capstone/docs/baseline.pdf 
 Capstone Phase I Interim Safety Study, 2000/2001  
 Page 6  
address. It also reported pilots’ initial assessments of how they expected the Capstone 
technology to affect operations and safety. 
Additional background on aviation safety in Alaska is available in the reports listed 
below. 
Mitchell (American Airlines Training Corporation); Final Report on Definition of 
Alaskan Aviation Training Requirements; (1982). 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Aviation Safety in Alaska; (1995). 
Garrett et al; “Epidemiology of Work-Related Aviation Fatalities in Alaska 1990-
94,” in Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine Vol. 69, No. 12; (1998). 
FAA; Joint Interagency/Industry Study of Alaskan Passenger and Freight Pilots; 
(1999). 
Thomas, Timothy K., et al; “Controlled Flight into Terrain Accidents Among 
Commuter and Air Taxi Operators in Alaska”, Aviation Space and Environmental 
Medicine, Vol. 71, No. 11; (2000). 
1.4 Organization of This Report 
Section 2, Evaluation of the Capstone Baseline, re-examines some of the data and 
findings discussed in the Capstone Baseline Report for the period 1990-1999. This 
establishes a basis for projecting the potential safety effects of Capstone. First, we 
repeat the baseline analysis, looking only at Y-K Delta part-135 operators.  That group 
of air carriers is Capstone Phase I’s target population.  Section 2.2 then compares 
accident causes for the components of Capstone area operations, including all 
Capstone area operations, Capstone part-135 operations, and Y-K Delta part-135 
operations. 
Section 2.3 attributes 1990-1999 accidents to a detailed set of causes that help us to 
assess Capstone’s expected safety effects.  Sections 2.4 and 2.5 consider the extent to 
which Capstone could have indirect safety benefits in two areas–increased IFR 
operations and improvements in operator and pilot safety attitudes and practices. 
Section 2.6 discusses the limitations of available baseline data that constrain our 
analysis. 
Section 3, Evaluation of 2000/2001 Safety Factors, identifies relevant aviation safety 
data from 2000 and 2001. Section 3.1 discusses implementation of Capstone Phase I 
ground infrastructure and services.  Section 3.2 looks at Capstone avionics–installation, 
pilot training, and usability. Section 3.3 assesses changes in the level of aviation 
operations in the Capstone area.  Section 3.4 identifies changes in pilot and operator 
safety attitudes and practices. Section 3.5 discusses the limitations of our ongoing data 
collection. 
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Section 4, Changes in Safety, estimates the overall safety benefits of Capstone for the 
Y-K Delta and for the Capstone area.  Section 5 states conclusions of the study team. 
Appendixes include data tabulations, details of data collection, and analysis methods. 
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2 Evaluation of the Capstone Baseline 
Understanding how the Capstone program is affecting safety begins with understanding 
the situation before the program began.  The earlier baseline report describes 
operations and accidents in the Capstone area from 1990-1999 and assesses how the 
Capstone program might have improved safety, if it had existed during that period. 
The causes and rates of accidents from 1990 to 1999 differ significantly by location, 
FAR part, and accident severity. The baseline report assessed how Capstone might 
have affected all flights in the Capstone area.  Here we review our baseline analysis 
and focus it on the operations and accidents among part-135 operators in the Y-K Delta 
(Figure 2-1). Capstone is equipping aircraft belonging to these operators, and accident 
causes and rates in this group are most directly comparable to accidents among aircraft 
that are now Capstone-equipped. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 compare all accidents in the 
Capstone area from 1990-1999 with accidents in the same period for just the Y-K Delta 
part-135 operators.  As the Capstone program was implemented over the last two 
years, these part-135 operators–who received the majority of the avionics–provide us 
with an opportunity to measure safety benefits among a limited group of operators who 
face similar aviation and economic challenges.  
Figure 2-1.  Alaska, Capstone Area, and Y-K Delta 
 
The baseline report assessed potentially preventable accidents among other air 
carriers, agencies, and individuals flying in the Capstone area; that analysis is helpful 
for understanding the potential benefits to that broader group, where the data available 
for the analysis is much more limited. 
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Section 2.3 examines which of the accidents in the baseline period could potentially 
have been prevented by Capstone Phase I and explains how we made those 
determinations.  Section 2.4 discusses why there was limited capacity for IFR 
operations in the Capstone area during the baseline period. This baseline information is 
necessary for the later discussion, in Section 3, of the potential for additional IFR 
operations in the Y-K Delta.12  Section 2.5 briefly reviews the safety posture information 
in the baseline report, and Section 2.6 discusses the limitations we have encountered in 
collecting and analyzing data for the baseline period. 
2.1 Baseline Populations 
Data collected for the Capstone Phase I baseline and analyzed in the baseline report 
correspond to the formal scope adopted by the Capstone program.  That includes 
general aviation aircraft flying under Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) part 91 
(referred to as part-91 operations); scheduled and unscheduled commercial service by 
small aircraft flying under part-135;13 larger passenger and cargo transport aircraft 
under part 121; and aircraft flown by or for governments for public use.  Geographically 
this includes the Y-K Delta plus other hubs and villages within the Capstone area. 
Phase I of Capstone will of course have the most effects on air operations using aircraft 
with the new avionics and flying where new infrastructure and services are provided.  
Through December 2001, almost all the infrastructure and services provided by 
Capstone have been located within the Y-K Delta, and new avionics have been 
installed almost exclusively into part-135 aircraft based there.  This group is the most 
directly affected, and is the focus of this report.  
Accidents among all the groups from 1990 to 1999 are shown in Figure 2-2 (next page).  
The inner pie chart shows the distribution of accidents by FAR part for the Capstone 
area, 1990-1999, including the break-out of sub-groups in part-135.  The striped 
extensions show the subsets of these accidents by Y-K Delta part-135. 
                                            
12 As the potential for additional IFR operations is an unanticipated effect of Capstone, it was not 
discussed in the baseline report.   
13 Operations in Alaska also include “part-135 flying as 91.”  In this report these aircraft are included with 
scheduled and unscheduled part-135 aircraft. 
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Figure 2-2.  Capstone Area and Y-K Delta Part-135 Accidents  
by FAR Part Number of the Flight, 1990-1999 
YKD 135 





YKD Air Taxis  
60
Commuters














There were 309 accidents in the Capstone area of southwest Alaska from 1990 to 1999 
(pie) of which 101 were aircraft operated by Y-K Delta Part-135 operators that are a main 
focus of Capstone Phase 1 (gray outer wedges). The categories “part 135 flying under 91” 
and “YKD 135 under Part 91” refers to those flights that commercial operators may make 
under the less restrictive general aviation regulations (part 91).  These are non-revenue 
producing flights, such as return flights from a one-way charter or flights to and from a 
maintenance location. 
2.2 Causes and Severity of Accidents Among Capstone Area Aircraft 
During the baseline period, accidents among all Capstone area aircraft, Capstone area 
part-135 aircraft, and Y-K Delta part-135 aircraft have similar injury rates, as shown in 
Figure 2-3 (next page). Each accident is categorized by the worst injury it caused.  Most 
accidents–typically around 70 percent–result in no injuries.  In the Capstone area, the 
38 accidents that caused only minor injuries hurt a total of 62 people; the 26 fatal 
accidents resulted in 50 fatalities. 
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Figure 2-3.  Capstone Area and Y-K Delta Accidents, 1990- 1999 
by FAR Part and Injury Severity 
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Causes of accidents among these aircraft groups are also similar. Figure 2-4 (page 14) 
divides the same accidents shown in Figure 2-3 into nine basic cause categories. The 
inner pie shows all accidents. The red extension shows only accidents that caused 
injury. The black outer-most extension shows only fatal accidents. The causes are 
grouped as follows: 
Mechanical  Engine failure, inoperable control surfaces, failed landing gear, propeller  
Failure  or shaft failure.  (There were no fatal accidents in this category among 
part-135 aircraft based in the Y-K Delta during the 1990s. In the Lower 48, 
10 percent of mechanical accidents are fatal.) 
Navigation Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) while en route is often associated with 
reduced visibility and small navigational errors.  In the Y-K Delta, CFIT 
accidents also occur in VFR when flat light on snow-covered ground 
prevents pilots from recognizing terrain.  Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF) 
warnings are planned for Capstone Phase II; this function would address 
the 20 to 30 percent of CFIT accidents that occur on approach or 
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departure. Phase I avionics aren’t designed to directly deal with such 
accidents. Rarely, CFIT accidents are due to pilots being far from their 
intended path; GPS-map displays can help reduce those accidents. 
Traffic Usually mid-air collisions between aircraft.  Also accidents from last-
moment avoidance of other aircraft and from jet blast on airport surface. 
Flight  Usually accidents that result from inadequate weather information and are  
Information often caused by icing and sometimes poor visibility but rarely convective 
weather. (Surface winds contributing to take-off or landing accidents have 
been included under take-off or landing rather than here.)  Occasionally, 
lack of information on changes in procedures or facility status also 
contributes to accidents. 
Fuel Mis- Typically accidents caused by running out of fuel. Sometimes, pilots  
Managemnt fail to switch fuel tanks. 
Flight  Accidents caused by a variety of poor flight preparation measures,  
Preparation including failure to insure that cargo is tied down and within the aircraft’s 
weight and balance limits and failure to check whether fuel has been 
contaminated by water.  Rare in the Lower 48 but significant in the Y-K 
Delta are accidents caused when pilots or others fail to remove ice or 
snow from the aircraft; these are often serious or fatal accidents. 
Take-off  Accidents during take-off or landing from various causes, including  
and  accidents when pilots fail to maintain control (especially in wind), maintain 
Landing  improper airspeed, or don’t take adequate care near vehicles or  
(two causes) obstacles. In the Y-K Delta, an unusually high number of such accidents 
results from poor runway conditions or from hazards at off-runway sites 
such as beaches and gravel bars; float planes sometimes hit obstacles in 
water. 
Other Includes a variety of accidents from unusual causes such as hitting birds 
or colliding with ground vehicles. 
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Figure 2-4.  Capstone Area and Y-K Delta Accidents, 1990- 1999 
by Cause and Injury Severity 
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Each pie above is actually three nested charts.  The inner, multi-colored pies show all accidents by accident 
cause; the red wedges show accidents with a minor or serious injury by accident cause, and the outer black 
wedges, fatal accidents by cause. 
The causes of fatal accidents are markedly different from those of all accidents.  For 
example, although accidents during landings or take-offs are the two most frequent 
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types of accidents, they caused no fatalities in the Capstone area from 1990-1999.  
This finding is consistent with recent accident studies14 in the Lower 48.  Accidents from 
other causes—like navigation errors or mid-air collisions—are much more likely to be 
fatal.  The percentage of fatal accidents due to navigation errors in the Y-K Delta during 
the baseline period was comparable to the percentage of such accidents in the Lower 
48—but the percentage due to traffic problems (like mid-air collisions) is dramatically 
higher in the Y-K Delta. 
2.3 Potential and Expected Prevention 
The baseline analysis of Capstone’s potential to prevent accidents grouped accidents 
into three categories where Capstone would address:  
•  All identified causes (the “yes” category) 
•  Some but not all identified causes (the “maybe” category) 
•  None of the identified causes (the “no” category”) 
This report builds on that baseline analysis by focusing on Y-K Delta part-135 
accidents, using more detailed cause categories, and attempting to quantify the 
likelihood that Capstone—as implemented in 2000 and 2001—could have prevented 
each type of accident. The analysis methods are compared in detail in Appendix A.  
Figure 1-3 (page 4) shows how Capstone works: 
•  Capstone addresses accidents associated with navigation by showing pilots 
their location on a moving map on a multi-function display (MFD).  Capstone 
derives the location of the aircraft from GPS, and stores the map as part of an 
onboard navigation database.  
•  Capstone can reduce en route CFIT accidents by telling pilots their location 
relative to high ground. The system compares nearby terrain to the aircraft’s 
altitude and GPS location and then color-codes the information on the MFD —
terrain 500 feet or less below the plane is displayed in yellow; terrain level with 
the aircraft or higher is displayed in red. The GPS unit also has programmable 
functions to aid en route flight planning and may reduce pilot navigation 
workload. 
•  Capstone addresses accidents associated with aircraft traffic through ATC 
radar-like services (discussed below) and by showing pilots the locations of other 
Capstone-equipped aircraft.  Each equipped aircraft broadcasts its location to 
other Capstone equipped aircraft within line-of-sight15. This helps keep pilots 
aware of other aircraft in their vicinity and helps them coordinate with other 
nearby pilots. In the future, locations of aircraft that are not Capstone-equipped 
                                            
14 2001 Nall Report – General Aviation Accident Trends and Factors for 2000, AOPA Air Safety 
Foundation 
15 The Capstone avionics also transmits the location to GBTs, which in turn provide that information to air traffic 
controllers, to aircraft within line-of-sight of the GBTs, and through an internet service to companies wishing to 
flight follow their aircraft. 
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but that are visible to ATC radar might be provided by traffic information service 
broadcast (TIS-B) from the network of ground-based transceivers (GBTs). 
•  Capstone provides improved weather and flight information through new 
AWOS installations at remote airports and by broadcasting text and graphical 
weather information to the cockpit. The pilot can display the broadcast 
information on the multi-function display. 
•  Capstone supports increased IFR operation. The program installed new AWOS 
equipment at remote airfields, and published GPS instrument approaches for 
those airfields. For qualified aircraft and pilots, this allows safe IFR operations in 
low visibility conditions that unsafe for VFR operations.  Capstone also improves 
and expands IFR operations by allowing air traffic controllers to use automatic 
dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) to support radar-like services.  ADS-
B takes an aircraft’s location from GPS16 and transmits it to ground-based 
transceivers, which forward it to ATC computers—where the aircraft locations are 
displayed much like aircraft locations from radar.  This capability allows 
controllers to provide flight-following and surveillance-based separation services 
in airspace that is not visible to radar. 
•  Tower operators at Bethel airport in 2002 use a “BRITE” display of ADS-B 
targets to help them locate aircraft, better coordinate arrival and departure 
sequencing, and monitor surface operations. However, they did not have this 
display during the interim study period. 
•  Managers in companies that operate Capstone-equipped aircraft in 2002 will be 
able to monitor their flight locations on PCs connected to the Internet. This 
capability has the potential to significantly improve managers’ awareness of risks 
and help improve safety posture. The companies did not have this capability in 
2000 and 2001. 
Accidents in each category have distinguishing features (found by reviewing the 
detailed narratives) that allow us to assign them to detailed cause sub-categories that 
are or are not directly addressable by Capstone.17  For those directly addressed by 
Capstone, narratives also provide insights into the likelihood that a perfectly 
implemented Capstone program would have prevented the accident.  Based on this 
narrative and expert opinion, we have estimated a best-expected prevention likelihood 
for each Capstone area accident from 1990 through 1999.18 
Capstone’s success at preventing each type of accident also depends on the proportion 
of aircraft that are equipped, levels of pilot training, and geographic coverage of 
Capstone services, all of which gradually change as Capstone is implemented. How 
these factors affect Capstone’s ability to prevent accidents is described for each of the 
                                            
16 Capstone Phase I avionics determines the aircraft altitude from the aircraft’s barometric encoder, and 
not from satellite positioning.  Latitude and longitude information is derived from the GPS. 
17 We have chosen the accident cause categories in this report to facilitate analysis of the potential impact 
of Capstone capabilities.  Therefore, they differ from categories used in other reports such as Nall. 
18 The full list of accidents, estimated percent of causes addressed and best expected prevention is 
included in appendix B. 
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accident categories below.  Bold portions of headings correspond to the labels on 
Figure 2-5; underlined ones are a direct focus of Capstone for which we can make 
quantitative projections of impact. 
Fuel 
Mismanagement 
Not a direct focus of Capstone, but these accidents are very 
dependent on safety posture of pilots and their companies.  Safety 
posture is influenced by Capstone as well as other safety initiatives. 
Mechanical 
Failure 
Not a direct focus of Capstone.  Some influence by company safety 
postures or improvements in maintenance facilities. 
Flight 
Information 
No impact in 2000-2001, but in-flight accidents in this category are a 
direct focus of Capstone.  We believe that accidents due to icing 
would have been preventable, if pilots had access to icing 
information.  When available, weather products that display icing 
information on maps will be particularly helpful.  NEXRAD19 
graphics, METARS, TAFs and AWOS information (as well as 
NOTAMs, PIREPs, and AWOS data over FIS-B20, when 
implemented) will contribute to safer operations, but we cannot 
assess the fraction of 1990-1999 accidents they would have 
prevented. 
Preventing accidents depends on the geographic coverage of FIS-
B, the availability of broadcast service, the availability of specific 
products (such as icing information), equipage of aircraft, the 
effectiveness of pilot training in accessing and interpreting weather 






We estimate (best possible case) that 90 percent of en-route CFIT 
accidents could be prevented if all aircraft were equipped with 
Capstone avionics and all pilots trained to use the equipment 
perfectly.  About 10 percent of en route CFIT accidents would occur 
regardless of these factors, because the pilots can’t always respond 
effectively to terrain warnings in low visibility, flat light, or white-out 
conditions.  In these cases, the pilot’s responses induce spatial 
disorientation and the pilot loses control of the aircraft.21   
                                            
19 NEXRAD is the weather service’s “Next Generation Radar”, which uses Doppler radar to show areas of 
active precipitation and software improvements to make better use of the radar information.  
20 Because the new AWOS stations installed by Capstone are not connected to the weather service’s 
system, information from those stations is not yet available over Capstone avionics.  Information from 
older AWOS stations is available over Capstone. 
21 Broadcast Services Evolution Path: Preventing Fatal GA Accidents by Market or FAA Services; 
Kirkman, Stock, Peed; MITRE Corporation, 2002.  This analysis estimated a 25% residual for fatal CFIT 
accidents by General Aviation pilots provided with terrain awareness capability.  Our assessment of 
accidents by YK Delta commercial pilots resulted in a smaller percentage because the pilots have higher 
experience levels, and experience many fewer spatial disorientation accidents than general aviation pilots. 
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For the other 90 percent of cases, the fraction of en route CFIT 
accidents and mistaken location accidents that Capstone might 
actually prevent depends on to the percent of aircraft equipped and 
the actual training level of pilots.  Assuming the effects are 














CFIT during approach and departure (TCF violations) is not directly 
addressed by the Phase I Capstone avionics, so we don’t estimate 
any prevention.  All types of navigation accidents could be 
influenced by changes in the pilot’s workload due to Capstone 
avionics and by changes in safety posture, but we do not have a 
basis for assessing this quantitatively.   
Traffic We estimate that Capstone could be 100 percent effective in 
preventing mid-air collisions by helping pilots be aware of aircraft 
around them, if both aircraft are equipped and both pilots trained to 
use the equipment perfectly. Most collisions occur in good visual 
conditions with many safe ways for pilots to avoid a collision.  So 
the percent of accidents prevented depends on the likelihood that 
the first aircraft is equipped, the likelihood that the second aircraft is 
equipped, and the training levels of the two pilots.  Again assuming 














Other aircraft include not only part-135 but also part-91, part-121, 
and public use aircraft with which a Y–K Delta part-135 aircraft 
might collide.22  We include the training effectiveness only for the 
pilot of the first aircraft in the equation, since typically if one aircraft 
takes evasive action the other aircraft does not need to.23  
Flight 
Preparation 
Not a direct focus of Capstone.  Accidents in this category reflect 
lapses in safety procedures by pilots and their companies.  
Improved safety practices may be influenced by Capstone and 
other safety initiatives. 
                                            
22 We calculate the effectiveness for 2000/01 by first multiplying the function describing the increase over 
time of the equipped portion of the Y-K Delta fleet times the function describing the increasing portion of 
all aircraft in the area that are equipped.  We then average the resulting function over the 2001/02 period. 
23 Because the pilot of either Capstone equipped aircraft could take action to avoid collision, we could 
refine this equation by replacing Training Effectiveness (TE) with 1-(1-TE)(1-TE).  In this report, the 
difference between the two equations is about 1/20th of one accident. 
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Take-off and 
Landing 
Not a direct focus of Capstone.  Likely influenced by skill and 
experience levels of pilots and the quality of runway maintenance.  
Wind information from AWOS or FIS-B may contribute to safer 
operations, but this could not be quantified from accident histories. 
Other Not a direct focus of Capstone.  Some accidents clearly could have 
been avoided with better pilot training and improved safety. 
The figures on the next page illustrate our analysis. The upper two charts in Figure 2-5 
(next page) show all Capstone area accidents from 1990–1999 (the inner pie of Figure 
2-4, upper left chart) and Capstone area fatal accidents 1990–1999 (outer ring of the 
same chart).  The outer rings in Figure 2-5 show selected detailed cause categories, 
highlighting those causes that Capstone could potentially prevent.  The lower two charts 
show the same information for Y-K Delta part-135 operators.  Note that the Capstone 
Area charts in Figure 2-5 expand on the information in the upper left chart of Figure 2-4; 
the Y-K Delta Part-135 pies expand on the information in the lower right chart from 
Figure 2-4.  Definitions of the detailed causes in Figure 2-5 are provided in Figure 2-6, 
page 21. 
There is little difference between the causes of all accidents and of fatal accidents for 
part-135 operations in the Y-K Delta and in the Capstone area as a whole—although  
Y-K Delta part-135 operations have somewhat higher fractions of accidents caused by 
navigation and flight preparation errors.  Visual differences between the fatal accident 
pies in Figures 2-5 are misleading.  With a total of only ten Y-K Delta part-135 fatal 
accidents, random differences resulting from a single accident appear large.  
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Figure 2-5.  Accidents and Fatal Accidents in the Capstone Area and  
of Y-K Delta Part 135 Operators, 1990-1999, by Detailed Cause 
 
Inner Pies show accidents by 9 major causes 
Black arcs indicates accident causes that are a focus of Capstone 
Outer rings breaks down selected causes into detailed causes 
Detailed cause definitions in box on following page 
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In Figures 2-7 and 2-8 (next page) we take the nine broad cause categories in Figure 2-
5 and combine them into seven, combining mechanical causes with other and flight 
preparation causes with fuel.  Figure 2-5 showed total accidents from 1990 through 
1999; Figures 2-7 and 2-8 show those accidents in annual averages rather than 
decade-long totals.  The standard deviation of the ten-year series for each type shows 
how much the number of accidents varies from year to year. 
The fraction of accidents that would be eliminated by a best-expected prevention 
(estimated as described above) is shown in green.  The residual (best expected being 
less than 100 percent) is shown in red.  Cause categories and sub-categories that new 
Capstone technologies don’t directly address are shown in gray. 
Fatal accidents average less than one per year; those small numbers, combined with a 
wide variation in the number of accidents from year to year, mean that it will be several 
years before a statistically significant change could be observed. Accidents from 
navigation problems are the category most likely to provide statistically significant 
changes in the number of accidents.  Other categories of accident may also be affected 
by Capstone, though we cannot make a projection from data in the baseline period.  
We discuss several such possibilities in the cause subsections. 
Figure 2-6.  Definitions of Detailed Cause Categories 
 
Flight Info:  
Weather= Accidents where the availability of weather information was a factor. 
Navigation: 
TCF = CFIT accidents that occur on approach or departure 
CFIT: Controlled Flight into Terrain accidents 
Map = pilot did not know aircraft’s location 
Traffic: 
Air_Air = mid-air collisions;  occasionally, collisions between moving aircraft on the ground 
Surface:  collisions on the ground 
Flight Prep: 
Wt_Bal = aircraft not loaded within weight and balance restrictions 
Take-off and Landing:  
Runw_cond= accidents related to runway conditions such as potholes, debris on the runway, etc 
Site= unisiual hazards of off-runway sites; 
Other: 
Taxi=collisions with objects (not a/c) while taxiing 
Maneuvering=typically, stalling the aircraft while maneuvering 
Spatial Disor.=loss of control due to pilot disorientation 
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Figure 2-7.  Average Annual Accidents, Fatal Accidents, and  
Best Expected Prevention, by Cause, in the Capstone Area, 1990-1999 
Capstone area, all FAR parts, all accidents/year with std-
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The gray “no direct impact” bars represent accidents with causes that Capstone does not address. This 
includes the lower gray portion of the navigation bars. The green “best prevention” areas show the number of 
accidents that we estimate Capstone might have prevented if fully implemented in the baseline period. The red 
“residual” area shows the number of potentially Capstone-preventable accidents we estimate would have 
occurred even with Capstone. The “I” lines centered on the top of each bar show one standard deviation of the 
ten-year series–and give an indication of how the number of accidents varies from year to year.  Typically, 
two-thirds of the annual counts fall within one standard deviation of the mean.   
Figure 2-8.  Average Annual Accidents, Fatal Accidents, and  
Best Expected Prevention, by Cause, Y-K Delta Part-135 Operators, 1990-1999 
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Figure 2-7 showed all accidents for the Capstone area; this figure looks only at accidents of Y-K Delta Part-
135 operators.  The gray “no direct impact” bars represent accidents with causes that Capstone does not 
address.  This includes the lower gray portion of the navigation bars. The green “best prevention” areas show 
the number of accidents that we estimate Capstone might have prevented if fully implemented in the baseline 
period. The red “residual” area shows the number of potentially Capstone-preventable accidents we estimate 
would have occurred even with Capstone. The “I” lines centered on the top of each bar show one standard 
deviation of the ten-year series–and give an indication of how the number of accidents varies from year to 
year.  Typically, two-thirds of the annual counts fall within one standard deviation of the mean.   
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For the Capstone area, our best-expected prevention estimate is that average annual 
accidents from navigation problems would have been about 1.3 accidents per year 
lower than observed in the baseline period; traffic accidents would have been about 0.8 
accidents per year lower.  Fatal navigation accidents would have been about 0.3 
accidents per year lower and fatal traffic accidents about 0.4 accidents per year lower 
(Figure 2-7). 
We would only have seen those reductions if all aircraft in the Capstone area had been 
equipped with new avionics, and if the ground infrastructure had served the entire area.  
The best-expected reduction for the operations and area actually affected by Capstone 
Phase I is lower, as Figure 2-8 shows.  Y-K Delta part-135 operators would have had 
0.9 fewer navigation and 0.3 fewer traffic-caused accidents per year; fatal accident 
averages in those categories would have declined by just 0.08 and 0.2 accidents per 
year.  
2.4 IFR Capability 
In the baseline period, the potential for IFR operations in the Y-K Delta was limited.  In 
the Capstone area, there were only seven airports equipped with instrument 
approaches.  Of the Y-K Delta airports that account for most of the traffic among our 
Capstone operators, there were only three airports with instrument approaches: Bethel, 
Aniak, and St. Marys.  Therefore, even if aircraft and operators were IFR-equipped and 
certified—and pilots certified and current—they were still restricted to VFR operations 
for most of their flights, since there was no way to make an IFR approach and landing if 
destination weather was below VFR minimums. Of the 27 Capstone area operators 
identified in the baseline report, 14 had VFR-only certificates. 
2.5 Safety Posture 
Training, maintenance, flight preparation, decision-making, and oversight are all 
indicators of the safety attitudes and practices of Capstone operators. Economic factors 
such as insurance and customer choices also affect safety posture. 
2.5.1 Training 
Initial and recurrent pilot training is central to safe flying.  Beyond basic piloting skills, 
pilots need to know the particular aircraft they are flying, and how it responds to the 
loads they carry. They need to be knowledgeable about a great variety of local 
conditions, including terrain, navigation and communication aids, airport facilities, and 
weather hazards. They need to be thoroughly familiar with both FAA and company 
regulations governing their operations. They need to understand how to function 
successfully in the local business environment as well. Some of this knowledge comes 
through formal training, but much is mastered only through experience. 
In the baseline period, some of the Capstone operators were large enough to have 
extensive written training programs; others were small one-pilot operations with little or 
no capacity to provide training internal to the company. Critical safety issues in the 
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Capstone area that operators would typically address in formal training would be taking 
off and landing on short, gravel runways and dealing with the weather hazards of the 
area (see Section 1 of this report and Chapters 3 and 7 of the baseline report). 
Pilots reported a mean of 53 hours of ground training and 34 hours of flight training in a 
wide variety of categories in the previous 14 months (see baseline report, Chapter 8). 
The importance of experience in addition to formal training was clear when pilots 
reported their greatest safety concern in the Y-K Delta: “Pilots not experienced in 
Alaska conditions” (baseline report, p. 46). 
2.5.2 Maintenance 
Well-maintained aircraft are another component of safe operations. As with training, 
Capstone operators in the baseline period ranged from those large enough to have 
extensive in-house maintenance down to one-pilot companies which took their aircraft 
to a local licensed A&P mechanic for required maintenance.  Nevertheless, the baseline 
analysis makes it clear that mechanical failures have not been a major source of 
accidents and especially not of serious accidents.  Of 155 accidents from 1990 through 
1999, only 28 included mechanical failure among their causes, and 23 of those resulted 
in no injuries (Figure 2-4). 
2.5.3 Oversight 
Federal aviation regulations are designed to ensure that aircraft have adequate 
maintenance, pilots have more than adequate rest and training, and operators provide 
more than adequate oversight of their operations.  Regulatory oversight contributes to 
safety by balancing the economic incentive operators have to try to do more with less. 
Chapters 5 and 6 in the baseline report discuss regulatory requirements, safety 
programs, and FAA oversight of Capstone operators.  Four of the larger operators fell 
completely or partially under FAR part 121; the rest flew exclusively under FAR part-
135.  The smallest part-135 operators had only minimal manual and personnel 
requirements. We found that FAA inspectors met most frequently with operators whose 
headquarters were in Anchorage or Fairbanks. Operators and pilots reported that 
Bethel facilities receive fewer visits, although inspectors do travel to Bethel as their time 
permits. Therefore, small operators headquartered in Bethel received less oversight 
than those with facilities in Anchorage and Fairbanks. Inspectors that we talked to rarely 
flew beyond Bethel to the smaller communities. Many of those villages are served only 
by smaller aircraft, with only one to five potentially paying seats. It would be a significant 
financial burden for the companies to transport non-paying inspectors in such small 
aircraft. 
2.5.4 Economics 
The economics of air carrier operations in the Y-K Delta are unforgiving. As described 
in the introduction, companies use very small aircraft to serve many scattered 
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destinations. The number of passengers traveling to any one destination (other than 
Bethel) is typically too low to support frequent service without some form of subsidy. 
One way the federal government has chosen to provide that subsidy is the “bypass 
mail” program—under which shippers, rather than the U.S. Postal Service, deliver mail 
directly to the air carrier. Shippers pay a subsidized rate to the Postal Service, which in 
turn pays carriers enough to cover their calculated cost of delivering the mail. This 
program is designed to enable participating air carriers to sell passenger tickets at the 
marginal—rather than the average—cost of transport.  By covering many of the fixed 
costs, air carriers can potentially keep passenger fares affordable. 
In the baseline period, operating costs in the Y-K Delta were pushed higher by rising 
insurance rates.  Alaska’s high accident rates and small insurance market combined to 
make participation less attractive to insurers.  As a result, only a few companies offered 
insurance to air carriers here, and they charged high rates.  Some air carriers chose to 
cease carrying passengers in order to reduce insurance costs.  
Taken together, these factors provided air carriers in the 1990s with economic 
incentives to cancel as few flights as possible, get as many flights out of each pilot and 
each aircraft as possible, and load aircraft as full as possible. 
2.6 Limitations of Baseline Data 
Data on air operations within the Capstone area are quite limited. As discussed in 
section 2.3 of the baseline study, departure and enplanement data collected by the U.S. 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) record only scheduled passenger and cargo 
flights. The only systematic data available for the Capstone area during the baseline 
period come from the APO Terminal Forecast Survey Summary Report from the FAA’s 
Aviation Policy and Plans Office.  The APO compiles historical traffic counts from FAA 
Form 5010, the airport master record. In Bethel, the air traffic controllers report the 
number of aircraft cleared for take-off or landing. At all other airports in the Capstone 
area, airport managers provide estimates of annual traffic counts; published data for 
Capstone airports are only available for 1999. We estimated annual departures by 
dividing the traffic counts by two. This method undercounts unscheduled air taxi and 
general aviation departures to and from off-airport locations. 
As described in section 4.6 of the Capstone baseline report, as of 1999 there were 22 
locations in the Capstone area with some level of weather reporting. Bethel was the 
only staffed full-time weather station in the area that provided continuous weather 
observations.  All the remaining sites that continuously reported weather were 
automated stations. There are several reasons why weather information available to 
pilots and for our baseline analysis was less complete than in most areas of the U.S. 
•  Distance between stations. The 22 locations were widely separated, typically at 
least 60 miles apart and often more than 100 miles.  In a region characterized by 
changing weather, widely separated stations can’t observe many localized 
conditions. 
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•  Lack of corroboration. In much of the continental U.S., automated observations 
are supplemented by other weather information, such as from Doppler radar and 
manned observations. In the Capstone area in the 1990s there was often no 
other source of information to help reconstruct local weather conditions when 
reported data for weather factors such as wind speed or visibility were missing or 
obviously invalid. 
•  Lack of interpretation. Current weather information, while useful, is greatly 
improved by interpretation in the context of how the weather is changing over 
time—that is, by local forecasts. In large, sparsely populated regions like the 
Capstone area, the National Weather Service makes a single forecast for a large 
area, characterizing general conditions but without the specifics needed to 
determine exactly where it is safe or dangerous to fly. 
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3 Evaluation of 2001 Safety Factors 
This section describes progress in implementing Capstone to date and Capstone’s 
effects on safety in the study area through 2001. Other factors besides Capstone also 
affect safety, and also consequently affect the risk of aircraft accidents from the various 
causes we analyzed in Section 2. So we also describe these other factors and discuss 
how we might distinguish their effects from those of the Capstone program. 
3.1 Infrastructure and Services 
Capstone has provided new infrastructure and services that support IFR and improve 
VFR operations in the Y-K Delta. These include AWOS installations, improved 
navigation, data-linked weather, and radar-like services in this non-radar environment. 
A “Brite” display for tower operators, flight following for operator management, and 
traffic information broadcast had not yet been implemented at the end of 2001. 
3.1.1 AWOS Stations and GPS Approaches 
As part of the Capstone program, nine airports have received AWOS weather reporting 
stations and associated GPS non-precision instrument approaches. Eight of the AWOS 
stations and one GPS approach were added during 2001.  One additional airport is 
scheduled for improvements in 2002. Table 3-1 summarizes these changes; Figure 3-1 
(next page) shows the locations of the new facilities in the Y-K Delta. 
Table 3-1.  Weather Stations and GPS Approaches  
Added in 2000 and 2001 
Airport AWOS GPS Approach 
Egegik Baseline 2001 
Holy Cross  2001 2000 
Kalskag 2001 2000 
Kipnuk 2001 2000 
Koliganek 2001 2000 
Mountain Village 2000 1999 
Pilot Point Planned Planned 
Platinum 2001 1999 
Russian Mission 2001 2000 
Scammon Bay 2001 2000 
St. Michael 2001 1999 
Source: FAA Capstone program, http://www.alaska.faa.gov/capstone/status.htm 
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Figure 3-1.  New AWOS Stations and GPS Approaches in the Y-K Delta 
 
The AWOS stations and GPS approaches are most useful to instrument operations, but 
they also provide helpful services to VFR flights.  Pilots flying between Bethel and 
airports with weather information and GPS approaches are less likely to encounter 
unexpected bad weather and more likely to be able to land safely if they do.  Even 
without the GPS approaches, the additional AWOS stations represent a real 
improvement in the weather data available to all Y-K Delta flight operations.   
In the baseline period, only eight weather stations in the Y-K Delta provided pilots with 
continuous weather information.24  The closest were about 60 miles apart; in many 
areas pilots would have to fly over 100 miles between weather stations.  As discussed 
in Chapter 7 of the baseline report, the Y-K Delta is a transition area between 
continental and maritime climates; the weather often changes rapidly as pilots travel 
toward the coast. The eight new weather reporting stations added under Capstone 
double the number of Y-K Delta reporting locations, and the distance between weather 
reporting stations along most typical flight routes is now less than 50 miles. 
Besides improving the available weather information, increasing the number of 
destinations to which IFR flights are possible also increases the potential return to 
operators if they develop IFR-capability.  It is expensive to equip aircraft and keep pilot 
                                            
24 The baseline report lists 22 weather reporting stations (page 33).  Of these, ten are outside the Y-K 
Delta, and four operate only to support military or large commercial flights, and thus are often unavailable.  
Bethel has a 24-hour National Weather Service office, and the remaining seven are AWOS or ASOS 
installations. 
100 miles 
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IFR training current; operators will make that investment only if they can recover those 
expenses through fewer cancelled flights (and so, more revenue).  Once operators 
make that investment, pilots flying VFR, rather than guess about deteriorating weather, 
can file and fly under IFR. 
To assess how much this new infrastructure contributes to safety in the Y-K Delta, we 
looked at how many more operations were served by the new equipment, compared to 
operations served by weather reporting and instrument approaches in the baseline 
period.  Bethel is often the origin or destination of operations; we excluded Bethel 
operations numbers so we could focus on operations served by weather reporting and 
instrument approaches at the non-Bethel end.   
We analyzed several sources of data: enplanements from 1995 through 1999; APO 
data from 1999 (the baseline operations data—airport managers’ estimates of traffic at 
their airports); and T-1 origin-destination passenger counts from 1995 and 1996 (which 
include scheduled service only).  None of these data provide an exact count of total 
flights into and out of the Y-K Delta; however, they all produced similar results. The 
number of operations into IFR-capable airports (excluding Bethel) increased by more 
than 75 percent as a result of the added AWOS stations and GPS approaches.  Figure 
3-2 shows the percent of air taxi and commuter operations at Y-K Delta airports 
(excluding Bethel) with IFR capability in the baseline period; where IFR capability was 
added in 2000 and 2001, and where all operations are still VFR only. 
About 40 percent of flights to small Y-K Delta communities could benefit from the IFR 
capabilities of the destination airports. Since not all aircraft are equipped or certified to 
fly IFR, fewer than that could actually fly IFR.  But because aircraft in the IFR fleet carry 
on average more passengers per flight than VFR-only aircraft, about 45 percent of the 
available seats to airports with IFR infrastructure are on IFR-capable aircraft. 
Figure 3-2.  Estimated Air Taxi and Commuter Operations to Y-K Delta Airports 












Source: APO operations data, 
Air Taxi Operations Estimates by Airport, 1999
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3.1.2 Data-link weather 
The flight information system–broadcast (FIS-B) function of the Capstone system is 
intended to provide aircraft with current weather information and forecasts. During 2000 
and 2001, this capability increased greatly, but this feature of Capstone Phase I was 
still not completely implemented at the end of 2001. Pilots’ access to up-link weather 
data is limited by the existence of few ground-based transceiver stations (GBTs). But 
even in areas served by GBT’s, pilots’ access to information is still affected by several 
factors: whether the GBTs are operating or are temporarily shut down for maintenance; 
if they are operating, whether the pilot is within radio line-of-sight of a station; and what 
weather products exist and are linked to the GBTs. 
In early 2000, there were no GBTs in the Y-K Delta; by July 2000, there were three, and 
by May 2001, there were five (as well as one in the Anchorage area). Figures 3-3 
(below) and 3-4 (next page) show the areas within which pilots flying at 1000’ (yellow) 
and 3,000’ (yellow plus red) were in radio line-of-sight of GBTs in July 2000 and May 
2001, and thus were able to access data-link weather. 
Figure 3-3.  Ground Based Transceiver Coverage, July 2000 
 
Yellow shows GBT coverage 
 at 1,000 feet altitude; 
 Red shows coverage 
 at 3,000 feet altitude 
Approx 100 mi 
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Figure 3-4.  Ground Based Transceiver Coverage, May 2001 
 
By mid-2001 there were GBTs in Bethel, Cape Newenham, Cape Romanzof, Aniak and 
St Marys, as well as at Site Summit outside Anchorage.  Additional installations are 
planned for Dillingham, King Salmon, Sparrevohn, Tatalina, and Unalakleet. 
Text weather (METAR and TAF) is available through the GBTs; graphic weather from 
Bethel weather radar (NEXRAD) was usually available by late 2001. One of the 
implementation difficulties was establishing a robust data connection from NOAA 
(which produces the NEXRAD data) to the GBTs for broadcast to aircraft. The Bethel 
airport radar covers most of the Y-K Delta.  However, because there is only one radar 
installation covering an area from several different directions—rather than the multiple 
installations typical for NEXRAD products in other states—bad weather may be 
obscured from the radar’s view, if there is precipitation directly between the area of bad 
weather and Bethel.  To interpret Bethel’s NEXRAD graphics, pilots have to do more 
analysis than they would with similar weather products elsewhere. 
The pilots and operators using the flight information system (FIS) report the following 
limitations and concerns. 
•  FIS does not yet have weather for the new AWOS III stations that were added as 
part of Capstone. Pilots can only get those weather data over the telephone 
before they take off, or by radio when the aircraft is near the AWOS.  When all 
Yellow shows GBT coverage 
 at 1,000 feet altitude; 
 Red shows coverage 
 at 3,000 feet altitude 
Approx 100 mi 
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the AWOS data becomes available en route, through FIS, pilots will be better 
able to use such data to decide what to do in changing weather conditions.  
•  FIS is only available when flights are in line-of-sight range of the Bethel GBT.  
When all the GBTs are brought on line this concern should be eliminated. 
3.1.3 Radar-like Services 
As mentioned above, flight below 6,000 feet in the Y-K Delta is in a non-radar 
environment.  The only radar coverage in the area is high-altitude coverage for long-
range jets, controlled from Anchorage Center.  Capstone’s traffic awareness function, 
which lets anyone with an ADS-B receiver see the locations and altitudes of Capstone-
equipped aircraft, brings the potential of “radar-like” services to the Y-K Delta.  
Controllers in Anchorage could use Capstone’s ADS-B feature to guide Capstone-
equipped aircraft just as they now use radar to guide aircraft over 6,000 feet.  This idea 
was successfully tested in January 2001. 
Few operators have used radar-like services since they became available. Capstone 
operators are accustomed to operating without air traffic control and have little 
motivation to change at this time. The greatest potential benefit of radar-like services for 
most Capstone operators would be to provide approach control to the Bethel airport—
and that service is not yet available. 
As more Y-K Delta part-135 operators upgrade their operations to become IFR-capable 
(see section 3.3.2), radar-like services for both en-route operations (currently available) 
and approach control (not yet implemented) will be more useful to them.  During the 
study period, both operator development and Capstone program implementation limited 
the use of radar-like services to only a few flights.  Until we see how Capstone 
operators use this capability, it’s impossible to estimate even the potential safety 
benefit. 
3.1.4 Tower Services and Approach Control 
Tower services are similar to radar-like services, except that the controllers are in the 
Bethel tower, rather than at the Anchorage Center.  Using a BRITE display, controllers 
can more easily acquire and track VFR and SVFR aircraft.  Approach control, if 
implemented at Bethel, could potentially allow air traffic controllers25 to use Capstone 
technology to space and sequence IFR or SVFR aircraft landing at Bethel. During times 
of special visual flight rules (SVFR) operations, controllers are both spacing the IFR 
aircraft and closing the Bethel airport Class D airspace to all VFR (including SVFR) 
traffic for the approach and departure of IFR flights.  While the average SVFR 
operational time26 is less than 10 minutes, the times vary from none to over an hour.  
                                            
25 Approach Controllers would not necessarily be located at the Bethel tower, but could be at Anchorage 
Center, Fairbanks, or some other location.  
26 “Operational time” in this context is the time from a pilot’s request for SVFR clearance to his time of 
landing. 
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Over 10 percent of SVFR traffic waits 20 minutes or more. When Capstone is fully 
implemented, air traffic controllers will be able to see both (1) traffic on radar and (2) 
ADS-B broadcasting traffic. They will not need to close the Class D airspace for as long 
a period as they now do for arriving IFR flights, and could potentially space SVFR flights 
more efficiently.  Both of these could shorten operational times.  These services, 
therefore, can improve efficiency for operators and provide the potential safety benefits 
described in Section 2.3.3, Traffic.  These services were not implemented in 2001, and 
the average SVFR operational times did not change from the baseline through 2001. 
In interviews, some smaller operators said they were concerned that if many larger 
operators move to IFR operations (see next section) before the Bethel tower is able to 
manage IFR and Capstone-equipped SVFR together, then the SVFR delays will 
increase. That’s because there would then be more IFR operations, which take 
precedence over SVFR operations into Bethel airport. 
3.1.5 Flight Monitoring 
The Capstone system potentially provides a way for Capstone operators to track their 
aircraft over the Internet, using PC software that would allow them to access ADS-B 
information at their operations base.  All operators we talked to would like to use that 
capability to improve management oversight of flight activities—but such flight 
monitoring was not yet implemented in 2001. 
3.1.6 TIS-B 
Traffic information system-broadcast (TIS-B) will send location data into the Capstone 
avionics for aircraft that are visible on radar.  The multi-function display (MFD) will then 
display aircraft visible on radar, as well as the ADS-B equipped traffic. One of the 
potential drawbacks of Capstone’s traffic display is that pilots may rely on the MFD to 
show all other aircraft, forgetting that some are not visible.  TIS-B will make one 
category of invisible aircraft—those on radar—visible, this improving the effectiveness 
of Capstone’s traffic awareness functions.  However, TIS-B was not yet operating at the 
end of 2001. 
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3.2 Avionics 

































Figure 3-5 shows the primary components of the airborne avionics system in Capstone 
Phase I: 
1. A GX50/60 GPS navigator:  The system is a non-precision IFR approach 
certified GPS receiver. The GX50/60 provides navigation in areas that are not 
served with traditional navigation aids such as VOR and NDB and provides 
route information, distance, and time remaining. The unit includes extensive 
information on routes, navaids, and airports; the GX50/60 also includes a 
720-channel communications radio. 
2. The MX20 Multi-Function Display (MFD), with: 
a. Terrain alerting and awareness provides a color-coded display of 
hazardous terrain in the area of the aircraft.  
b. Traffic alerting currently tells pilots the locations of other Capstone-
equipped aircraft relative to their aircraft.  When the TIS-B feature is 
implemented, it will also display the locations of aircraft visible to radar.  
c. Custom map provides a sectional-like display that can be customized 
to show route lines, airports, navaids and geographic features. 
d. Flight Information System displays METAR and TAF text weather. 
e. Weather displays NEXRAD weather radar. 
f. Flight plan allows the pilot to display and edit the active flight plan and 
also displays information such as runway diagrams and CTAF 
frequencies. 
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3. The UAT “box” or universal access transceiver.  This is the transmitter/receiver 
that communicates the ADS-B data link information between aircraft and from 
the aircraft to ground stations.  It also receives flight information and weather 
services from the ground stations and will receive TIS-B information when 
that feature is implemented. This 50-watt UHF transmitter reports the aircraft 
data at one-second intervals. 
3.2.1 Equipped Aircraft and Operations 
Capstone’s effectiveness depends on what fraction of flights take place in equipped 
aircraft.  This is especially true for the traffic functions, where both aircraft need to be 
equipped to “see” each other.  From January 2000 through the end of December 2001, 
the Capstone program equipped 138 aircraft, bringing the total equipped from 2 to 140.  
The blue line in figure 3-6 (next page) shows the percent aircraft being used in the Y-K 
Delta by part-135 operators that were Capstone equipped, by month27. We estimate 
that by December, 2001, this was about 85 percent.  On average over the study period, 
about 45 percent of aircraft operated by part-135 operators in the Y-K Delta were 
equipped with Capstone avionics. This percentage is not necessarily the same as the 
percentage of aircraft operations flown with an equipped aircraft. Capstone-equipped 
aircraft might have been used proportionally more (or less) than other aircraft.  
Data from the Bethel tower about SVFR operations are currently our best source of 
equipped vs. non-equipped operations data for Y-K Delta part-135 operators, and we 
believe these ratios are a good estimate for those companies’ non-SVFR operations as 
well. The data is less accurate for estimating the fraction of all operations that are 
Capstone-equipped. Our data show that Y-K Delta part-135 operators accounted for 90 
percent of SVFR operations in 2000 and 2001–4,877 of 5,408 total tower strips. 
However, part-91 operations normally have greater flexibility and are much more likely 
to choose not to fly in marginal weather. So SVFR data may under-represent the 
fraction of all operations that is flying under part 91, and over-estimate the fraction flying 
under part 135.   
We estimate the percent of SVFR flights that were Capstone-equipped from the aircraft 
identifier that controllers include on the “tower strip” that they create for each SVFR 
flight. Sometimes this is a company name and flight number, but often it is an N-
number—which allows us to identify whether the aircraft was Capstone-equipped on 
that date.28   
                                            
27 Four equipped aircraft belonged to public agencies, and nine more belonged to operators outside our 
target group of Y-K Delta part-135 operators.  It’s difficult to specify exactly the number of aircraft the Y-K 
Delta part-135 operators are actually using over time; however, even after accounting for these 13 aircraft, 
between 80 and 85 percent of the Y-K Delta part-135 fleet was Capstone-equipped by December 2001.  
28 This plot omits information from two dates.  The tower strips provided for 5/5/01 and 7/11/01 were 
actually strips from multiple dates over more than one month; the identified date was merely the beginning 
date of the group. Grouping such large numbers of operations (402 and 509, respectively) at the earliest 
date would have skewed the data towards earlier implementation than was the case. 
 Capstone Phase I Interim Safety Study, 2000/2001  
 Page 36  
The percentage of operations with equipped aircraft starts near zero (which makes 
sense, since only two aircraft were equipped in January 2000) and is about 80 percent 
in November and December 2001.  Through most of 2000, when relatively few aircraft 
were Capstone-equipped, SVFR operations show a consistently higher share of 
equipped aircraft than do the fleet numbers.  We have anecdotal evidence that pilots 
preferred to fly Capstone-equipped aircraft; this, combined with the SVFR operations 
data, indicates that when equipped aircraft were a relatively small share of the fleet they 
may have been flown more than non-equipped aircraft.   
However, in late 2000 and all of 2001, the equipped share of SVFR operations is 
sometimes higher and sometimes lower that the equipped share of the fleet.  Once 
equipped aircraft were common, they don’t appear to have been used more or less than 
non-equipped aircraft. By December 2001, when over 80 percent of the part-135 fleet 
had been equipped with the new avionics, the overall use in SVFR operations should 
also have been just over 80 percent. 
Figure 3-6.  Percent of Y-K Delta Part-135 Operators’ Aircraft  
that were Capstone Equipped, and  
Percent of their SVFR Operations Flown with Capstone-Equipped Aircraft 







Jan-00 Apr-00 Jul-00 Oct-00 Feb-01 May-01 Aug-01 Dec-01
Percent of YKD-135 Operators' a/c Equipped
 Percent of YKD-135 SVFR Operations Equipped
 
Sources: SVFR data – Bethel tower strips 
Number of Aircraft equipped: FAA Capstone Program Office 
Fleet Size: participating Capstone operators 
Section 3.3 assesses operation levels by FAR part in the Y-K Delta.  Part-91 operations 
make up about 30 percent of overall Y-K Delta operations. Almost no part-91 aircraft 
were Capstone-equipped in the interim evaluation period. Assuming that Y-K Delta part-
135 operations accounted for just under 70 percent of all Y-K Delta operations, then the 
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fraction of total operations comprised by equipped aircraft rose from zero to about 60 
percent from January 2000 to December 2001, and averaged about 35 percent. 
3.2.2 Training on Capstone Avionics 
Under contract with the FAA, the University of Alaska Anchorage’s Aviation Technology 
Division conducted train-the-trainer classes on Capstone avionics for participating 
operators. Those classes were designed to provide an instructor cadre and give 
Capstone operators the capability to provide “in-house” training for their pilots on the 
equipment. These classes were largely conducted in 2000. 
In 2001, the division contracted with Capstone operators (at their expense) to provide 
the Capstone portions of those carriers’ initial and refresher training programs. In 2001, 
air carriers hired the division to provide initial training for 127 pilots. In addition, the air 
carriers themselves have conducted numerous in house classes, including initial, 
recurrent and re-qualification training for their pilots. To provide additional support to 
carriers for their in-house training, the aviation technology division produced and 
distributed to Capstone participants a series of eight video training tapes that work with 
other training materials. 
The division also scheduled the use of Capstone simulators that air carriers can check 
out to conduct their in-house Capstone training. In 2001, the division documented that 
demand exceeded the four available simulators—so the FAA acquired two additional 
simulators to meet training needs. The six simulators now available (four VFR, and two 
IFR/VFR) meet the air carriers’ current training demands. 
Training is a key element in the effective use of Capstone equipment. Some operators 
and pilots in the Capstone area are concerned that (1) not all pilots receive adequate 
training to use the equipment, and (2) not all trained pilots apply their training to flight 
operations.   
Operators and pilots we surveyed generally agreed that Capstone training should 
include both initial and recurrent training; should include classroom, desktop simulator, 
and flight training; and should include flight checking. We asked Capstone pilots in the 
NIOSH survey how many hours of classroom training, classroom with desktop-simulator 
training, and flight training they had received.  The answers to those questions for pilots 
in Y-K Delta Part 135 operations are summarized in Figure 3-7 (next page).  
We interviewed 106 pilots who flew Capstone-equipped aircraft.  Of those, 101 flew for 
Y-K Delta Part-135 operators.  Pilots were drawn in two samples: a random sample of 
40 pilots selected as part of the NIOSH survey, and 61 in a sample of convenience—
that is, all the Capstone operator pilots we could contact during a set period, including 
many contacted during training. Because we contacted many of the pilots at Capstone 
training sessions, were concerned about a potential bias towards pilots with Capstone 
training.  So we compared the random sample pilots with those in the convenience 
sample. The convenience sample did report significantly more classroom and 
classroom/simulator training than did pilots in the random sample; however, pilots in the 
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random sample reported significantly more hours of flight training than those in the 
convenience sample.   There was no significant difference when we looked at total 
training hours.  Therefore, we believe that our total sample of 106 pilots accurately 
represents overall Capstone training among all pilots flying Capstone-equipped aircraft.  
Figure 3-7  Type and Hours of Training on Capstone Avionics  











































Over half of all pilots answering our survey reported no hours of classroom-only training; many of those 
did have classroom –with-simulator training.   When we add each pilots’ hours of different types of training 
together, 18 percent reported no formal training of any type; another 8 percent had 4 hours or less of 
training; 40 percent had 9 or more hours of training. 
Training levels ranged from none up to several days of classroom/simulator training 
supplemented by one-half to one day of flight training.  We summarized the training 
levels of Capstone pilots employed by YK Delta part-135 operators by sorting them into 
five training levels and estimating an effectiveness rating for each of the levels.  A 100 
percent effectiveness would mean that the pilot would always use the equipment 
perfectly, in every instance where it could be useful.  Fifty percent effectiveness would 
mean that over time, we expect that the pilot would avoid 50 percent of the accidents 
and incidents where Capstone avionics could theoretically be useful.  Zero percent 
effectiveness would be the same as leaving the avionics turned off.29  Table 3-2 (next 
page) shows the definitions of each training level and the effectiveness assigned to 
each.   
                                            
29 Leonard Kirk estimated effectiveness levels based on classroom assessments, self-reports, and 
observations and interviews in the field.  These assessments draw on models of learning and 
effectiveness in Human Factors in Flight, Chapter 9; Frank H. Hawkins; Ashgate Publishing Limited; 1993, 
and in the FAA’s advisory circular AC 60-14; Aviation Instructors Handbook; U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington D.C.  
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Table 3-2  Training Levels and Their Estimated Effectiveness 
Level Description Effectiveness 
0 No formal Capstone training  25% 
1 Up to 12 hours of classroom training but less than 4 hrs of 
classroom/simulator training; up to than 1 hr of  flight training 40% 
2 More than 4 hours classroom or classroom/simulator training 
and up to 1 hr flight training  
50% 
3 More than 1 hr flight training but less than 4 hours classroom or 
classroom/simulator training 
60% 
4 More than 1 hr flight training and more than 4 hours classroom 
or classroom/simulator training 
90% 
Ninety percent effectiveness means that when a highly trained pilot encounters a situation in which the 
Capstone avionics could potentially help avoid an accident, nine out of ten times the pilot will use the equipment 
effectively to avoid the accident.  Twenty-five percent effectiveness means that an untrained pilot using 
Capstone might be able to avoid an accident in one of four situations where Capstone avionics could potentially 
help avoid an accident. 
Figure 3-8 (next page) shows the distribution of YK Delta Part-135 pilots by training 
level, the estimated effectiveness of each training level, and an estimated average 
effectiveness for Capstone pilots. The width of each bar is the percentage of pilots 
reporting each training level (for example, 18 percent of pilots reported no training; 13 
percent of pilots reported training level 4). The height is the estimated effectiveness of 
their Capstone use, given the training they received; the average line represents the 
average effectiveness of Capstone pilots taken as a group.  As we discussed above, 
our sample may be biased towards trained pilots, and so this average may be 
somewhat high.  However, using the sub-sample of pilots who were chosen through 
random sampling gives a slightly different training distribution, but the aggregate 
estimate is within one percentage point of the 51 percent that we derive with the full 
sample. 
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Figure 3-8.  Percent of Surveyed Y-K Delta Part 135 Pilots 
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The height of each bar is drawn from Table 3-2; the width (specified in the bars) shows the percent 
of pilots whose reported types and hours of training indicated that they were at each training level.  
The 51 percent line is the weighted average training level across all surveyed pilots.   
3.2.3 Usability of Capstone Avionics 
“Usability” measures how easily pilots can use the equipment to accomplish the tasks it 
was designed for and to evaluate the equipment’s effect on cockpit workload. Usability 
of the Capstone equipment is critical: a piece of equipment that is difficult to use may 
not deliver the safety benefits it was designed for. Further, a piece of equipment that 
becomes a distraction or causes too much heads-down time in the cockpit could 
actually decrease safety.  
We assessed the usability of Capstone avionics through surveys, observation flights, 
and simulator demonstrations. Two surveys administered by UAA (the pilot baseline 
survey in the fall of 1999 and the Capstone module of the NIOSH operator and pilot 
surveys in the winter of 2001/02) included usability questions. These two surveys were 
supplemented with key informant interviews, some of which covered usability issues. In 
2000 and 2001, two additional surveys, focused primarily on usability, were developed 
and administered by the FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI), Wichita 
Certification Office, and VOLPE Transportation Systems.  Some pilots participating in 
usability surveys also took researchers on observation flights or had them observe 
simulator training to demonstrate the equipment in use. These surveys, interviews, and 
observations took place primarily in Bethel. 
Many users reported initial difficulties with some Capstone features, especially flight 
planning.  However, with training and experience they reported becoming proficient—at 
least with the functions they use regularly.  In actual flights and simulators, pilots were 
able to display traffic and terrain information without difficulty or excessive heads-down 
time. But even with functions they used frequently, pilots wanted fewer required button 
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pushes—for example, they wanted to move between the terrain and the custom map 
modes, or the traffic page and map pages, with only one push of a button.  Pilots with 
ground and flight training followed by 20 or more hours of operating experience 
demonstrated little difficulty using the equipment, although both surveys and interviews 
indicate that the flight planning function is difficult to use, even for IFR flight and two-
pilot operations. 
Pilots with less training or experience tended to use the equipment in much more 
limited ways.  For example, many pilots, especially those with limited training, simply 
circumvent the flight planning function by using either the “nearest” or “direct-to” 
capability of the GX-60.   
In summary, Capstone avionics is certainly usable enough to provide safety benefits but 
many pilots would prefer it be easier to learn and use. And to get the full safety benefit, 
pilots must have adequate training—including ground training using a simulator and 
flight training in a Capstone-equipped aircraft. 
3.3 Operations 
We made a major effort in 2001 to explore and develop different ways of establishing 
the denominator information we need—that is, the amount of flying in the Capstone 
area.  
In the baseline report, we used the APO Terminal Forecast Survey Summary Report 
from the FAA’s Aviation Policy and Plans Office. This report uses historical data on 
traffic counts from FAA Form 5010, the airport master record.  These counts are the 
only systematic data available for the Capstone area; however, in rural Alaska they 
represent estimates from airport managers rather than systematically collected data.  In 
addition, airport managers have incentives to overestimate airport activity—in order to 
qualify for more state funding.  UAA is not satisfied that these data represent a reliable 
count of aviation activity. 
The FAA’s General Aviation and Air Taxi Activity and Avionics Survey (GA Survey) 
annually collects detailed information on the activities of a sample of aircraft in Alaska.  
If it were possible to identify which aircraft in the survey belong to Capstone operators, 
the survey could provide a measure of scheduled and unscheduled aircraft use to 
compare with the form 5010 data.  Our review of the usefulness of this information 
included exploring ways of potentially identifying Capstone aircraft and a review of the 
sampling and survey procedures. 
Accidents and accident rates provide one measure of aviation safety; there are many 
other factors we can measure that indicate levels of safety in Alaska.  So a simple 
comparison of accident rates will not accurately measure Capstone’s effect on aviation 
safety. Certain types of accidents—those on take-off and those caused by mechanical 
failures—will be unaffected Capstone improvements.  Others—primarily landing 
accidents—might be reduced by Capstone’s better weather reporting and new GPS 
approaches. But any reduction might also be the result of other factors unaffected by 
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Capstone’s infrastructure improvements.  Capstone should have its greatest direct 
effects on controlled-flight-into-terrain accidents and mid-air collisions. 
3.3.1 Operations Levels 
Figure 3-9 shows enplanement data for the Y-K Delta from 1990 to 2000 and a 
projection for 200130.  These data cover part-135 operators based in the Y-K Delta.  Air 
taxis are likely to be undercounted, because reporting is voluntary for air taxi operators.  
We regard the enplanements data as the most reliable and accurate measure of part-
135 activity. We projected 2001 levels in the Y-K Delta based on increased 
enplanements in Aniak, Emmonak, St. Marys, and Bethel and on by-pass mail data for 
Bethel. 
Figure 3-9.  Enplanements of Y-K Delta Part-135 Operators 
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Total
Aniak, Emmonak, St. Marys, Bethel
 
Notes: "Total 2001 enplanements" is an estimate based on change in four regional hubs. 
Source: FAA, data from form 28C 
Because there are no general aviation data equivalent to part-121 operations’ 
enplanements data, we don’t have complete enplanement information for the Capstone 
area.  We used data from the APO Terminal Area Forecast to estimate part 121 and 
general aviation and for area-wide activity of part-135 operators.  These data are less 
reliable than the enplanements data.31  Figure 3-10 (next page) presents operations 
levels in the Capstone area based on these data. The 2001 numbers are projections. 
                                            
30Enplanement data from FAA Airport Planning, at  http://www2.faa.gov/arp/planning/stats/ 
31 For airports with control towers, controllers report the number of aircraft cleared for takeoff or landing. 
For airports without towers, which include all the airports in the Capstone area except Bethel, airport 
managers estimate the annual traffic counts.  The numbers for non-tower airports are clearly estimates 
and don’t change from year to year.  These data are not very accurate. 
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We estimate that annual average part-135 operations in the Capstone area were 35 
percent greater in 2000–2001 than the average of operations from 1990 to 1999.  We 
estimate all operations (part-135 and other) increased 17 percent.  
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Source: FAA TAF data from form 5010 
 
Figure 3-11 (next page) shows operations in the Y-K Delta from 1990 through 2001.  
Again, the data is from the APO Terminal Area Forecast estimates made by airport 
managers.  The raw data indicates declining part-91 operations, driven by a reported 87 
percent drop in part-91 operations at Bethel–which is inconsistent with all our other 
sources of data, including part-91 SVFR operations at Bethel and part-91 operations at 
other nearby Y-K Delta airports.  
Therefore, for our analysis we have projected Y-K Delta part-91 operations as level 
since 1997 (shown as the dotted line in Figure 3-11) and adjusted figures that include 
part-91 operations accordingly. Part-135 operations have risen by an average of eight 
percent annually since 1996.  Part-121 operations have risen by less than one percent 
annually.  We estimate that part-135 operations in just the Y-K Delta were 40 percent 
higher in 2000-01 than the average from 1990-99. 
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Air Carriers 
Commuters, Air Taxis and part 135 flying as 91 
General Aviation
General Aviation projected @ 1997 level
 
Source: FAA (2002) Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) http://www.apo.data.faa.gov  (7/12/02) and 
author estimates 
3.3.2 IFR Capable Operations 
Three components of the Capstone program make IFR operations easier for Capstone 
area operators.  First, the GX50/60 avionics installed in the aircraft can be used as part 
of an IFR instrumentation system. Second, the program has installed AWOS III weather 
stations and published associated GPS non-precision approaches at nine airports in the 
Capstone area. The FAA selected these airports for weather stations and approaches 
based on input from the Capstone user group; they are among the busiest in the Y-K 
Delta. Third, the FAA is working toward using the Capstone avionics’ ADS-B 
component to provide “radar-like” services for aircraft throughout the Capstone area. 
These improvements are changing the mix of part-135 aircraft and how they are being 
operated in the Bethel area.  A number of Capstone operators are in the process of 
obtaining IFR authority.  Table 3-3 (next page) shows estimated growth in the number 
of aircraft that have become IFR legal as a result of Capstone Phase I.  The number 
increased from 8 at the start of 2001 to 22 by the end of the year; we project the 
number will grow to 41 by the end of 2002. These aircraft meet four criteria. They are: 
(1) of a type that can be IFR certified; (2) equipped with Capstone avionics that can be 
used as part of the aircraft’s IFR instrumentation; (3) belong to an IFR-certified air 
operator; and (4) fly in and out of Bethel. These are the aircraft that are most likely to 
use radar-like services, and the growth in the number of these aircraft parallels the 
growth of IFR-capable aircraft overall in the Y-K Delta. 
The 41 aircraft represent a total of 90 scheduled arrivals per day at Bethel from 
Tuesday through Saturday and 20 flights per day on Sunday and Monday.32  By June 1, 
2002 there could be as many as 490 flights per week with the potential to use ADS-B 
radar-like services. 
                                            
32 Sunday and Monday schedules are limited due to mail distribution. 
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Table 3-3.  Current and Projected Number of ADS-B IFR Legal Aircraft  
for FAR 121 or 135 operations at Bethel Airport 
 Bethel 




Status during 2001 
January 01, 2001 2 6 8 
November 28, 2001 12 8 20 
December 31, 2001 14 8 22 
Forecast 
June 01, 2002 31 10 41 
* Aircraft remains overnight in Bethel and Bethel is its primary base of operations 
** Aircraft flies to Bethel daily or weekly as part of Capstone operations  
The ability to operate under IFR in most of the Y-K Delta is very new.  There are no 
data that would allow us to assess the historical safety differences between IFR and 
VFR operations in the delta.  One possible approach is to look at the change in part-
135 accident rates nationwide when new regulations changed the characteristics of the 
part-135 fleet.  In 1997, new rules published under 14 CFR part 119 took effect, moving 
many of the more sophisticated part-135 operations with larger IFR-capable aircraft into 
part-121.  Figure 3-12 (next page) shows the U.S. accident rates for part-135 commuter 
operations from 1990 through 2001.  With the 1997 shift of many operators from part-
135 to part-121, the number of part-135 commuter (scheduled service) hours dropped 
by 80 percent and the accident rate climbed.  While the rate varies by year, it has 
consistently been much higher than before 1997.  Since the regulations governing the 
operations that remained in part-135 had not changed significantly, the higher accident 
rates may indicate that the smaller VFR-only aircraft remaining in part-135 had higher 
accident rates all along—but those higher rates were obscured before 1997 by 
averaging them with accident rates among the larger, safer aircraft that subsequently 
moved into part-121. 
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Figure 3-12.  Flight Hours and Accidents per 100,000 Flight Hours 





















































Source: NTSB; www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Stats.htm, Table 8. 
Applying these national rates to the Capstone area is problematic, because there are 
many differences between the aircraft and operations affected by part-119 and the Y-K 
Delta aircraft that are moving toward IFR capability.  Not only are accident rates 
different, but aviation operations and accident causes in southwest Alaska also differ 
from national averages.  However, these NTSB data at least indicate that more capable 
and more sophisticated equipment may result in fewer accidents and fatalities. 
3.4 Safety Posture 
As we’re defining the term here, “safety posture” for flights in the Y-K Delta is the total 
environment affecting aviation safety—including not only practices of pilots and 
operators, but also public policies and market forces. Some of the factors contributing 
to that environment are human factors, pilot training, aircraft maintenance, FAA 
oversight, operator management, economics, and industry initiatives. All these are part 
of an inter-related system, affecting and being affected by the Capstone program. 
Operators set the bounds and provide the motivation for pilots to conduct safe flights, 
within the context of both regulatory oversight (which pressures them to improve safety) 
and economic factors (which pressure them to get the job done at the least cost). 
Economic pressures are varied, including all sources of revenue (mail, passengers, and 
freight) and costs (aircraft, training, maintenance, and insurance). Pilots can feel 
economic pressure on their operators, and that can make them feel pressured to take 
larger risks. 
We need to track and (insofar as possible) quantify changes in safety posture for two 
reasons. First, changes unrelated to Capstone may cause accident rates to increase or 
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decrease. We don’t want to mistakenly attribute to Capstone changes that are actually 
caused by other factors. Second, the Capstone program may affect safety posture and 
indirectly affect accident rates (again, rates may increase or decrease). We want to 
identify and if possible quantify any indirect safety effects of the Capstone program. 
We measured the safety posture in the Capstone area by interviewing pilots and 
operators, examining relevant data, and making ground and in-flight observations of 
facilities, equipment, and personnel. Operators and pilots—the primary source of 
Capstone assessments—have increasingly cooperated with our efforts to collect data 
on human factors that affect safety. This increased cooperation provides us with an 
opportunity not only to measure opinions and attitudes, but also to identify safety issues 
and possible solutions and to evaluate Capstone’s effectiveness more broadly than we 
could by just relying on the aircraft accident rate as an indicator.  
3.4.1 Human Factors 
Air travel, like other means of transportation, involves inherent risks; safe flight involves 
risk management. Of the many factors involved in aviation safety, human factors 
ultimately determine whether a flight ends safely or results in an accident. Figure 3-13 
(next page) illustrates the relationship among the various factors affecting whether the 
pilot avoids a preventable accident. 
The pilot—who is ultimately responsible for risk management—uses the information 
and resources available to respond to the situation, making decisions and taking 
actions that are based on the perceived risk. The pilot brings to the situation knowledge 
and skills (gained through training and experience) as well as judgment—all of which 
are affected by the pilot’s attitude toward risk. Carlton E. Melton, a human factors 
consultant, points out that, “risk taking can overrule the basic instinct for survival ... the 
best pilots know that the essence of safety in flight is ... in taking no unnecessary 
chances.”33 
This axiom has not changed, and it defines the two extremes of pilot attitude toward 
risk: pilots who are inclined to avoid unnecessary risks and prepare for and manage the 
necessary risks; and pilots who see “necessary risks” as whatever it takes to get the job 
done on schedule. Capstone equipment may help the first group reduce accident risk—
but it could also help the second group push the envelope and ultimately increase risk. 
While safety can’t be installed in the instrument panel or mandated, pilots can use 
accurate, current, and integrated information (such as that provided by Capstone 
avionics) to support more informed decisions in managing risk. As discussed in Section 
2, Capstone equipment helps pilots make decisions through improved terrain and traffic 
awareness, more accurate navigation, and other flight information. However, other 
human factors may limit Capstone’s helpfulness. 
                                            
33 Melton, Carlton E., “Can Human Error be Eliminated,” FAA General Aviation News, July-August 1987. 
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 Situational  Information Training/ Pilot  
 Factors  Experience Factors 
 Weather Weather reports Capstone training Attitude towards risk taking 
Runway Conditions Communications Other training Decision making skills 
 Navaids Dispatch/flight following Flight Experience Judgment 
 Terrain ARTC Alaska experience Opinions 
 Traffic Terrain Awareness  Confidence level 
  Traffic displays  Stress level 
    Fatigue 
     
 
This model was adapted from human factors models developed by Dr. Judith Orisano and Dr. Jon 
Holbrook, 2002, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA. 
NTSB investigations have concluded that “pilot error” either causes or contributes to 
approximately 75 percent of aircraft accidents. Pilot error refers to one or more of 15 
factors the NTSB has identified:34 
•  Excessive workload (task overload) •  Physical impairment 
•  Improper decision •  Physical strength overload 
•  Improper use of equipment/aircraft •  Spatial disorientation 
•  Improper use of procedure •  Visual/aural detection 
•  Physiological condition •  Use of unapproved medication/drug 
•  Correcting lenses not worn •  Psychological condition 
•  Fatigue •  Qualification 
•  Incapacitation  
                                            
34 NTSB, Aviation Coding Manual, 1998  
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All these factors can reduce (or negate) Capstone’s usefulness and contribute directly 
or indirectly to accidents.  For example, in investigating the April 2001 CFIT crash of a 
Capstone-equipped aircraft, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded that 
the pilot prevented the avionics from accurately relating the aircraft’s altitude relative to 
terrain. That action, along with other errors, resulted in a CFIT accident. 
Also, some pilots use personal identification names or disable the ADS-B to avoid being 
identifiable on other Capstone displays, on companies’ flight monitoring displays, or by 
the FAA. This reflects some pilots’ continuing concerns that Capstone information could 
be used as a basis for issuing violations. 
Respondents to the Capstone module of NIOSH safety survey were asked why pilots 
might choose not to use the capabilities of Capstone avionics. Comments from 61 pilots 
are summarized below.  
1. Monitoring too closely by: 
a. FAA enforcement   38 (62%) 
b. Company     8 (13%) 
c. Other aircraft     2 (3%) 
2. Lack of knowledge or training   3 (5%) 
3. Shifting between Capstone   
and non-Capstone aircraft    3 (5%) 
4. Equipment design and reliability   2 (3%) 
5. Instrument panel location    1 (2%) 
6. Resistance to change    1  (2%) 
7. Cost to maintain after test period   1 (2%) 
8. Don’t need it      1 (2%) 
3.4.2 Training 
Training—critical to the proper use of any equipment—is an essential part of flight 
safety posture. Proper training includes training in all aspects of flight operations and in 
the use of tools like those provided by Capstone. 
Training pilots to make safe decisions needs to include both the use of the tools and 
the interpretation of the information those tools provide. In the Capstone area, some 
operators have expanded their training to include making weather and airport go, no-go 
decisions. Other operators have kept their training at the FAA-required minimum. 
3.4.3 Maintenance 
Since January 2000, four Bethel operators have expanded their existing facilities or 
constructed new facilities to accommodate indoor aircraft maintenance. In the past, 
hangar space was limited, and often so much mail was stored in hangars that there was 
no room to park aircraft or do maintenance. It’s much easier to do pre-flight checks on 
aircraft parked inside and potential problems are easier to spot.  Maintenance is more 
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likely to be thorough and unhurried—especially compared with maintenance done 
outside in sub-zero, windy weather. These improvements potentially affect about 50 
aircraft, or about 33 percent of the part-135 aircraft fleet in the Y-K Delta. The improved 
maintenance and appearance of the aircraft and facilities could also contribute to a 
more professional pilot attitude; we will look for evidence of this in our continuing 
human factors research.  
3.4.4 FAA Oversight 
FAA oversight helps pilots and operators resist economic or other pressures to shortcut 
regulations; it also helps keep them up-to-date about regulatory changes and to 
understand exactly what is required.  Our surveys and interviews have not revealed any 
evidence that the level of oversight has changed since the baseline period—or, at least, 
operators don’t perceive any change.  Operators who in the baseline period expressed 
the belief that inconsistent or lax oversight allowed their competitors to operate unsafely 
have repeated those assertions in more recent interviews.  They maintain that some 
operators fly in conditions not permitted by their operations specifications or the FARs.  
Specifically, they assert that some operators fly in weather conditions below VFR 
minimums, enabling them to deliver mail more quickly than operators who keep to the 
regulations. This gives unsafe operators a market advantage with the U.S. Postal 
Service, which is the largest single customer in the region.  Several operators in the 
Capstone area have expressed a desire for increased FAA enforcement of visual flight 
rules that would “level the playing field” and contribute to safer operations. 
The FAA could also contribute to improved safety through training oversight. Training 
levels are inconsistent from operator to operator.  Pilots and operators we interviewed 
expressed concerns about inadequate training in the use of Capstone, in instrument 
proficiency, and in weather interpretation. 
3.4.5 Operator Management 
Management oversight has increased in the Capstone area.  Four of the largest 
Capstone operators we surveyed reported that they have implemented formal risk 
management tools for their release decisions. These typically include a structured 
decision chain, starting with the pilot and including others such as the dispatcher, chief 
pilot, and senior management, depending on the conditions of the specific flight.   
Two other management improvements that may affect safety are (1) use of FAA- 
certificated aircraft dispatchers in the decision-making role for part-135 operations and 
(2) operational-control training for management teams.  Finally, operators reported in 
both open-ended survey responses and in interviews that they believe the addition of 
flight-monitoring capability using Capstone’s ADS-B will improve their management 
oversight. 
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3.4.6 Economics 
As discussed in Section 2, economic pressures can increase or decrease safety. The 
two most important economic factors in rural Alaska (and not just the Capstone area) 
are the U.S. Postal Service and insurance rates. There have been no changes in postal 
rules since the baseline period, although Congress is currently considering new rules. 
Insurance rates, however, have increased.  Alaska’s high accident rate and generous 
claims settlements have led many underwriters to avoid the Alaska market. Those who 
do write insurance for Alaska carriers charge especially high rates to those who carry 
passengers, so some operators have stopped carrying passengers and instead carry 
mail and cargo only.  Other operators have moved toward twin-engine and turbine-
power aircraft, which cost more to operate but less to insure.  Of the 155 operators we 
surveyed (statewide), 107 reported that their insurance rates had increased since early 
2000.  The increases ranged from 1 to 350 percent, with an average of 23 percent.  
Some operators see Capstone as part of a process that, together with training and 
other efforts to improve safety, will help reduce their insurance costs. Insurers vary their 
rates due to perceived risk (passenger, type of aircraft, pilot qualifications and accident 
history). 
Passenger choices may also improve Y-K Delta safety, if passengers are willing to pay 
more for to fly with safer operators.  According to Capstone pilots we interviewed, 
passengers are selecting airplanes with the “Capstone” logo on the side. The 
passengers like the airplanes with the “TV” and perceive they are in an aircraft that is 
safer. (More data is needed to determine the magnitude of this trend, which would tend 
to give an advantage to carriers with Capstone-equipped aircraft.) 
In addition (as described by travel planners for larger organizations), some travelers are 
willing to pay a higher fare to ride on safer aircraft. Some corporate travel offices put 
their passengers in the Y-K Delta on twin-turbine aircraft with two-pilot crews to gain a 
safety benefit, even though fares for this class of aircraft are higher.  All these twin-
turbine, two-pilot aircraft are now Capstone equipped. One Y-K Delta air carrier will not 
carry passengers on single-engine aircraft.  
3.4.7 Industry Initiatives 
The Alaska Air Carriers Association has initiated a comprehensive, voluntary program 
that is intended to raise the standard of operational safety for commercial carriers 
throughout the state.  That program is based on safety-risk assessment programs of 
individual companies and other operator initiatives. It will be administered by a new 
entity, the Medallion Foundation.  The foundation’s director, Jerry Dennis, has said “We 
will be advocating for a safety culture, working with other fine programs like the FAA’s 
Capstone Program.  The chief purpose will be to create an industry program which will 
establish high standards for safety and lower accident rates.” 
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Under the Medallion program, carriers will be evaluated by the foundation’s safety 
personnel in five areas and will receive a star for each area they complete. They will 
receive a Medallion award when they complete all five steps. 
Of the 16 air carrier applicants for entry into the Medallion Program at the end of 2001, 
8 are Capstone operators. The Medallion Foundation received funding in 2002 to 
assemble a staff and begin evaluating carriers. This process is to be ongoing; those 
carriers that meet the standard for stars may receive them within a few months.  
3.5 Limitations of Ongoing Data Collection 
This section briefly discusses limitations of four critical types of data that we use to 
evaluate 2000-2001 safety improvements in this report. These are weather, accident 
reporting, and air operations data, as well as data from operator and pilot surveys. 
3.5.1 Weather Data 
Section 2.6 discusses limitations of weather data during the baseline period. More 
recent weather data is subject to the same limitations. While the Capstone program 
installed nine new weather reporting stations in the region, the weather data recorded at 
these new stations is not being archived at the National Climate Data Center or Alaska 
state climate centers. This means that the data collected at these new stations were not 
available for analysis in this safety study. 
3.5.2 Accident Reporting 
Often there is a significant delay between when an aircraft accident occurs and when 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) completes its investigation of the 
cause. For serious accidents, especially ones involving fatalities, the NTSB may take 
more than a year to reach its final determination. For some accidents occurring in 2001, 
our analysis is based on preliminary assessments that could change. 
Often the NTSB determines that multiple factors played a part in a given accident. This 
may complicate the task of projecting whether Capstone program components might 
have been able to prevent a particular accident. In accidents with multiple causes, one 
which is Capstone-related and others which are not, we must use professional 
judgment to determine the relevance of Capstone—and such determinations are 
inevitably somewhat arbitrary. 
3.5.3 Operations Data 
Operations data are critical to assessing whether the pattern of accidents over time 
measures a change in accident rates or hazards or whether it simply follows a change 
in scale of operations. Section 2.6 discusses limitations of operations data and weather 
data during the baseline period. These limitations apply as well during the evaluation 
period. In particular, we note that the Bethel tower data provide the only systematic 
information—a traffic count—on total activity over time. We note in section 3.3.1 that 
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the APO traffic data from the Bethel tower over the period 1999-2001 appears 
inconsistent with other sources of related data35.  There is no way to reconcile these 
conflicting data sources, and we cannot explain the discrepancies. In the end, we must 
make a judgment call on the balance of the evidence. 
3.5.4 Survey Data 
The data on operator and pilot characteristics, as well as information on pilot 
experience with Capstone avionics, are drawn from interviews with a sample of 
operators and pilots. Survey data of this kind contain four potential sources of error: 
sampling error, sample selection bias, response bias, and non-response to certain 
questions. Sampling error describes the potential discrepancy between the survey 
estimates and true values, based on the fact that only a portion of the population was 
interviewed. Appendix F describes the survey sampling procedure and sampling errors 
for operators and pilots. Sample selection bias occurs when some survey respondents 
are systematically more likely than others to be included in the sample. The operator 
and general pilot surveys were stratified random samples, so they do not have a 
selection bias. However, the Capstone usability survey employed a different sampling 
protocol, with additional pilots being interviewed in person at the Bethel airport—so 
pilots of some Capstone operators may be more likely to be included in the survey than 
those of other operators. 
Response bias occurs if some types of operators or pilots are systematically more likely 
than others to respond to the survey. Survey responses rates, as described in Appendix 
F, were quite high—over 70 percent—so there is relatively little room for response bias 
to affect the results of these surveys. Finally, missing or invalid survey responses to 
individual questions show up as missing values in the survey data. For most questions, 
missing values represented only a small fraction of the responses—no more than five to 
ten percent of total responses. 
 
                                            
35 See page 42.  To make our estimates of departures we reconciled data from several sources.  For 
example, while the Bethel tower data report a substantial decline in total traffic between 2000 and 2001 
total enplanements show a slight (0.7 percent) increase. We did not find evidence that airlines were using 
larger capacity aircraft.  We did hear from several sources that the Bethel tower implemented a new 
method to track take-offs and landings.  
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4 Changes in Safety 
This section assesses the possible safety effects of Capstone in two ways: (1) changes 
in aviation accidents from the 1990-1999 baseline period to the 2000-2001 interim 
evaluation period; and (2) differences in accident rates between Capstone-equipped 
and non-equipped commercial aircraft based in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta. The 
section then summarizes the opinions of pilots and company managers about 
Capstone’s safety effects. Finally, we conclude by summarizing our assessment of 
Capstone’s effects on safety so far. 
4.1 Changes in Accidents from the Baseline Period 
To assess how Capstone might have improved safety, we first we use Capstone’s 
implementation so far to make realistic projections of the number of targeted accidents 
Capstone might have been expected to prevent (and not prevent) in the recent 
evaluation period. These projections are based not on actual accidents in 2000 and 
2001, by rather on the baseline distribution of accidents by cause (Section 2), projected 
upward to reflect increased aviation operations (Section 3).  These projections tell us 
what would likely have happened, if accidents in 2000 and 2001 had followed baseline 
patterns. 
Then, we compare the accidents that actually occurred in 2000 and 2001 against these 
projections. That tells us whether our estimate of accidents Capstone likely prevented is 
realistic.  
4.1.1 Projected Accident Prevention 
The safety benefits we predict for Capstone depend on three factors: 
1. The types of accidents (and rates of occurrence) seen in 1990 through 1999  
2. The “best-expected” effectiveness against these accidents by a complete 
Capstone implementation 
3. The FAA’s progress in implementing Capstone during 2000 and 2001. 
Besides the safety benefits Capstone is designed to produce, we may also see 
additional benefits from increased IFR capability, changes in safety posture from 
Capstone or other causes, and changes in operations from pilots using Capstone 
capabilities in ways we have not predicted. 
For navigation-based accidents, Capstone capabilities are available if avionics is 
installed and operational in the aircraft and if the aircraft is within both GPS coverage 
and geographic coverage of the on-board databases. In the interim evaluation period, 
about 45 percent of part-135 aircraft based in the Y-K Delta were Capstone-equipped 
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and about 50 percent of Y-K Delta part-135 flights used Capstone-equipped aircraft.36  
Average pilot effectiveness in using the Capstone capabilities to avoid accidents was 
approximately 50 percent, based on surveys of training levels and assessment by 
trainers.  Because of these limitations, we estimate that Capstone would have 
prevented only about 25 percent of potential CFIT and GPS-map accidents in the 
interim evaluation period. 
For accidents caused by air traffic, Capstone can only prevent collisions if all aircraft 
involved are equipped with Capstone avionics. Preventing collisions between part-135 
aircraft and other aircraft in the Y-K Delta depends on how many part-135 aircraft are 
equipped and how many other aircraft operating in the Y-K Delta are equipped. 
The part-135 fleet in the delta went from 5 percent equipped in January 2000 to 85 
percent equipped by December 2001. However, that fleet accounts for only about 70 
percent of total aircraft operations in the delta.  Almost none of the aircraft accounting 
for the remaining 30 percent of operations are Capstone-equipped. So, in January 
2000, if a Capstone-equipped plane had a random encounter with another plane, there 
was only a 4 percent chance that the other plane would also have Capstone avionics. 
That chance rose to about 60 percent by December 2001.  
Combining these two probability vectors and averaging over the 2000/01 period yields 
about one chance in five that both a part-135 aircraft and some other aircraft it might 
encounter in the Y-K Delta would have both been Capstone-equipped during the 
evaluation period.  Taking training levels into account, Capstone’s projected 
effectiveness for preventing mid-air collisions was 11 percent during the evaluation 
period.   
Capstone might prevent a collision during take-off, even if only one plane were 
Capstone-equipped—if a tower had a “Brite” display that allowed the tower operator to 
observe the equipped plane. Since responding to the tower operator does not require 
the pilot to use avionics, it does not depend on Capstone pilot training.  However, tower 
display capability was not yet implemented by December 2001.  
Capstone’s net projected effectiveness in preventing all accidents caused by traffic–in 
mid air and during take-off–during 2000 and 2001 was 9 percent. 
Figure 4-1 (next page) shows the projected effectiveness of Capstone in preventing 
navigation and traffic accidents (total and fatal) among Y-K Delta part-135 operators in 
the interim evaluation period.  We adjusted total accident counts for growth in 
operations (from Section 3.3).  Error bars represent the standard deviation for a two-
year interval, which is somewhat less than the standard deviation of the annual counts.   
 
                                            
36 Based on analysis of SVFR operations at Bethel. Operations in better weather or at other locations 
could have a slightly different ratio. 
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The number of accidents Capstone might have prevented—given the capabilities that 
existed in the evaluation period—is much smaller than the statistical variation in 
numbers of accidents. It will take time—and a higher proportion of Capstone-equipped 
planes and more pilot training—for that prevention level to rise above normal year-to-
year variation.  For fatal accidents, it will take even longer for accident prevention to rise 
above year-to-year variation—because historically, fatal accidents caused by navigation 
or traffic problems have occurred less than once per year in the Y-K Delta. 
Figure 4-1.  Projected Total and Fatal Accidents for Y-K Delta Part-135 Operators, 
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These data show projected–not observed–accidents in 2000 and 2001, calculated by adjusting accident 
numbers from 1990 through 1999 upwards for increased operations.  The gray “no direct impact” bars 
represent accident causes that Capstone does not address.  The green striped “best prevention”  areas show 
the projected number of accidents we estimate Capstone could have prevented, if fully implemented; the red 
striped “best residual” areas show Capstone-relevant projected accidents that would have occurred even with 
full implementation.  The solid green “expected prevention” bars –navigation and traffic only–adjust the striped 
green “best prevention” bars to reflect the fact that Capstone was not fully implemented in 2000 and 2001.  
Thus, fewer of the projected accidents would be prevented. The solid red “expected accidents remaining” bar 
is total projected accidents less solid green “expected prevention” accidents.  The “I” lines centered on the top 
of each bar show one standard deviation of the two-year moving average from 1990 through 1999– an 
indication of how the two-year sum varies from year to year.  Typically, two-thirds of the observed biannual 
totals are within one standard deviation of the mean.   
    Projected Total Accidents       Projected Fatal Accidents 
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4.1.2 Analyzing Capstone Area Accidents, 2000 and 2001 
In 2000 and 2001 there were 58 accidents and incidents in the Capstone area, 30 of 
which involved part-135 operators.  Nineteen of those involved part-135 operators in the 
Y-K Delta.  Figure 4-2 breaks-out the accidents by Capstone area/Y-K Delta part-135 
operator and by FAR part.  
























The pie shows the 58 accidents in the Capstone area by the FARs under which each flight 
operated.  The gray outer wedges show the 19 accidents where the flight was operated by one of 
the Y-K Delta part 135 operators that are the focus of Capstone. 
The number of part-135 accidents among aircraft based in the Y-K Delta, in the 
Capstone area, and throughout Alaska varies from year to year.  Figure 4-3 (next page) 
shows accidents from 1990 through 2001 for these three groups.   
We considered whether we could predict the expected accidents among Y-K Delta part-
135 operators (in the absence of Capstone), based on variations in the number of 
accidents elsewhere.  That is, if accidents among part-135 operators statewide went up 
some percentage, could we expect the same increase among Y-K Delta part-135 
operators as well?  We discovered, however, that the year-to-year accident variations 
for Y-K Delta part-135 operators and for all Alaska part-135 operators are too different 
to justify applying the statewide change to the Y-K Delta.  Nor could we use percentage 
changes in numbers of accidents involving part-135 operators outside the Y-K Delta but 
still within the Capstone area—again, we found no similarity in accident variation 
between part-135 operators in the Y-K Delta and in the broader Capstone area. 
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Figure 4-3.  Accidents of FAR Part-135 Operators, 1990–2001 
























Remainder of Capstone Area
YK Delta 
Source: NTSB (2002) Accident and Incident Database
Note: We used information on owners and operators to determine FAR part 135 flying as 91.
 
4.1.3 Capstone Area Accidents 
Figure 4-4 (next page) breaks out the 58 Capstone area accidents into the nine 
accident categories used in Section 2.2.  (There were no accidents caused by fuel 
problems, so only eight causes appear on the chart.) The distribution of accidents 
appears similar to that in the baseline period. Applying the analysis used to generate 
Figure 4-1 (which shows projected 2000 and 2001 accidents by cause for Y-K Delta 
part-135 operators), Figure 4-5 (page 61) shows the projected number of accidents by 
cause37 for the entire Capstone area, compared with the number of accidents observed.  
For most causes the observed number is quite close to the projected number; however, 
landing and mechanical/other accidents are down by slightly more than one standard 
deviation.  The figure also illustrates the very small changes we project from the 
Capstone program during the evaluation period, when Capstone was only partly 
implemented and only in the Y-K Delta. 
                                            
37 Again, the nine categories have been collapsed to seven by combining fuel and flight prep; and 
mechanical and other. 
 Capstone Phase I Interim Safety Study, 2000/2001  
 Page 60  
Figure 4-4.  Accidents in the Capstone Area by Cause, 2000-2001 




































Figure 4-4 shows the same 58 accidents as in Figure 4-2, this time by the nine cause 
categories used in section 2.2.  There were no fuel accidents, so there are only eight 
slices.  The outer wedges show detailed cause categories (the same used in Figures 2-5 
and 2-6).   
Detailed Causes:  
•  Flight Info 
Weather= Accidents where the availability of weather information was a factor. 
•  Navigation 
TCF = CFIT accidents that occur on approach or departure 
CFIT: Controlled Flight into Terrain accidents 
Map = pilot did not know aircraft’s location 
•  Traffic 
Air_Air = Collisions between aircraft when both are moving, including mid-air collisions, 
but also collisions while taking off, landing or taxiing 
•  Flight Prep 
Wt_Bal = aircraft not loaded within weight and balance restrictions 
•  Take-off and Landing 
Runw_cond= accidents related to runway conditions such as potholes, 
 debris on the runway, etc. 
Site= unusual hazards of off-runway sites 
•  Other 
Taxi=collisions with objects (not a/c) while taxiing 
Maneuvering=typically, stalling the aircraft while maneuvering 
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Figure 4-5. Projected and Measured Accidents in the Capstone Area  
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Figure 4-5 compares the projected accidents (bars on left) with measured (observed) accidents 
(bars on right) for the Capstone area. The gray “no direct impact” bars (and portions of bars) show 
accidents with causes that Capstone doesn’t address; the solid green “expected prevention” areas 
represent the number of the projected accidents we believe Capstone could have prevented, 
given its actual implementation in 2000 and 2001; the red bars “expected residual” areas are the 
remainder of potentially Capstone-preventable accidents .  The black-and-white striped 
”measured” bars on the right show the 58 Capstone area accidents in 2000 and 2001 by cause. 
4.1.4 Y-K Delta Part-135 Accidents 
Figures 4-6 (page 62) and 4-7 (page 63) repeat the above analysis for just Y-K Delta 
part-135 operators.  As discussed in Section 2, these are the operators most affected 
by Capstone implementation and therefore most likely to show measurable safety 
benefits.   
Figure 4-6 shows the 19 Y-K Delta part-135 operator accidents by cause, and Figure 4-
7 compares those accidents with projected accidents and expected prevention of those 
projected accidents. For the most part, accident numbers in 2000 and 2001 are similar 
to those in previous years, but there are several variations worth noting: 
1. There were no accidents caused by improper flight preparation or by fuel 
mismanagement, and zero is more than one standard deviation below the 
baseline.  It is possible this decrease is only a statistical anomaly-it was not 
observed in the Capstone area as a whole.  However, this category more 
than any other is directly affected by the safety attitudes and practices of 
pilots and their companies.  Section 3.4 describes improvements in safety 
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posture that could be manifested in just this way.  It is possible that the 
increased focus on safety by Y-K Delta operators, of which Capstone 
implementation is a part, contributed to this decline. 
2. There were no accidents attributable to lack of flight information. This might 
be due to improved weather information from Capstone AWOS installations 
or due to better risk avoidance by pilots, resulting from improved safety 
posture. However, the number declines by less than one accident and even 
zero is well within one standard deviation from the baseline. This number 
may simply be part of normal variation, even without Capstone. 
3. There were no accidents caused by other aircraft traffic.  However, zero 
accidents is within one standard deviation of the baseline level—it’s within 
normal year-to-year variation.  Also, while traffic accidents are a direct focus 
of Capstone capabilities, limited implementation means we wouldn’t expect 
Capstone to have affected this type of accident in 2000/02.   
All other accident types were within one standard deviation of the baseline mean, 
including navigation accidents targeted by Capstone’s GPS-map and CFIT-avoidance 
capabilities. This finding is consistent with projections, when we take into account the 
limited level of implementation in the evaluation period.   
Figure 4-6.  Accidents of Y-K Delta Part-135 Operators by Cause, 2000-2001 























The nineteen accidents of Y-K Delta Part 135 operators in 2000 and 2001 fell 
into just four of the nine cause categories, and five detailed cause categories.  
See Figure 4-4, above, for explanations of the detailed categories. 
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Figure 4-7.  Projected and Measured Accidents of Y-K Delta Part-135 Operators 
by Cause, 2000-2001 
2000-2001 Accidents vs Prediction
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Figure 4-7 repeats the projected accident numbers from figure 4-1 (left bar of each pair) and compares it 
with observed accidents  (right bar of each pair) for Y-K Delta Part-135 operators.  The gray “no direct 
impact” bars (and portions of bars) are projected accidents with causes that Capstone doesn’t address. 
The green “expected prevention” areas for navigation and traffic causes show the number of projected 
accidents we would expect Capstone to have prevented, given its actual implementation level in 2000 and 
2001; the red “expected residual” areas show Capstone–relevant accidents that we expect would have 
occurred despite Capstone’s implementation. The black-and-white striped “measured” bars show the Y-K 
Delta Part-135 operators’ 19 accidents in 2000 and 2001.  
4.2 Y-K Delta Part-135 Accidents by Equipped and Non-Equipped Aircraft 
This section contrasts the accident rates between equipped and non-equipped part-135 
aircraft based in the Y-K Delta during 2000 and 2001. This is a second way of 
evaluating the possible safety benefits of Capstone.  Aircraft were gradually equipped 
over the interim evaluation period, and for much of the period there were no systematic 
differences in how equipped and non-equipped planes were used and the conditions 
they flew in. In early 2000, when few planes were equipped, Capstone-equipped planes 
weren’t representative of the fleet as a whole. By the end of 2001, when about 85 
percent of part-135 aircraft had been equipped, it was the non-equipped planes that 
were not representative of the fleet. Nevertheless, these two groups of aircraft in the Y-
K Delta still provide the most sensitive measure of the safety effects of Capstone 
avionics.38 
                                            
38 Comparing equipped and non-equipped sub-populations is convenient for direct assessment of safety 
changes associated with Capstone’s implementation. Because the non-equipped sub-population is 
essentially gone by mid-2002, we cannot repeat this analysis for future years.  The results must be 
interpreted with caution because of the small numbers of accidents in each sub-group each year. 
 Capstone Phase I Interim Safety Study, 2000/2001  
 Page 64  
We have good data about the dates that each aircraft were returned to service after 
Capstone avionics were installed; we also know about how many aircraft those 
operators had that were not equipped as of December 2001. This information allows us 
to calculate the number of total aircraft-days for equipped and non-equipped aircraft in 
the Y-K Delta part-135 fleet39 (Figure 4-8).  From these data we can calculate the 
accident rate per aircraft day, shown in Figure 4-9. 
Figure 4-8.  Count of Equipped and Non-Equipped Aircraft-Days, 




















Figure 4-9.  Accident Rates for Capstone Equipped and Non-Equipped Aircraft,  





























In 2000, equipped and non-equipped aircraft belonging to Y-K Delta part-135 operators 
had similar accident rates.  In 2001, the rate of accidents among Capstone-equipped 
aircraft was less than half that of non-equipped aircraft. The data set isn’t big enough to 
                                            
39 We eliminated some Capstone-equipped aircraft from the analysis: Northern Air Cargo aircraft fly under 
part 121; PenAir is no longer a Y-K Delta part-135 operator, nor are UAA, FAA, and the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service.  This was necessary because we had to define the fleet strictly as Y-K Delta part-135 
operators to be consistent in our counts of equipped aircraft, non-equipped aircraft, and accidents.  Also, 
because we had no information about how quickly operators replaced aircraft that crashed, the 19 
accident aircraft were subtracted from the fleet on the dates they crashed. 
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allow us to make statistically significant predictions about future years.  With only 19 
accidents in 2001, if we split the fleet in some way unrelated to accidents (by paint 
color, for example) there would be a 30 percent chance that we might see this big a 
difference in accident rates, just by chance.  However, the results are promising, if not 
conclusive. 
One of the Capstone-equipped aircraft accidents should have been prevented by 
Capstone.  The aircraft flew into a hillside in flat light conditions–a navigation/CFIT 
accident. Why didn’t Capstone equipment prevent this accident? Did limited pilot 
training in use of Capstone avionics (as characterized in Section 3) interfere with the 
pilot’s use of the CFIT-avoidance capability? 
The NTSB narrative for this accident is included in Appendix C, with additional 
information from pilot interviews by Leonard Kirk of the University of Alaska 
Anchorage’s Aviation Technology Division. From these documents it is apparent that 
the limited training of the pilot, the pilot’s attitude toward accident risks, and the 
potential that his activities might be monitored led him to actively defeat the operation of 
Capstone’s CFIT-avoidance capability.  While this is a rather extreme example of the 
limitations of training, it nevertheless is consistent with our discussions of the 
importance of both training and attitudes.   
Even if this accident hadn’t happened–and there had been no navigation-caused 
accidents among Capstone-equipped planes– a reduction to zero would have been 
within normal year-to-year variation.  
4.3 User Assessments of Capstone Safety Benefits and Problems 
During the baseline study and again in the winter of 2001/02, UAA asked pilots to 
assess the expected safety benefits of Capstone. The pilots we talked to in the baseline 
period were familiar with Capstone and some had had classroom training, but few had 
flown with the equipment.  In 2001/02 all the pilots had flown aircraft with Capstone 
avionics, although a significant number (over 10 percent) had not been trained to use 
the equipment. Figure 4-10 (page 67) summarizes their answers about expected safety 
benefits. 
We asked about 11 potential benefits and gave the pilots an opportunity to cite benefits 
that we had not listed (almost no one did). They rated each potential benefit on a 1-to-5 
scale from “no benefit” to “major benefit.” In general, pilots tended to rate the safety 
benefits lower in 2001/02 than they had in the baseline period. This pattern is 
consistent with pilots’ optimistic expectations giving way to reality as they gained 
experience using Capstone avionics.   
To some extent, these ratings also reflect incomplete Capstone implementation. For 
example, “improved terrain awareness” showed a relatively small change in user 
assessments. Terrain awareness in flight is a function that has been implemented in 
Capstone from the start.  By contrast, pilots assessed “improved SVFR procedures” far 
lower in 2001/02—which is not surprising, since that potential use of Capstone is not 
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yet implemented. Likewise, there was little change in “fewer near mid-air collisions” and 
in “safer flying in VFR minimum weather”. These benefits largely reflect fully 
implemented capabilities.  However, “more useful weather information” was rated much 
lower, reflecting the fact that pilots can’t yet receive in the cockpit the weather 
information from the newly installed AWOS stations. 
The majority of pilots rated all the potential benefits we listed as at least of minor 
benefit.  The percentage that chose 3, 4, or 5 ranged from 60 to 97 percent, except for 
the two measures that involved new instrument approaches–“fewer cancelled flights” 
and “safer operations at remote airports.”  Again, those capabilities were phased in over 
the 2000/01 period.  Also, in order for IFR benefits to be fully realized, operators will 
have to gain instrument capability as well. 
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Figure 4-10.  Pilot Assessments of Capstone Safety Benefits,  
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As Figure 4-11 shows, the pattern in pilots’ ratings of potential Capstone problems is 
similar to their estimate of benefits. They agreed that items on our list represented 
potential problems; few identified any additional problems; and their optimistic ratings 
before using the equipment gave way to a more realistic assessment after they had 
used it. The problem pilots rated as most serious—less heads-up time—is addressed 
by training. In their comments and interviews, several pilots and operators noted that 
this is a major reason pilots flying Capstone-equipped aircraft need thorough training. In 
addition, pilots commented that in the winter, when they’re wearing heavy gloves, they 
find it more difficult to push the buttons and turn the knobs on Capstone equipment. 
Figure 4-11.  Pilot Assessments of Capstone Safety Problems,  
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4.4 Interim Evaluation 
Table 4-1 summarizes our assessments of Capstone’s impact on safety.  The first 
column lists individual capabilities or factors that might affect safety.  The next group of 
columns characterizes the implementation status of each capability in 2000 and 2001.  
The third group of columns assesses the effects of each capability as implemented (or 
in some cases, not implemented).   
Table 4-1. Capstone Phase I: Interim Assessment of Safety Effects 







































































































Capability or Contributing Factor Status Impact: 2000/01 
Navigation Systems         
En Route Terrain (CFIT) Avoidance    X  X   
Approach Terrain (TCF) Avoidance X        
Location    X  X   
Runway Alignment   X   X   
Non-precision Instrument Approaches   X   X   
Flight Information Systems         
FIS-B: text weather    X  X   
FIS-B: graphical weather   X   X   
FIS-B: additional AWOS observations  X    X   
Spatial Icing product  X    X   
Additional AWOS (VHF voice)   X X  X   
Pilot reports guided by traffic display    X   X  
Traffic Systems         
Cockpit display of ADS-B aircraft   X   X   
Cockpit Display of Transponder a/c (TIS-B) X     X   
Radar-like Services: Surveillance   X   X   
Radar-like Services: Approach Control  X    X   
Tower “Bright” display  X    X   
Flight Following Displays for operators  X    X   
Over-all         
Installation of Capstone Avionics    X   X  
Installation of Ground Systems   X    X  
Pilot training on Capstone Avionics   X    X  
Operator Safety Postures   X    X  
IFR Capable operations   X    X  
Our confidence in these assessments varies, depending on the available data.  Table 
4-2 describes the basis for our assessments. A few consist only of a conjectured 
rationale for improved safety—which should be regarded skeptically. The best are 
measured changes in accident rates, which over time will provide very high confidence.  
At this time the grounding for most of our assessments is in between these extremes 
and is based on (1) what pilots and operators using the equipment have told us, and  
(2) on measurement of factors that contribute to changes in safety but are not 
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themselves measures of improved safety.  Each of these is an interim evaluation that 
we can make with more confidence later, when Capstone has been in existence longer.  
Table 4-2. Capstone Phase I: Basis for Assessments 

































































































Capability or Contributing Factor      
Navigation Systems      
En Route Terrain (CFIT) Avoidance X X X X  
Approach Terrain (TCF) Avoidance X X    
Location X X    
Runway Alignment X     
Non-precision Instrument Approaches X   X  
Flight Information Systems      
FIS-B: text weather X     
FIS-B: graphical weather X     
FIS-B: additional AWOS observations X     
Spatial Icing product X X    
Additional AWOS (VHF voice) X   X  
Pilot reports guided by traffic display X X  X X 
Traffic Systems      
Cockpit display of ADS-B aircraft X X X X  
Cockpit Display of Transponder a/c (TIS-B) X     
Radar-like Services: Surveillance X     
Radar-like Services: Approach Control X  X   
Tower “Bright” display X  X   
Flight Following Displays for operators X  X   
Over-all      
Installation of Capstone Avionics X X X X X 
Installation of Ground Systems X X X X X 
Pilot training on Capstone Avionics X X  X  
Operator Safety Postures X   X X 
IFR Capable operations X   X  
Based on Tables 4-1 and 4-2, we have developed the following interim assessments of 
the effects on aviation safety of Capstone Phase I in southwest Alaska during 2000 and 
2001: 
Safety posture in the Capstone area has increased substantially.  Capstone has played 
a significant role, in particular through providing additional weather stations, GPS 
approaches, avionics, and training. 
Pilots and operators are generally pleased with the program. Their expectations may 
have originally been too optimistic; their views about the potential benefits and 
problems associated with Capstone have become more realistic.  They still see the 
program’s benefits as valuable and the problems as tractable with training and 
experience. 
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Accidents still happen–even some of types that Capstone was designed to prevent.  
Examining the reasons why will be a focus of our continuing research.  We know that 
both training and attitude are important factors in Capstone’s full effectiveness, and that 
these changes can’t be realized as quickly as avionics and ground systems can be 
installed. 
The lower accident rate among Y-K Delta part-135 Capstone-equipped aircraft in 2001 
indicates that Capstone may already be improving safety in the Y-K Delta. The rate was 
1.5 accidents per 10,000 aircraft days among equipped planes, compared with 3.1 
among non-equipped planes. We will need more data before we can be confident that 
this difference results from the Capstone program rather than from random variation. 
An unanticipated use of Capstone equipment may also be producing safety benefits. 
Pilots told us that they get up-to-date information on their destinations by contacting 
other pilots in those locations—and they identify those pilots using Capstone’s ADS-B 
feature.  This could explain the absence of landing accidents caused by poor runway 
conditions, since pilots can learn about those conditions in advance and be prepared 
for them. 
Improved infrastructure that supports IFR flight is encouraging Y-K Delta operators to 
use IFR operations.  Additional weather stations and GPS approaches have increased 
the number of Y-K Delta airports with instrument approaches from 3 to 13.  At the same 
time, the number of IFR-certified commercial aircraft operating in the area rose from 8 
to 22, and will likely continue to increase. 
We didn’t expect to see Capstone’s full benefits during this evaluation period because 
the program was only partly implemented. Avionics were installed gradually over the 
two-year period; pilots had limited training and experience using the equipment; and not 
all the traffic and flight information capabilities were functional, even by December 
2001.   
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5 Findings and Recommendations 
Capstone Phase I has not yet been fully implemented.  To fully realize Capstone’s 
potential benefits, the FAA must finish equipping the fleet as planned and building the 
ground infrastructure to support the system’s capabilities. Operators must continue to 
provide training and support for pilots to use the equipment effectively.  Our preliminary 
recommendations include: 
•  It is definitely worthwhile for the FAA to continue this program. Only when all the 
Capstone equipment is in place and pilots have been well-trained—and have used 
the equipment for a longer period—can we expect to see the full safety benefits. 
•  The Capstone program won’t see its full benefits unless pilots and operators support 
it and use all its capabilities. Safety research needs to continue tracking pilot and 
operator attitudes about the program and assessing the effectiveness of pilot 
training.  The FAA needs to continue to market the program to pilots and Flight 
Standards District Offices (FSDO’s) need to assure pilots and operators that the 
technology won’t be used for enforcement. 
•  Operators also need to allocate time and money for thorough initial and continuing 
training.  FAA oversight could help to ensure this happens. 
•  Simulators with Capstone avionics would be a valuable addition to the pilot training 
currently available. 
•  In order to get the most benefit out of data-link weather and other relevant 
information the Capstone potentially makes available in the cockpit, pilots need to 
be able to access this information wherever they fly, and not just in a part of the Y-K 
Delta.  It’s important to increase the number of ground-based transceiver stations so 
they cover at least the full Y-K Delta. 
•  To fully realize the potential benefits of radar-like services, the FAA should work to 
provide approach-control services for Bethel airport using Capstone’s capabilities. 
•  The FAA should require future Capstone participants to provide more information on 
how often and where they fly, what training they provide, who their pilots are, and 
what their qualifications are. Lack of such information in the Y-K Delta hampers our 
ability to estimate safety benefits. Operators in Phase I of the program weren’t 
required to provide this information when they received the Capstone equipment.  
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Appendix A  
Comparison of Baseline and Interim Accident Analyses 
Data Limitations 
As identified in the baseline report, data to characterize flight operations, 
particularly in remote areas, are very limited.  Data to characterize accidents that 
have occurred is of much higher quality because of systematic collection by the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the FAA.  Nevertheless, when 
accidents with specific causes or in specific populations are examined, the 
numbers per year are small and subject to large percentage variations. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the FAA compile 
excellent documentation of accidents and events leading to them, but data on 
flight operations in rural Alaska are very limited.  This makes accident rates per 
flight hour or per operation less accurate.  Further, though well documented, the 
total numbers of accidents associated with particular causes or types of aircraft 
operations are small and subject to large percentage variations from year to year.  
For these reasons a simple comparison of accident statistics with and without 
Capstone is not informative for the brief evaluation time to date.  
Our approach combines knowledge of aviation, Y-K delta operations, and 
factors that influence safety to build a framework that helps interpret empirical 
observations and measurements.  We have organized this knowledge as a safety 
model for the Capstone Area.  The inputs to this model are safety factors that we 
have measured. The parameters that influence the impact of safety factors are 
derived from prior studies, from analysis, or from the expert judgment of team-
members.  The outputs from the model are predicted changes in accidents. We 
validate predictions of the model against observed accidents by Capstone-
equipped aircraft, and contrast these with accidents by non-equipped aircraft in 
the Capstone Area and elsewhere in Alaska.  We compare these predictions with 
the expectations and experiences of pilots and operators using Capstone. 
Conceptually, were sufficient data available, a simpler approach could be 
used: we could statistically characterize changes in safety and correlate these 
with changes in safety factors – such as the availability of weather warnings, 
equipage or training with Capstone avionics, or the existence of the Capstone 
program as a whole.  This approach could validate relationships empirically and 
might be less sensitive to differences in judgment, but the amount of data 
required is large and the results obtainable from limited data are small.  Also, 
such an approach would not build a common understanding of importance of 
particular safety issues and contributing factors.  The numbers of Capstone Area 
accidents in the baseline and evaluation period to date are too few to average-
out random variations and show statistical significant correlations with individual 
safety factors. 
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Table A.1 Accidents, Incidents and Fatalities in the Capstone Area  
1990-99 and 2000-01 
 
 
Accident Classification Methods 
Description of Methodologies 
This report extends the method developed for the baseline study.  By 
doing this we use as much data as possible, overcome some of the weaknesses 
in the data, and can provide a better explanation of how Capstone avionics affect 
safety.  Both the baseline method and interim method use as a starting point all 
accidents in the YK delta between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999,1 
and from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001 as the recent period.  
Both use FAR part number to group accidents.  Table A.1 shows counts of 
accidents and incidents, fatal accidents and fatalities in the YK delta for 1990-99 
and 2000-01. 
There are important differences between the two methods.  The methods differ in 
(1) geographic coverage (2) avionics categories and, (3) method for assessing 
avionics relevance. The baseline method includes information about more 
accidents and more operators.  The baseline method looks at the pattern of 
accidents in the Capstone area and Alaska during the baseline and recent 
                                            
1  The earlier published totals for the baseline period in this report differ from the earlier version 
because we updated the data to cover the period from 10/15/99 through December 31, 1999 
missing from the earlier version.  The dataset extending through December 31, 1999 also 
contained better latitude and longitude information.  We used this to make some adjustments to 
earlier accident counts.   
 
1990-99 2000-01 1990-99 2000-01 1990-99 2000-01 1990-99 2000-01
Air Carriers Operating Under FAR Part Number 121
Non Scheduled 2 0 2 0 1 0 4 0
Scheduled 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
Air Carriers Operating Under FAR Part Number 135
Non Scheduled 89 13 86 13 9 1 12 1
Scheduled 33 8 30 8 1 1 6 10
135 Operating as Part 91 33 9 31 8 5 2 9 2
Air Carriers Operating Under FAR Part 91  
 FAR Part 91 140 18 139 18 9 0 17 0
FAR Part 91 - Public 10 7 10 7 1 1 2 1
Other 
FAR Part 125 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
FAR Part 129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FAR Part 133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FAR Part 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 309 58 300 56 26 5 50 14
  
Source: NTSB (2002) Accident and Incident Database.  Data cover 1/1/90 through 12/31/2001.
Accidents, Incidents and Fatalities in the Capstone Area, 1990-99 and 2000-01
All Accidents & Incidents Accidents Accidents w/ Fatalities Fatalities
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periods.  Then it evaluates accidents in the recent period to see if the pattern of 
accidents and accident rates are different than they were in the baseline and 
different from the pattern of accidents statewide.  It categorizes accidents as 
“yes”--Capstone avionics would have been addressed all accident causes, “no”--
Capstone avionics would not have addressed any of the accident causes or 
“possible” where avionics would have addressed some but not all of the causes.  
The strength of this method is that it uses nearly all the available data and makes 
comparisons with other areas.  Its weakness is that in order to make 
comparisons, it uses accident rates (accidents per 100,000 departures) and the 
data on departures are weak.  Departures data are limited, especially at lower 
than statewide levels.  The APO Terminal Forecast Survey Summary Report 
from the FAA’s Aviation Policy and Plans Office uses historical data on traffic 
counts from FAA Form 5010, the Airport Master Record.  These are the only 
systematic data available for the Capstone area, and the published data for 
Capstone airports are only available for 1999.  For airports with control towers, 
airport managers report the number of aircraft cleared for takeoff or landing. For 
airports without towers, which include all the Capstone area airports except 
Bethel, airport managers estimate the annual traffic counts.  It slightly 
undercounts unscheduled air taxi and general aviation departures, since it would 
not count departures from off-airport locations.  However, we think such 
departures are only a small part of the total.   
Another weakness in the baseline method is that it assumes that all avionics 
components are equally effective in preventing accidents.   
The method used in the interim report focuses on FAR part 135 operators 
based in the YK delta (the majority of Capstone participants).  It tracks Capstone 
equipped aircraft.  In the baseline period, this method evaluates accidents in 
terms of which of the seven avionics components would have been relevant to 
the accident and then assigns a measure of effectiveness from 0 to 100 percent 
to each component.   For the remainder of accidents where no components 
would have been relevant, the method categorizes accidents by phase of flight or 
other cause.  It applies this to the recent period, adjusting for equipage and 
training and anticipates the number and mix of avionics related accidents for 
2000 and 2001.  The strength of the interim method is that it tracks the Capstone 
equipped aircraft specifically and assigns an effectiveness measure to each 
component of the avionics.  This method can better explain how and why 
accidents could occur in Capstone equipped aircraft.  
The two methods used different decision rules to classify baseline period 
and evaluation period accidents as to avionics relevance.  The baseline method 
categorized accidents in 1999, prior to full program implementation.  The method 
posited best-case scenarios.  Based on discussions with the FAA, it made 
optimistic assessments of avionics relevance.  The interim method categorized 
baseline accidents in 2002, after the start of the program and made, as it turns 
out, more realistic assessments of avionics relevance.  
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Baseline and Interim Methods Applied to Baseline Accidents 
Both the baseline and interim methods assessed whether or not Capstone 
avionics would have been helpful in baseline accidents.  Here, we compare the 
two assessments of avionics relevance for accidents, fatal accidents and 
fatalities among FAR part 135 operators based in the YK delta.  In the baseline 
period there were 101 accidents, 10 fatal accidents and 20 fatalities.  Figure A.1 
compares the “yes” and “no” counts in the interim method to the “yes”, “no” and 
“possible” counts in the baseline methods.  It also presents a detailed breakdown 
of the coding used in the interim method to assess avionics relevance.   
Figure A.1 
 
"No" Avionics "Yes" Avionics
Comparison of Avionics Relevance in Baseline Accidents
Baseline and Interim Methods



















*Revised from "no" to "Yes" in baseline  method.
101
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Figure A.2 shows that in the baseline period, both methods make the 
same assessment of Capstone avionics relevance for fatal accidents.  Of the ten 
fatal accidents involving 135 operators based in the YK delta, both methods 
anticipate that avionics might have been helpful in three cases and not helpful in 
seven.  The interim method assessed which avionics components would have 
been helpful in fatal accidents and found that avionics addressing CFIT accidents 
might have been helpful in one fatal accident and avionics addressing traffic 
might have been helpful in two fatal accidents.  Six out of ten fatalities were in 
accidents where avionics addressing CFIT might have been helpful. 
Figure A.2 
 Comparison of Avionics Relevance Fatal Accidents  Baseline Period
Detailed Breakdown of Categories in Interim Method
"No" Avionics "Yes" Avionics
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Figure A.3 shows that both methods anticipated that Capstone avionics 





Comparison of Avionics Relevance Fatalities Baseline Period 
Detailed Breakdown of Categories in Interim Method
"No" Avionics "Yes" Avionics







 9 "Yes" baseline
10
"Yes" interim
 10"No" interim 
10
*Baseline method includes 1 revision from "yes" to "no".
10 10
20
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Baseline and Interim Methods Applied to 2000-2001 Accidents 
Both the baseline and interim methods evaluated 23 accidents in 2000-01.  
Figure A.4 shows that the baseline method determined that avionics would have 
been helpful in two accidents, possibly been helpful in four accidents and not 
helpful in 17 accidents.  The interim method determined that avionics would have 
been relevant in three accidents.  These are the two accidents coded as “yes” in 
the baseline method and one of the accidents coded as “possible”.   The 
remaining 20 accidents were coded as “no” in the interim method.  
Figure A.4 
 
Figure A.5 shows how the interim method further categories accidents. The 20 
accidents coded as “no” are divided into causes or phases on flight.  The three 
accidents coded as “yes” are linked to avionics components that were relevant.   
Figure A.5 
 
Comparison of Avionics Relevance 2000-2001
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Accidents by FAR part 
Accidents 1990-99 by FAR part 
Figure A.6 shows the different sets of accidents.  There were 309 accidents and 
incidents in the area between 1990 and 1999.  Of these, 155 involved FAR part 





Accidents & Incidents Involving YKD Based 135 Operators
Capstone Area Accidents & Incidents
1990-99 by FAR part Number
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Accidents 2000-01 by FAR part 
Figure A.7 shows that in 2000 and 2001 there were 58 accidents and incidents in 
the YK delta.  Nineteen involved part 135 operators based in the delta.    
Figure A.7 
 
Figure A.8 shows that in 2000-01 there were 5 fatal accidents in the Capstone 
area.  One involved a part 135 operator based in the delta. 
Figure A.8 
 
Capstone Area Accidents & Incidents
2000-01 by FAR part Number























Capstone Area Fatal Accidents  
2000-01 by FAR part Number
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Figure A.9 shows that there were fourteen fatalities in the Capstone area in 
2000-01.  Only one was the result of an accident involving a part 135 operator 




Alaska, Capstone Area, and YKD Accidents per Year  
for Part 135 Operations  
Figure A.10 (page A-11) shows all part 135 accidents for Alaska, the Capstone 
area, and the YK delta.  Figures A.11 through A.13 (pages A-11 to A-12) show 
the three component parts of this total: part 135 flying under part 91; part 135 air 
taxi operations, and part 135 commuter operations.  Statewide, accidents 
involving air taxis are lower in 2000 and 2001 than in earlier years.  In the 
Capstone area and YK Delta, there were fewer accidents involving air taxis in 
2000 and 2001 than in late 1990s.  Statewide, accidents involving commuters are 
lower in 2000 than in the previous four years, but are not as low as in the mid 
1990s.  In 2001, all of the commuter accidents in Alaska were in the Capstone 
area.  It is difficult to see a pattern in the number of accidents involving part 135 
operators flying as 91.  These accidents are at the same level in 2001 as in the 
mid to late 1990s.  Overall, statewide FAR part 135 operators showed very little 
change between 1990 and 2000 and are down slightly in 2001.  This is true in the 
Capstone area as well. 
2000-01 by FAR part Number
Capstone Area Fatalities
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Figure A.10. 
FAR Part 135 Accidents 1990-2001 




















































Source: NTSB (2002) Accident and Incident Database




Part 135 Flying as 91 Accidents 1990-2001 

















































Source: NTSB (2002) Accident and Incident Database
Note: We used information on owners operators to determine FAR part 135 flying as 91.
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Figure A.12. 
Air Taxi Accidents 1990-2001 























































Commuter Accidents 1990-2001 


















































Source: NTSB (2002) Accident and Incident Database
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Appendix B.  Capstone Area Accidents, 1990 – 1999 
 
The tables below present the Capstone area accidents from 1990–1999 (Table 
B-1, page B-3) and for 2000–2001 (Table B-2, page B-12).  For each accident, 
the first column is the NTSB identification number; this number references the 
reports which we used to assign cause categories and probabilities.   Column 2 
is the date of the accident; column 3 is the level of the most severe injury 
resulting from the accident–none, minor, serious, or fatal.  Column 3 lists the 
capstone relevance and cause category; a “no:” means that the accident was not 
capstone relevant, and a cause category.  The cause category explanations are 
listed below, with the abbreviations used in the table in parentheses at the end of 
the relevant paragraph.  
Mechanical Failure (Engine failure, inoperable control surfaces, failed landing 
gear, propeller or shaft failure.  (mech) 
Navigation Usually Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) while en route, most 
often associated with reduced visibility.  In the YK Delta, CFIT also 
occurs in nominal VFR conditions when “flat light” on snow-covered 
ground prevents recognition of terrain.  Terrain Clearance Floor 
(TCF) warnings are a Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
(TAWS) function planned for Capstone Phase 2 that addresses the 
20%-30% of CFIT accidents on approach or departure.  These are 
not directly addressed by Capstone Phase 1 avionics.  Rarely, 
accidents are due to mislocation, which can be addressed by a 
GPS- map display.  (CFIT, TCF) 
Traffic Usually mid-air collisions or near mid-air collisions (NMACs) 
between aircraft.  Also includes accidents from last-moment 
avoidance of other aircraft and from jet blast on airport surface. 
(traffic, NMAC) 
Flight Information Usually inadequate weather information, especially icing, but 
also visibility; rarely convective weather.  (Surface winds 
contributing to take-off or landing accidents have been included 
under take-off or landing rather than here.)  Occasionally, lack of 
information on changes in procedures or facility status. (Wx, ice, 
IMC) 
Fuel Mismanagement Usually fuel exhaustion.  Occasionally, failure to 
switch fuel tanks. (fuel) 
Flight Preparation Failure to ensure cargo is tied-down and within the aircraft’s 
weight and balance limits.  Failure to check fuel for the presence 
of water.  Rare in the lower 48 but significant in the YK Delta is 
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failure to remove ice or snow from the aircraft – often resulting in 
serious or fatal accidents. (preflt, wtbal) 
Take-off and Landing Failure to maintain control (especially in wind), 
improper airspeed, or inadequate care near vehicles or obstacles. 
The YK Delta also includes unusually high numbers of accidents 
from poor runway conditions, from hazards at off-runway sites 
such as beaches and gravel bars, and from obstacles in water that 
are struck by float-planes. (tkoff, torwcond, tsite. Ldg, lrwcond, lsite) 
Other Includes a variety of unusual causes such as bird strikes or 
collisions with ground vehicles. 
 
Column 5 shows the estimated probability that Capstone would have applied.  
Most often, this is either 100 percent or zero–while every accident has multiple 
causes, it is usually evident whether Capstone avionics could have prevented the 
accident.  Occasionally, the accident causes are unknown, or the contributions of 
two quite different factors(such as a mechanical failure in bad weather) make it 
difficult to determine whether Capstone would, in fact have been helpful.  In 
those cases the  author has estimated the likelihood, based o the accident 
narrative. 
Column 6 shows the authors’ estimate of how likely it is that Capstone could 
have actually prevented the accident, if all Capstone capabilities were fully 
implemented and the pilot trained and experienced in using those capabilities. 
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Table B-1. Capstone Area Accidents, 1990 – 1999, with Causes and  















Pcnt Prob of 
Prevention 
ANC90LA035 2/27/1990 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA038 3/9/1990 NONE no:appro 0 0 
ANC90FA039 3/16/1990 FATL no:vfr>imc>disor 0 0 
ANC90FA047 3/29/1990 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA057 4/15/1990 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA058 4/15/1990 NONE no:fuel 0 0 
ANC90FA061 4/16/1990 FATL no:mnvr 0 0 
DCA90MA030 6/2/1990 SERS yes: TCF 100 90 
ANC90FA086 6/9/1990 FATL no:fuel 0 0 
ANC90LA096 6/23/1990 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA102 6/29/1990 MINR no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA108 7/2/1990 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC90LA114 7/8/1990 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA119 7/18/1990 NONE no:other 0 0 
ANC90LA123 7/25/1990 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA124 7/27/1990 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC90LA125 7/27/1990 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC90LA137 8/8/1990 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC90LA143 8/12/1990 FATL no:unknown 0 0 
ANC90LA145 8/14/1990 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC90LA149 8/17/1990 NONE no:lsite 0 0 
ANC90LA157 8/24/1990 NONE no:tsite   
ANC90LA153 8/26/1990 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA168 9/12/1990 NONE no:fuel 0 0 
ANC90LA176 9/15/1990 NONE no:taxi   
ANC90LA177 9/16/1990 NONE no:preflt/wet-gas 0 0 
ANC90LA181 9/21/1990 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC90LA184 9/22/1990 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC90LA189 9/30/1990 FATL yes: Wx/CFITorRLS 100 75 
ANC91LA005 10/12/1990 NONE no:lrwcond   
ANC91LA006 10/15/1990 MINR no:tsite 0 0 
ANC91LA007 10/16/1990 SERS no:unknown   
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Pcnt Prob of 
Prevention 
ANC91LA015 12/11/1990 NONE no:appro 0 0 
ANC91LA033 3/8/1991 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC91IA037 3/18/1991 NONE no:lrwcond 0 0 
ANC91T#A01 3/21/1991 MINR no:tkoff   
ANC91LA038 3/27/1991 MINR yes: Wx/CFIT 100 75 
ANC91LA040 3/28/1991 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC91IA052 4/8/1991 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC91LA055 5/3/1991 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC91LA057 5/8/1991 MINR no:carbheat 0 0 
ANC91LA060 5/22/1991 NONE no:wtbal 0 0 
ANC91LA065 6/4/1991 NONE no:tsite 0 0 
ANC91LA066 6/5/1991 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC91LA074 6/15/1991 NONE no:fuel   
ANC91LA080 6/23/1991 NONE no:tsite 0 0 
ANC91LA158 6/26/1991 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC91GA087 7/3/1991 NONE no:other 0 0 
ANC91LA096 7/4/1991 NONE no:mech   
ANC91LA100 7/16/1991 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC91LA108 7/23/1991 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC91FA107 7/24/1991 FATL yes: Wx:vfr>imc>diso 0 0 
ANC91LA118 8/8/1991 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC91T#A02 8/14/1991 NONE no:unknown   
ANC91LA125 8/14/1991 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC91LA127 8/18/1991 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC91LA134 8/24/1991 NONE no:mech   
ANC91LA135 8/24/1991 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC91FA142 9/3/1991 NONE no:preflt/oil-cap 0 0 
ANC91LA143 9/4/1991 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC91LA153 9/25/1991 MINR no:lsite 0 0 
ANC92FA002 10/3/1991 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC92LA003 10/5/1991 NONE no:ldg   
ANC92TF#01 10/9/1991 NONE no:unknown   
ANC92LA008 10/17/1991 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC92LA007 10/18/1991 MINR no:ldg 0 0 
ANC92LA010 10/26/1991 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
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Pcnt Prob of 
Prevention 
ANC92LA014 11/7/1991 NONE no:mnvr 0 0 
ANC92LA016 11/8/1991 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC92FA022 12/22/1991 FATL yes: Wx/TCF 100 75 
ANC92LA025 1/6/1992 NONE no:lrwcond 0 0 
ANC92LA031 2/4/1992 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC92LA045 2/28/1992 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC92LA049 3/21/1992 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC92LA052 3/24/1992 MINR no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC92LA056 4/1/1992 FATL no:drugs&alc 0 0 
ANC92LA070 5/9/1992 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC92LA086 5/21/1992 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC92LA080 5/26/1992 NONE no:mech   
ANC92LA095 6/18/1992 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC92IA100A 6/26/1992 None yes: NMAC, Wx? 100 100 
ANC92IA100B 6/26/1992 None yes: NMAC, Wx? 100 100 
ANC92LA102 7/4/1992 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC92FA106 7/13/1992 FATL no:wtbal 0 0 
ANC92LA108 7/20/1992 NONE yes: CFIT 100 90 
ANC92T#A06 7/21/1992 NONE no:unknown   
ANC92LA109 7/22/1992 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC92LA110 7/23/1992 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC92FA116 7/30/1992 FATL yes: Wx/terrain/control 100 50 
ANC92LA118 8/3/1992 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC92LA122 8/8/1992 MINR yes: Wx/CFIT ? 100 75 
ANC92LA126 8/9/1992 MINR no:mech 0 0 
ANC92LA140 8/22/1992 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC92IA147 8/29/1992 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC92LA168 9/8/1992 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC92FA159 9/9/1992 SERS no:mech 0 0 
ANC92LA161 9/9/1992 MINR no:ldg 0 0 
ANC92LA167 9/9/1992 NONE no:carbheat 0 0 
ANC92LA172 9/13/1992 MINR no:appro   
ANC92LA174 9/17/1992 NONE no:fuel 0 0 
ANC93LA005 10/6/1992 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC93LA014 11/11/1992 SERS yes: WxApro/GPS/ice 70 70 
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Pcnt Prob of 
Prevention 
ANC93LA019 12/4/1992 NONE yes: Wx/CFIT 100 75 
ANC93LA024 1/5/1993 MINR yes: Wx/TCF 100 80 
ANC93LA029 1/29/1993 NONE no:mech   
ANC93LA037 2/27/1993 NONE no:torwcond 0 0 
ANC93FA045 3/20/1993 FATL yes: Wx/CFIT 100 75 
ANC93LA048 3/25/1993 MINR yes: Wx/TCF 100 80 
ANC93LA052 4/12/1993 NONE no:torwcond 0 0 
ANC93LA059 5/1/1993 NONE no:torwcond 0 0 
ANC93FA060 5/6/1993 NONE yes: CFIT 100 80 
ANC93LA065 5/16/1993 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC93IA085 5/26/1993 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC93LA072 5/29/1993 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC93LA073 5/29/1993 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC93LA078 6/3/1993 NONE no:lsite 0 0 
ANC93LA098 6/19/1993 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC93LA111 7/3/1993 NONE no:tsite 0 0 
ANC93LA126 7/24/1993 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC93LA135 8/5/1993 NONE no:lsite 0 0 
ANC93LA144 8/13/1993 MINR no:tkoff   
ANC93LA169 9/5/1993 NONE no:taxi   
ANC93LA180 9/19/1993 NONE no:ldg   
ANC93LA182 9/20/1993 NONE no:ldg   
ANC94LA008 10/4/1993 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC94LA006 10/6/1993 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC94LA010 10/8/1993 NONE no:lsite 0 0 
ANC94LA016 11/8/1993 NONE no:appro 0 0 
ANC94IA020 11/30/1993 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC94LA021 12/3/1993 NONE no:ldg   
ANC94LA022 12/3/1993 NONE no:tsite 0 0 
ANC94LA031 2/8/1994 NONE yes: GPS&TCF 100 90 
ANC94LA034 2/11/1994 NONE no:tsite 0 0 
ANC94LA066 6/4/1994 MINR no:mnvr 0 0 
ANC94LA068 6/6/1994 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC94LA072 6/28/1994 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC94FA080 7/11/1994 FATL no:wtbal 0 0 
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Pcnt Prob of 
Prevention 
ANC94LA081 7/12/1994 NONE no:tsite 0 0 
ANC94LA099 8/5/1994 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC94LA102 8/9/1994 MINR no:ldg 0 0 
ANC94LA112 8/19/1994 NONE no:lsite 0 0 
ANC94T#A03 8/29/1994 NONE no:unknown   
ANC95LA002 10/1/1994 NONE no:tsite 0 0 
ANC95LA010 11/12/1994 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA013 11/18/1994 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA017 12/12/1994 SERS no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC95LA020 12/13/1994 NONE Wx/CFIT 100 80 
ANC95LA024 12/25/1994 NONE no:taxi 0 0 
ANC95LA031 12/31/1994 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA025 1/4/1995 NONE no:lrwcond 0 0 
ANC95LA028 1/15/1995 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC95LA029 1/20/1995 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC95LA036 3/20/1995 NONE Wx/CFIT 100 90 
ANC95LA040 3/29/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA043 4/14/1995 NONE SfcMM/traffic/Twr? 100 90 
ANC95LA045 4/15/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA050 5/8/1995 NONE no:wtbal 0 0 
ANC95LA058 5/25/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA060 5/28/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA084 6/5/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA110 6/9/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA071 6/10/1995 NONE no:fuel 0 0 
ANC95LA077 6/12/1995 NONE no:txrwcond 0 0 
ANC95LA080 6/22/1995 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC95LA097 7/5/1995 NONE no:taxi 0 0 
ANC95LA098 7/5/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA100 7/12/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95FA104A 7/14/1995 FATL yes: Traffic/water 100 100 
ANC95FA104B 7/14/1995 FATL yes: Traffic/water 100 100 
ANC95LA105 7/16/1995 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC95LA108 7/19/1995 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC95LA123 8/1/1995 NONE no:tsite 0 0 
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ANC95LA136 8/10/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA138 8/14/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA154 8/29/1995 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC95LA156 9/3/1995 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC95LA161 9/8/1995 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC95LA171 9/17/1995 NONE no:lrwcond 0 0 
ANC96LA005 10/17/1995 MINR no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA012 11/3/1995 NONE no:preflt/frost 0 0 
ANC96LA017 11/18/1995 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA019 12/16/1995 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC96LA033 3/13/1996 NONE no:lsite 0 0 
ANC96LA053 4/20/1996 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA062 4/30/1996 MINR no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA067 5/1/1996 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA063 5/2/1996 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA064 5/2/1996 NONE no:preflt/frost 0 0 
ANC96FA081 6/3/1996 FATL no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA082 6/4/1996 MINR no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC96IA085 6/5/1996 NONE no:other 0 0 
ANC96FA102 7/20/1996 FATL no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA105 7/20/1996 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA123 7/26/1996 SERS no:taxi 0 0 
ANC96LA115 8/2/1996 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC96LA117 8/3/1996 SERS no:taxi 0 0 
ANC96LA119 8/5/1996 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC96LA132 8/17/1996 NONE no:lsite 0 0 
ANC96LA153 9/8/1996 NONE no:taxi 0 0 
ANC96LA159 9/20/1996 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC96TA163 9/24/1996 SERS no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC96LA164 9/24/1996 NONE no:preflt/ice 0 0 
ANC97FA008 11/26/1996 FATL no:unknown 0 0 
ANC97FA009 11/30/1996 FATL no:mnvr 0 0 
ANC97LA010 12/4/1996 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC97LA012 12/5/1996 NONE no:fuel 0 0 
ANC97TA016 12/31/1996 NONE no:carbheat 0 0 
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ANC97LA019 1/12/1997 NONE yes: m-apr>cfit 0 0 
ANC97LA022 1/17/1997 SERS yes: Wx/CFIT 100 80 
ANC97FA024 1/29/1997 FATL no:mech 0 0 
ANC97LA027 2/22/1997 NONE yes: Wx/TCF 0 0 
ANC97LA030 2/26/1997 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC97FA037A 3/25/1997 FATL yes: Traffic 100 100 
ANC97FA037B 3/25/1997 FATL yes: Traffic 100 100 
ANC97LA042 3/27/1997 MINR no:mech 0 0 
ANC97LA044 3/31/1997 NONE no: Fuel 0 0 
ANC97LA048 4/7/1997 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97LA054 4/11/1997 FATL no:mnvr 0 0 
ANC97LA055 4/12/1997 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC97LA064 4/30/1997 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97LA067 5/3/1997 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97LA073 5/3/1997 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC97LA094 6/28/1997 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC97TA098 7/7/1997 MINR no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97LA106 7/19/1997 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC97LA109 7/21/1997 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97GA126 8/20/1997 FATL ? IMC/CFIT/Helo   
ANC97LA129 8/24/1997 SERS no:fuel 0 0 
ANC97LA133 8/26/1997 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97LA135 8/26/1997 SERS no:mnvr 0 0 
ANC97LA138 9/1/1997 SERS no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97LA140 9/1/1997 MINR no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC97LA142 9/3/1997 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC97LA134 9/6/1997 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97TA148 9/13/1997 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC97LA149 9/14/1997 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC97LA154 9/23/1997 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC97FA155 9/26/1997 FATL ? VMC/CFIT or mnvr?   
ANC97LA157 9/29/1997 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC98IA004 10/20/1997 NONE no:preflt/aileron 0 0 
ANC98LA005 10/20/1997 NONE no:fuel 0 0 
ANC98LA012 12/15/1997 NONE no:fuel 0 0 
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ANC98LA013 12/16/1997 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC98LA014 1/2/1998 NONE no:mech   
ANC98LA018 1/30/1998 MINR yes: Wx/ice 0 0 
ANC98LA025 2/24/1998 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC98LA023 2/26/1998 NONE yes: SfcMM/traffic 100 90 
ANC98LA024 3/3/1998 NONE no:lsite 0 0 
ANC98LA029 3/12/1998 NONE no:taxi-site   
ANC98LA028 3/21/1998 NONE no:other 0 0 
ANC98GA036 4/8/1998 FATL yes: vfr>known imc   
ANC98LA040 4/22/1998 MINR yes: Wx/CFIT 100 75 
ANC98LA056 5/21/1998 NONE no:torwcond   
ANC98LA059 5/29/1998 NONE no:mech   
ANC98LA050 6/4/1998 NONE no:ldg   
ANC98LA065 6/6/1998 NONE no:ldg   
ANC98LA073 6/14/1998 NONE no:tkoff 0 0 
ANC98LA104 6/17/1998 NONE no:bird   
ANC98LA078 6/19/1998 NONE no:mech 0 0 
ANC98LA090 7/1/1998 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC98LA098 7/14/1998 NONE no:mech   
ANC98LA099 7/16/1998 MINR no:mech 0 0 
ANC98LA101 7/17/1998 MINR no:mech 0 0 
ANC98LA118 8/8/1998 NONE no:ldg   
ANC98LA129 8/22/1998 MINR no:mech   
ANC98LA138 9/2/1998 NONE yes: Wx/CFIT 100 75 
ANC98LA148 9/11/1998 NONE no:ldg 0 0 
ANC98LA149 9/13/1998 NONE no:tsite   
ANC98LA155 9/22/1998 NONE no:tsite   
ANC98LA156 9/23/1998 NONE no:ldg   
ANC98LA158 9/24/1998 NONE no:tsite   
ANC98LA159 9/25/1998 NONE no:ldg   
ANC98LA160 9/25/1998 NONE no:ldg   
ANC98LA161 9/26/1998 MINR no:tkoff   
ANC98LA163 9/27/1998 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC99LA001 10/4/1998 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC99LA002 10/8/1998 MINR no:preflt/wet-gas   
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ANC99LA009 10/26/1998 MINR no:mech   
ANC99LA016 12/17/1998 SERS yes: Wx/CFIT 100 75 
ANC99LA017 12/18/1998 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC99FA021 1/10/1999 MINR no:mech   
ANC99LA022 1/10/1999 NONE Wx:ice 0 0 
ANC99LA023 1/12/1999 NONE Wx:ice 0 0 
ANC99FA028 2/11/1999 SERS yes: TCF 0 0 
ANC99LA039 3/27/1999 NONE no:lsite   
ANC99LA045 4/11/1999 NONE no:ldg   
ANC99LA051 4/19/1999 NONE no:lrwcond   
ANC99LA054 4/21/1999 NONE no:ldg   
ANC99LA062 5/15/1999 NONE no:preflt/gustlock   
ANC99LA158 6/5/1999 NONE no:ldg   
ANC99LA082 6/24/1999 NONE no:mech   
ANC99LA093 7/19/1999 NONE no:preflt/wet-gas   
ANC99LA095 7/20/1999 NONE no:watertaxi   
ANC99LA097 7/22/1999 MINR no:fuel   
ANC99LA098 7/28/1999 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC99LA104 7/31/1999 NONE no:lsite   
ANC99LA121 8/20/1999 MINR no:tsite   
ANC99LA134 9/6/1999 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC99LA148 9/6/1999 SERS no:lsite   
ANC99LA144 9/13/1999 NONE no:lsite   
ANC99LA153 9/17/1999 NONE no:taxi   
ANC99LA156 9/20/1999 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC00LA005 10/7/1999 NONE no:other   
ANC00LA008 10/27/1999 NONE yes: Wx/ice 0 0 
ANC00LA009 10/28/1999 NONE yes: Wx/ice 0 0 
ANC00LA015 11/16/1999 MINR no:preflt/frost   
ANC00LA017 12/6/1999 NONE no:preflt/snow-ice   
ANC00FA018 12/7/1999 FATL yes: Wx/CFIT 100 75 
ANC00LA021 12/24/1999 MINR no:preflt/frost   
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Table B-2. Capstone Area Accidents, 20000 – 2001, with Causes and  
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ANC00LA025 02/07/00 NONE no:torwcond   
ANC00LA033 03/04/00 NONE no:mech   
ANC00TA039 03/29/00 NONE WxHelo>imc>cfit 100 90 
ANC00LA041 04/12/00 MINR Wx/CFIT 100 90 
ANC00LA044 04/13/00 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC00LA069 06/13/00 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC00FA076 06/22/00 FATL no:tkoff   
ANC00LA074A 06/22/00 MINR Traffic/water 100 90 
ANC00LA074B 06/22/00 MINR Traffic/water 100 90 
ANC00TA075 06/22/00 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC00FA081 06/30/00 FATL no:preflt/tkoff/mech   
ANC00LA087 07/02/00 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC00LA086 07/12/00 NONE no:ldg   
ANC00LA098 07/26/00 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC00LA116 08/09/00 NONE no:ldg   
ANC00TA109 08/29/00 SERS no:downdraft   
ANC00LA112 09/02/00 NONE no:preflt/frost   
ANC00LA115 09/06/00 NONE no:lrwcond   
ANC00LA119 09/11/00 SERS no:tkoff   
ANC00LA122 09/13/00 NONE no:mech   
ANC00LA133 09/14/00 NONE no:lrwcond   
ANC00FA128 09/20/00 FATL Wx/CFIT ? 100 75 
ANC01LA001 10/01/00 NONE no:tsite   
ANC01LA004 10/07/00 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC01LA011 10/22/00 NONE no:mech   
ANC01LA017 11/03/00 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC01LA016 11/09/00 NONE no:carbheat   
ANC01LA019 11/14/00 NONE no:ldg   
ANC01IA022 12/12/00 MINR Wx/pireps 100 100 
ANC01LA024 12/16/00 NONE no:preflt/wet-gas   
ANC01LA028 01/03/01 NONE no:ldg   
ANC01LA031 01/19/01 NONE no:tkoff   
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ANC01TA032 01/23/01 NONE no:ldg   
ANC01LA034 01/31/01 NONE no:ldg   
ANC01LA036 02/06/01 SERS Wx/CFIT 100 80 
ANC01LA041 03/07/01 NONE no:tsite   
ANC01LA052 03/28/01 NONE no:lsite   
ANC01LA046 04/03/01 SERS (cap!)Wx/CFIT 100 90 
ANC01LA056 04/14/01 NONE no:mnvrg   
ANC01TA047 04/17/01 MINR Wx/CFIT 100 75 
ANC01TA049 04/21/01 NONE no:ldg   
ANC01LA059 04/24/01 NONE no:taxi   
ANC01LA053 05/03/01 NONE no:ldg   
ANC01LA057 05/15/01 NONE no:mech   
ANC01IA058 05/17/01 NONE no:mech   
ANC01LA066 06/02/01 NONE no:mech   
ANC01LA071 06/16/01 NONE no:lrwcond   
ANC01LA083 06/19/01 NONE no:mech   
ANC01GA075 06/25/01 FATL no:lost control   
ANC01LA117 07/25/01 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC01LA098 07/28/01 NONE no:ldg   
ANC01LA108 08/13/01 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC01LA125 08/22/01 NONE no:lsite   
ANC01LA131 09/01/01 NONE no:tkoff   
ANC01LA136 09/02/01 NONE no:mech   
ANC02TA001 10/05/01 NONE no:ldg   
DCA02MA003 10/10/01 FATL no:preflt/ice   
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Appendix C. Assessments of CFIT Crash of Capstone Equipped Aircraft, 
April 3, 2001 
NTSB Synopsis of Accident Identification #ANC01LA046 
The commercial certificated pilot and six passengers were en route between 
remote villages on a VFR scheduled commuter flight. The pilot contacted the 
village agent at the destination airport via radio, and received a weather report as 
800 feet overcast, with the visibility as 5 miles. The director of operations for the 
company reported that the weather at the accident scene was an indefinite 
ceiling of about 500 feet, and a visibility of about 2 miles. After departure, the 
pilot proceeded toward the destination airport about 450 feet above the ground. 
About 10 minutes after departure, the pilot said the horizon began to become 
obscured and the area ahead of the airplane turned white. He said there was no 
precipitation, rather the ground and sky became indistinguishable. He began a 
right turn toward the east, but about 2 seconds after beginning the turn, the 
airplane suddenly collided with snow-covered terrain. A passenger reported the 
visibility was about 1 mile under gray skies. The airplane was equipped with an 
avionics package provided by the FAA's Capstone Program. The Capstone 
Program is a joint industry/FAA demonstration program that features, among 
others, global positioning system (GPS) avionics, weather and traffic information 
provided through automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), traffic 
information service-broadcast (TIS-B) equipment, and terrain information 
depicted on a multifunction display (MFD) installed in the cockpit. The Capstone 
program provides radar-like services to participating air carrier aircraft operating 
in a nonradar environment of Western Alaska. Terrain depiction information, 
based on GPS data, is one of several visual display options available to the pilot 
on the MFD. Selection of the terrain mode for display, provides the pilot with 
color shading depicting areas of terrain that are black (2,000 feet below the 
aircraft), green (between 2,000 and 700 feet below the aircraft), yellow (between 
700 and 300 feet below the aircraft), and red (at or within 300 feet of the aircraft). 
Accurate depiction of terrain (in the terrain mode) requires the pilot to manually 
set a barometric pressure setting in the MFD menu. The Capstone avionics 
equipment does not receive barometric pressure data from the aircraft's 
altimeter. Selection of the map mode does not provide any terrain awareness 
information. During the interview with the NTSB IIC, the pilot said that he 
selected the moving map display with a five mile scale. He did not observe any 
warning flags illuminated on the MFD, and he did not manually enter any 
barometric pressure data into the MFD. The pilot said that he routinely utilized his 
own personal GPS receiver that has a color moving map display. He said he is 
more familiar with his own GPS, and had it installed on the top of the instrument 
panel glare shield. He said that since the terrain in Western Alaska is usually 
quite flat, he routinely utilized the Capstone map mode with the GPS "go to" 
function for each leg/destination of a route, not the terrain mode.  
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The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of 
this accident as follows.  
The pilot's continued VFR flight into instrument meteorological conditions, and his 
failure to maintain adequate distance/altitude from terrain, resulting in a collision 
with terrain while maneuvering. Factors in the accident were flat light conditions, 
snow-covered terrain, and the pilot's failure to utilize on-board Capstone 
flight/navigation instruments to display terrain awareness data. 
NTSB Full Narrative of Accident Identification #ANC01LA046 
Aircraft: Cessna 207, registration: N1581U, Injuries: 2 Serious, 2 Minor, 3 
Uninjured. 
On April 3, 2001, about 1745 Alaska daylight time, a wheel-equipped Cessna 
207 airplane, N1581U, sustained substantial damage after colliding with terrain, 
about eight miles north of Nightmute, Alaska. The airplane was being operated 
as a visual flight rules (VFR) scheduled domestic passenger flight under Title 14, 
CFR Part 135, when the accident occurred. The airplane was operated as Flight 
262 by Grant Aviation Inc., Anchorage, Alaska. The commercial certificated pilot 
and one passenger received serious injuries, two passengers received minor 
injuries, and three passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions 
prevailed in the area of the accident, and VFR company flight following 
procedures were in effect. The accident flight originated at the Nightmute Airport, 
about 1730. The intended routing of Flight 262 was from Bethel, Alaska, to 
Toksook Bay, Alaska, to Nightmute, to Newtok, Alaska, and then a return to 
Bethel. 
During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), on April 3rd, the director of operations for the 
operator reported that the flight had crashed, and search and rescue operations 
were underway. On April 6, 2001, the NTSB IIC interviewed the pilot who stated 
that while he was en route to Toksook Bay, he contacted the village agent via 
radio. The weather conditions were reported by the agent as 800 feet overcast, 
visibility 5 miles, with a light wind from the southeast. Before departing 
Nightmute, the pilot said he set the airplane's altimeter to the field elevation (15 
feet msl). After departure, he proceeded toward Newtok, but skirted an area of 
low hills by flying toward the east before turning toward Newtok. He said he was 
flying about 450 feet above the ground. About 10 minutes after departure, the 
pilot said the horizon began to become obscured and the area ahead of the 
airplane turned white. He said there was no precipitation, rather the ground and 
sky became indistinguishable. He began a right turn toward the east, but about 2 
seconds after beginning the turn, the airplane suddenly collided with snow-
covered terrain. 
In the Pilot/Operator report (NTSB Form 6120.1/2), the director of operations 
reported the weather conditions at the accident site as an estimated indefinite 
ceiling of 500 to 600 feet agl, and the visibility was estimated as two miles in 
haze/whiteout with no precipitation. 
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On September 13, 2001, in a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC, the right 
front seat passenger reported that as the flight progressed toward Newtok, the 
visibility was about one mile under gray sky conditions. Just prior the accident, 
the visibility began to decrease, and the airplane then collided with the snow. The 
passenger did not report any precipitation. 
The airplane came to rest on its right side. The engine and propeller were torn off 
the airframe. The pilot provided emergency care for the passengers, and 
contacted an over-flying jet airplane on a hand-held radio. Emergency personnel 
arrived by helicopter about 2 hours later. 
The airplane was equipped with an avionics package provided by the Federal 
Aviation Administration's Capstone Program. The Capstone Program is a joint 
industry/FAA demonstration program that features, among others, global 
positioning system (GPS) avionics, weather and traffic information provided 
through automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), traffic information 
service-broadcast (TIS-B) equipment, and terrain information depicted on a 
multifunction display (MFD) installed in the cockpit. The Capstone program 
provides radar-like services to participating air carrier aircraft operating in a non-
radar environment of Western Alaska. At the time of the accident, position 
information from Capstone equipped airplanes, to the Anchorage Air Route 
Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), Anchorage, Alaska, is provided by the ADS-B 
equipment in the airplane, and requires ground based radio repeater sites to 
facilitate the transmittal of position data. The area of the accident was not within 
radio coverage of a currently established repeater site. 
Terrain depiction information, based on GPS data, is one of several visual 
display options available to the pilot. Other options include custom maps, VFR 
sectional charts with topographical features, IFR charts, flight plan and traffic 
information, and weather data. The airplane's position can be displayed in 
relation to its location over the terrain, and may include bearing and distance 
information to selected points. Selection of the terrain mode for display, provides 
the pilot with color shading, depicting areas of terrain that are black (2,000 feet 
below the aircraft), green (between 2,000 and 700 feet below the aircraft), yellow 
(between 700 and 300 feet below the aircraft), and red (at or within 300 feet of 
the aircraft). Accurate depiction of terrain (in the terrain mode) requires the pilot 
to manually set a barometric pressure setting in the multifunction display menu. 
The Capstone avionics equipment does not automatically receive barometric 
pressure data from the aircraft's altimeter. Selection of the map mode does not 
provide any terrain warning/awareness information. 
During the interview with the NTSB IIC, the pilot said that he received training in 
the use of the Capstone equipment from the University of Alaska, Anchorage, 
and from his company. He also said that during the accident flight, he selected 
the moving map display with a five mile scale. He did not observe any warning 
flags illuminated on the multifunction display. He did not manually enter any 
barometric pressure data into the Capstone equipment. The pilot said that he 
routinely utilized his own personal GPS receiver that has a color moving map 
display. He said he is more familiar with his own GPS, and had it installed on the 
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top of the instrument panel glare shield. He said that since the terrain in Western 
Alaska is usually quite flat, he routinely utilized the Capstone map mode with the 
GPS "go to" function for each leg/destination of a route, not the terrain mode. 
The closest official weather observation station to the accident site is Hooper 
Bay, Alaska, which is located 71 nautical miles northwest of the accident site. On 
April 3, at 1835, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) was reporting in 
part: Wind, 140 degrees (true) at 9 knots; visibility, 9 statute miles; clouds and 
sky condition, 800 feet broken, 1,200 feet broken, 3,100 feet overcast; 
temperature, 32 degrees F; dew point, 28 degrees F; altimeter, 28.92 in Hg. 
On April 3, at 1753, a METAR from Bethel, located 81 nautical miles east of the 
accident site, was reporting in part: Wind, 160 degrees (true) at 18 knots, gust to 
24 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, 1,900 feet broken, 
2,600 feet overcast; temperature, 35 degrees F; dew point, 32 degrees F; 
altimeter, 28.94 in Hg. 
Accident Evaluation of April 3, 2001 Crash of Capstone Equipped C207 
by Leonard Kirk, UAA/ATD 
This accident is of particular interest to this writer (Leonard F. Kirk UAA/ATD 
Capstone Coordinator) because I was directly involved in training the pilot who 
operated the aircraft. The training was provided in Bethel, Alaska as part of the 
University of Alaska contract with the FAA Capstone project. On June 28 and 29 
2000 the PIC received two days of training on the use of Capstone avionics and 
classroom exercises included flight plans to Newtok and Nightmute, Alaska 
which are the two communities involved in this accident. 
The accident information important to this discussion is copied from the NTSB 
factual report and attached here in italics. As a pilot, Capstone instructor, and 
evaluator of the Capstone project I add the following information: 
The pilot was not using the equipment as he was trained to do. The pilot believed 
the equipment was a “Big Brother” attempt to violate him and therefore the pilot 
attempted to fool “Big Brother” by misusing the equipment. The pilot failed to 
keep the “Baro Aiding” feature of the MFD up with current altimeter and created a 
1200 foot error in the terrain feature of the MFD and by doing so eliminated the 
terrain alerting feature. The pilot felt the displayed altitude was able to be seen by 
the FAA and he allowed the error to exist so the FAA would think he was flying 
higher than he actually was. The altitude reported by the UAT box is based on a 
29.92”Hg. setting on the encoder and is not controlled by the pilot. However, this 
pilot did not accept the instruction he was given and instead attempted to fool the 
system. The failure to properly use the terrain feature was also an attempt to 
eliminate the red from the MFD because the passengers are aware of the system 
and do not like seeing the red. The UAA/ATD produced a short training video 
based on this accident and it is available for those pilots who fly the equipment in 
the accident area.
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Appendix D.  Data on Aircraft Equipped and Accidents of Y-K Delta Part 135 
Fleet, 2000 and 2001 
Table D-1 (next page) below shows the data we used to calculate the accident 
rated for equipped and non-equipped aircraft in the Y-K Delta Part 135 fleet in 
2000 and 2001.  Each row represents either the return to service of a newly 
Capstone-equipped aircraft, or an accident of an aircraft in the Y-K Delta part 135 
fleet.  Column 1 which each row represents.  Column 2 is either the date a newly 
equipped aircraft returned to service, or the date an accident occurred.  Column 
3, for accidents only, indicates whether an accident involved an equipped or non-
equipped aircraft.  Columns 4 and 5 indicate our estimate of the number of 
equipped and non-equipped aircraft in the fleet on each date.  We started with a 
fleet total of 164.  We subtracted aircraft that crashed, wither from the equipped 
or non-equipped parts of the fleet as appropriate.  Some of these aircraft 
returned to service, but because we don’t know which ones, or when, we simply 
dropped them from the analysis.  Columns 6 and 7 show the number of equipped 
and non-equipped aircraft days that have elapsed since the previous row: these 
columns are simply the days elapsed since the previous row times the number of 
non-equipped aircraft (Column 6) or times the number of Equipped aircraft 
(column 7). 
Table D-2 (page D-6) shows the summary data for 2000–2001, and for 2000 and 
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Table D-1.  Data for Analysis of Y-K Delta Equipped and  
Non-equipped Aircraft Accidents 



















RTS Equipped a/c 1-Jan-00  163 1 0 0 
Accident 07-Feb-00 Non-EQ ACC 162 1 5994 37 
RTS Equipped a/c 11-Feb-00  161 2 644 8 
RTS Equipped a/c 18-Feb-00  160 3 1120 21 
Accident 04-Mar-00 Non-EQ ACC 159 3 2385 45 
RTS Equipped a/c 4-Mar-00  158 4 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 7-Mar-00  157 5 471 15 
RTS Equipped a/c 10-Mar-00  156 6 468 18 
RTS Equipped a/c 22-Mar-00  155 7 1860 84 
RTS Equipped a/c 23-Mar-00  154 8 154 8 
RTS Equipped a/c 27-Mar-00  153 9 612 36 
RTS Equipped a/c 3-Apr-00  152 10 1064 70 
RTS Equipped a/c 3-Apr-00  151 11 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 11-Apr-00  150 12 1200 96 
RTS Equipped a/c 11-Apr-00  149 13 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 12-Apr-00  148 14 148 14 
RTS Equipped a/c 13-Apr-00  147 15 147 15 
RTS Equipped a/c 21-Apr-00  146 16 1168 128 
RTS Equipped a/c 21-Apr-00  145 17 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 25-Apr-00  144 18 576 72 
RTS Equipped a/c 25-Apr-00  143 19 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 26-Apr-00  142 20 142 20 
RTS Equipped a/c 27-Apr-00  141 21 141 21 
RTS Equipped a/c 4-May-00  140 22 980 154 
RTS Equipped a/c 4-May-00  139 23 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 8-May-00  138 24 552 96 
RTS Equipped a/c 23-May-00  137 25 2055 375 
RTS Equipped a/c 26-May-00  136 26 408 78 
RTS Equipped a/c 30-May-00  135 27 540 108 
RTS Equipped a/c 31-May-00  134 28 134 28 
RTS Equipped a/c 1-Jun-00  133 29 133 29 
RTS Equipped a/c 1-Jun-00  132 30 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 5-Jun-00  131 31 524 124 
RTS Equipped a/c 14-Jun-00  130 32 1170 288 
RTS Equipped a/c 16-Jun-00  129 33 258 66 
RTS Equipped a/c 21-Jun-00  128 34 640 170 
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Accident 22-Jun-00 Non-EQ ACC 127 34 127 34 
RTS Equipped a/c 23-Jun-00  126 35 126 35 
RTS Equipped a/c 28-Jun-00  125 36 625 180 
RTS Equipped a/c 11-Jul-00  124 37 1612 481 
Accident 12-Jul-00 EQ ACC 124 36 124 36 
RTS Equipped a/c 12-Jul-00  123 37 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 20-Jul-00  122 38 976 304 
RTS Equipped a/c 27-Jul-00  121 39 847 273 
RTS Equipped a/c 28-Jul-00  120 40 120 40 
RTS Equipped a/c 29-Jul-00  119 41 119 41 
RTS Equipped a/c 31-Jul-00  118 42 236 84 
RTS Equipped a/c 1-Aug-00  117 43 117 43 
RTS Equipped a/c 4-Aug-00  116 44 348 132 
RTS Equipped a/c 6-Aug-00  115 45 230 90 
RTS Equipped a/c 9-Aug-00  114 46 342 138 
RTS Equipped a/c 16-Aug-00  113 47 791 329 
RTS Equipped a/c 21-Aug-00  112 48 560 240 
RTS Equipped a/c 21-Aug-00  111 49 0 0 
Accident 06-Sep-00 Non-EQ ACC 110 49 1760 784 
Accident 14-Sep-00 Non-EQ ACC 109 49 872 392 
RTS Equipped a/c 15-Sep-00  108 50 108 50 
RTS Equipped a/c 15-Sep-00  107 51 0 0 
Accident 20-Sep-00 Non-EQ ACC 106 51 530 255 
RTS Equipped a/c 27-Sep-00  105 52 735 364 
RTS Equipped a/c 30-Sep-00  104 53 312 159 
RTS Equipped a/c 6-Oct-00  103 54 618 324 
RTS Equipped a/c 12-Oct-00  102 55 612 330 
RTS Equipped a/c 12-Oct-00  101 56 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 12-Oct-00  100 57 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 20-Oct-00  99 58 792 464 
RTS Equipped a/c 20-Oct-00  98 59 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 27-Oct-00  97 60 679 420 
Accident 03-Nov-00 EQ ACC 97 59 679 413 
RTS Equipped a/c 9-Nov-00  96 60 576 360 
RTS Equipped a/c 17-Nov-00  95 61 760 488 
RTS Equipped a/c 17-Nov-00  94 62 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 27-Nov-00  93 63 930 630 
RTS Equipped a/c 29-Nov-00  92 64 184 128 
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RTS Equipped a/c 18-Dec-00  91 65 1729 1235 
RTS Equipped a/c 18-Dec-00  90 66 0 0 
Accident 03-Jan-01 EQ ACC 90 65 1440 1040 
RTS Equipped a/c 3-Jan-01  89 66 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 5-Jan-01  88 67 176 134 
Accident 19-Jan-01 Non-EQ ACC 87 67 1218 938 
RTS Equipped a/c 14-Feb-01  86 68 2236 1768 
RTS Equipped a/c 18-Mar-01  85 69 2720 2208 
RTS Equipped a/c 18-Mar-01  84 70 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 21-Mar-01  83 71 249 213 
RTS Equipped a/c 21-Mar-01  82 72 0 0 
Accident 03-Apr-01 EQ ACC 82 71 1066 923 
RTS Equipped a/c 10-Apr-01  81 72 567 504 
RTS Equipped a/c 11-Apr-01  80 73 80 73 
RTS Equipped a/c 12-Apr-01  79 74 79 74 
RTS Equipped a/c 13-Apr-01  78 75 78 75 
RTS Equipped a/c 13-Apr-01  77 76 0 0 
Accident 14-Apr-01 Non-EQ ACC 76 76 76 76 
RTS Equipped a/c 17-Apr-01  75 77 225 231 
Accident 24-Apr-01 Non-EQ ACC 74 77 518 539 
Accident 03-May-01 Non-EQ ACC 73 77 657 693 
RTS Equipped a/c 3-May-01  72 78 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 3-May-01  71 79 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 12-May-01  70 80 630 720 
RTS Equipped a/c 14-May-01  69 81 138 162 
RTS Equipped a/c 15-May-01  68 82 68 82 
RTS Equipped a/c 16-May-01  67 83 67 83 
Accident 17-May-01 EQ ACC 67 82 67 82 
RTS Equipped a/c 29-May-01  66 83 792 996 
Accident 19-Jun-01 Non-EQ ACC 65 83 1365 1743 
RTS Equipped a/c 22-Jun-01  64 84 192 252 
RTS Equipped a/c 4-Jul-01  63 85 756 1020 
RTS Equipped a/c 4-Jul-01  62 86 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 5-Jul-01  61 87 61 87 
RTS Equipped a/c 6-Jul-01  60 88 60 88 
RTS Equipped a/c 13-Jul-01  59 89 413 623 
RTS Equipped a/c 14-Jul-01  58 90 58 90 
RTS Equipped a/c 16-Jul-01  57 91 114 182 
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RTS Equipped a/c 16-Jul-01  56 92 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 16-Jul-01  55 93 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 16-Jul-01  54 94 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 20-Jul-01  53 95 212 380 
RTS Equipped a/c 23-Jul-01  52 96 156 288 
RTS Equipped a/c 24-Jul-01  51 97 51 97 
Accident 25-Jul-01 EQ ACC 51 96 51 96 
RTS Equipped a/c 26-Jul-01  50 97 50 97 
RTS Equipped a/c 26-Jul-01  49 98 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 27-Jul-01  48 99 48 99 
RTS Equipped a/c 30-Jul-01  47 100 141 300 
RTS Equipped a/c 2-Aug-01  46 101 138 303 
RTS Equipped a/c 6-Aug-01  45 102 180 408 
Accident 13-Aug-01 EQ ACC 45 101 315 707 
RTS Equipped a/c 13-Aug-01  44 102 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 16-Aug-01  43 103 129 309 
RTS Equipped a/c 17-Aug-01  42 104 42 104 
RTS Equipped a/c 20-Aug-01  41 105 123 315 
RTS Equipped a/c 20-Aug-01  40 106 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 23-Aug-01  39 107 117 321 
RTS Equipped a/c 29-Aug-01  38 108 228 648 
RTS Equipped a/c 5-Sep-01  37 109 259 763 
RTS Equipped a/c 7-Sep-01  36 110 72 220 
RTS Equipped a/c 7-Sep-01  35 111 0 0 
RTS Equipped a/c 13-Sep-01  34 112 204 672 
RTS Equipped a/c 23-Sep-01  33 113 330 1130 
RTS Equipped a/c 3-Oct-01  32 114 320 1140 
RTS Equipped a/c 8-Oct-01  31 115 155 575 
RTS Equipped a/c 11-Oct-01  30 116 90 348 
Accident 16-Oct-01 Non-EQ ACC 29 116 145 580 
RTS Equipped a/c 2-Nov-01  28 117 476 1989 
RTS Equipped a/c 19-Dec-01  27 118 27 5546 
RTS Equipped a/c 20-Dec-01  26 119 26 119 
End of Period 31-Dec-01  26 119 286 1309 
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Table D-2.  Summary Statistics for Equipped and Non-equipped Aircraft: 
Aircraft –days, Accidents, and Accidents per 10,000 Aircraft-days, 
2000–2001 
 
 Non-Equipped Equipped 
2000–2001 
Total aircraft-days, 2000-2001 65,401 46,062 
Total Accidents 12 7 
Avg Accidents per 10,000 a/c days 1.83 1.52 
2000 
Total aircraft-days, 2000 46,035 12,.358 
Total Accidents 6 2 
Avg Accidents per 10,000 a/c days 1.30 1.62 
2001 
Total aircraft-days, 2001 19,303 33,795 
Total Accidents 6 5 
Avg Accidents per 10,000 a/c days 3.11 1.48 
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Appendix E.  Capstone Phase I Participants 
Table E.1.  Capstone Area Operators: Participation and  












In Progress  
as of 
12/31/01 Total 
Alaska Central Express N/A       
Alaska Island Air 2001  2 2  2 
Arctic Circle Air 2000 12  12  12 
Arctic Transportation Services Inc. 2000 8 3 11  11 
BellAir, Inc N/A       
Cub Drivers 2000 1  1  1 
Craig Air 2000 2 4 6  6 
ERA Aviation  2001  5 5  5 
Frontier Flying Service 2000 4 1 5  5 
Grant Aviation 2000 4 11 15 2 17 
Hageland Aviation 2000 7 14 21  21 
Hangar One Air Inc. N/A       
Inland Aviation Services Inc. 2001  3 3  3 
Kusko Aviation Inc. 2000       
Larry’s Flying Service 2000 4 1 5 2 7 
Neitz Aviation Inc 2000 1  1  1 
Northern Air Cargo 2000 1 4 5  5 
PenAir 2000 4  3  3 
Ptarmigan Air 2000 4  4  4 
Shannon's Air Taxi (Shade Av) 2000 1  1  1 
Tanana Air Service 2000 4 1 5  5 
Townsend, Richard A. N/A       
Vanderpool, Sr., Robert W. N/A       
Village Aviation 2000 5 1 6  6 
G & L Air Svc (George Walters) 2000 1  1  1 
Yukon Helicopters, Inc. 2000 3 2 5  5 
Yute Air Service 2000 7 5 12  12 
Alaska State Troopers N/A       
FAA Alaskan Region 2000 1  1  1 
Kuspuk School District N/A       
Office of Aircraft Services 2000 1 1 2  2 
UAA 2000 1  1  1 
Total Aircraft   76 58 133 4 137 
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Appendix F. Pilot Survey Research Methodology and Frequencies 
Objective 
This survey was part of a larger effort to collect information about qualifications, 
practices and attitudes of pilots and company management for aviation operators in 
Alaska.  Based on survey responses, focus group results, and consultation with to 
Alaskan aviation safety experts, the National Institutes of Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) will develop policy options designed to reduce aviation fatalities.   
NIOSH contracted with the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) of the 
University of Alaska Anchorage to design and administer two statewide aviation safety 
surveys, one of air carrier managers and one of active commercial pilots.  This 
document describes the methodology for the pilot survey, which addressed pilot 
demographics, flight hours (total, aircraft type, and instrument hours), Alaska flying 
experience, attitudes about safety, flying practices, and other salient risk factors.  
Instrument Development 
Focus Groups 
We hypothesized that there were measurable differences in attitudes, policies and 
behaviors of pilots and operators that put some pilots and operators at greater risk of a 
crash than others.  We further hypothesize that aspects of the economic and/or 
regulatory environment may be reinforcing those higher-risk characteristics.  To 
investigate these hypotheses, NIOSH conducted focus group meetings between May 
and November of 2000 among pilots, operators, and villagers in five Alaska regions.  
Both NIOSH and ISER reviewed the findings of previous Alaska aviation studies.  
Findings from these two sources became the foundation of the research questions, and 
core of both the pilot and operator survey questionnaires.   
Draft Questionnaire 
Respondents were asked to reply to questions about flight practices, attitudes, and 
perceptions from their personal perspective.  The questionnaire consisted of several 
sections: 
1. Pilot demographics, certifications and flight experience  
2. Flight experiences in their current employment relevant to the identified safety issues 
3. Training provided by their current employer relevant to the identified safety issues 
4. Attitudes about those safety issues and about potential ways to address them 
5. For pilots who fly with Capstone equipment, questions about their experiences with 
and attitudes about that equipment. 
Pre-Test 
The questionnaires were pre-tested on six pilots to filter out confusing questions and 
terms, confirm that perception and attitude questions worked, and to determine the time 
required to administer the survey.  We also had to deal with sensitivity to questions 
about practices that are contrary to federal aviation regulations (FARs).  In addition to an 
understandable reluctance to admit to breaking the law, some pilots also raised 
concerns that their survey responses to such questions would be used for enforcement 
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purposes.  For the same reasons, we chose not to ask pilots questions about their 
employers that might call for explanations of practices or procedures contrary to FARs. 
Use of previously collected data 
While prior studies examining crashes in commuter and air taxi services have provided 
useful leads on comparative information and examples of how to conduct this type of 
research, they do not provide the specific information needed for the reduction of deaths 
related to air crashes in Alaska.  No existing information, such as that available from the 
NTSB or FAA accident data reporting systems, has been identified of the type required 
for these studies.  Additionally, appropriate denominators and exposure estimates of 
commercial pilots are inaccurate and unreliable.  Our review of the scientific and 
technical literature did not yield the number of commercial pilots per year or the number 
of pilot flight hours or flights per year in Alaska.  
Sample Design 
The pilot was the unit of analysis in this study.  The survey population consists of pilots 
who flew for:   
•  Air carrier companies who identify themselves as air transportation companies who 
transport passengers and/or freight, operating in Alaska (other than companies who 
are scheduled airline companies operating only aircraft having more than 10 seats), 
as of November 2000.  
•  Government agencies that have public use aircraft operating in Alaska (such as the 
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Alaska State Troopers, U.S. Department of 
Interior, etc.). 
The Capstone sample had three groups, as shown in Table F-1 (next page):  
a. We randomly selected about one-quarter of pilots whose employers participated from 
the NIOSH operator survey’s large operator stratum.  This random sampling 
produced 41 responses to the Capstone module2.   
b. We randomly selected companies having only one or two pilots for a combined 
pilot/operator survey.  Obtaining both operator and pilot information in one contact 
reduced the time burden on small operator respondents. Four of these pilot-
operators were Capstone participants.  
c. We interviewed 61 pilots in person either at their place of work in Bethel or at 
Capstone training sessions in Bethel or Anchorage.  These pilots were all the 
Capstone pilots we could contact at a given time and place (for example, during a 4-
day visit to Bethel, or at a given training class). 
                                            
2 The large operator stratum consisted of all companies/operators that were shown as employing 
3 or more pilots by the FAA’s VIS database in June, 2001. The design sampling fraction for large 
operators was 21.5 percent.  However, we had to sample discrete numbers of pilots in small 
companies, so the actual sampling fraction varied by company size from 40 percent (2 pilots in a 
5-pilot company) to 21.51 percent (20 pilots in a 93-pilot company).  Over all large operators, it 
averaged 24.8 percent.    
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Table F-1.  Capstone Operators and Pilots Completing  
Capstone Module Surveys 





Capstone Participating Operators* 6 17 23 
Capstone Operators Sampled 4 16 20 
Pilot Responses from group a  n/a 41 41 
Pilot Responses from group b  4 n/a 4 
Pilot Responses from group c:  1 60 61 
Total Capstone Pilot Interviews 5 101 106 
*This table includes PenAir, an original Capstone operator, which ceased most of their operations in the Y-K 
Delta in 2001. 
Survey Protocols 
We generated the pilot sample from interviews with the air carrier operators.  ISER 
interviewed operators from August 2001 through February 2002; we interviewed pilots 
from December 2001 through February 2002.  As described above, the universe from 
which we drew the pilot sample was the pilots employed by operators that we 
interviewed. In the final section of the large operator/company questionnaire we 
requested a list of pilots employed by that carrier and their telephone numbers.  If the 
operator provided the list, the interviewer verified that the number of pilots on the list was 
the same as the number reported in question 1 (pilots currently employed by the carrier).  
If the numbers were different, the interviewer resolved the inconsistency, either by 
correcting question 1 or correcting the pilot list, as appropriate.  Once the numbers were 
the same, the interviewer chose a pilot sampling sheet with the same number of pilots as 
listed.  The pilot sampling sheets (generated by an excel spreadsheet) randomly 
selected which pilots on a numbered list should be interviewed.  We generated a new 
sampling sheet, with different random sample, for each company. 
If the operator refused to provide pilot information after follow-up by an interviewer 
experienced in turning around refusals, we tried one of several options.  We preferred 
option (1) or (2), but used option (3) when that was all the operator would agree to.  
1. Work with the operator to obtain contact information only for pilots selected for 
interview.  We would never see the full list of employees.  The interviewer would 
direct the operator to choose names based on where they fell on list.  For 
example, the interviewer, using a sampling sheet, would direct the operator to 
choose the 3rd, 5th and 8th pilots on the operator’s list.  The operator then 
provided us with names and contact phone numbers for the selected pilots. 
2. Obtain a list of pilot names without contact information; draw the sample and mail 
the questionnaire to the company for delivery to the selected pilots. 
3. Work with the operator (as above) so that the operator could select the random 
sample, but in addition, have the operator distribute the questionnaires to the 
selected pilots (rather than providing contact information to ISER). 
In all cases when ISER mailed questionnaire to pilots we included a self addressed 
stamped envelope for the pilot to return the questionnaire to ISER.  We also provided a 
form so that the pilot could mail us their telephone number, in which case we would call 
the pilot directly and conduct the survey over the telephone. 
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Initially we mailed surveys or called all selected pilots, and followed-up by telephone and 
fax as necessary.  In most cases, we expected interviewers to complete surveys over 
the telephone.  In cases where telephone contact was unsuccessful or where the pilots 
preferred face to face contact, interviewers arranged to complete the interview in person. 
Our methodology incorporated the standard strategies used to obtain high survey 
response rates.  We trained interviewers thoroughly so that they understood the goals of 
the research, the questionnaire, and the protocols for administering the questionnaire.  
We followed up by telephone (wherever possible) if we did not receive a response to an 
initial contact by mail.  If necessary, we followed up with face-to-face contact where both 
telephone and mail contacts were unsuccessful.  We did not assign the “unable to 
contact” disposition to a telephone number until we had made repeated calls on different 
days of the week and at different times of day.  Likewise, we attempted face-to-face 
contacts on different days of the week and at different times of day.  If potential 
respondents refused the survey, interviewers experienced at turning refusals around 
called them and attempted to change their minds.  This rigorous telephone interview 
approach minimizes non-response bias at the outset by generating a non-biased 
sample, and then by ensuring a high response rate.   
Interviewer Training 
ISER hired and trained interviewers for telephone and face-to-face, interviews with 
respondents.  The initial training was 16 hours and used the following outline: 
Day 1 
Research ethics - statement of professional ethics 
Confidentiality 
History of ISER 
Purpose of survey 
Background 
Purposes and structure of Alaska Aviation Safety Survey 
Selecting the respondent 




 Special interview circumstances 
 Handling reluctant respondents 
Some techniques to prevent or turn around a refusal: 
Misinterpreted questions 
Vague answers and answers that don't fit 
Clarifying respondent's role using positive feedback 
Disposition of interview and record keeping 
Evaluation 
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Day 2 
Practice interview 
 Disposition of interviews, record keeping 
 Paired interviewer practice 
 Readiness check —1 
 Practice interviews 
 Readiness check —2 
Initial sample assignment 
 
Interviewers are evaluated and approved by the field supervisor for readiness prior to 
their starting telephone interviews 
Confidentiality 
All respondents received voluntary participation and confidentiality information in a 
consent form.  Participants who responded by mail or face-to-face were given a copy of 
the form to keep, and also signed a copy that was attached to the interview.  If 
respondents returned a mail for fax survey without a signed consent form, we 
considered them to have given their implied consent.  For telephone respondents, 
interviewers read the consent form and obtained the respondent’s verbal consent.  The 
form included the following items: 
1. The authority and purpose for data collection,  
2. an explanation that participation was voluntary,  
3. An explanation of the confidentiality of their responses, including assurances that  
•  responses would not be used in any enforcement actions ,  
•  although survey results would be available to the air carrier operator and pilot 
associations, federal agencies, and other interested parties, this would be in 
summary format only -- without any personal or corporate identifiers. 
•  the information provided is kept confidential.  Responses are locked in a file 
cabinet with access limited to research staff on the project 
Current Events  
Respondents were expected to naturally refer to their own experience and prior flying 
experience in thinking about their responses.  Three events occurred during the course 
of this survey, which are certain to have affected pilot’s responses.  On September 11 
there were the tragic events at the World Trade Center and the shut-down of aviation 
nationwide.  In response to the uncertainty in the aviation industry and concern among 
respondents we stopped interviewing for one week.  On October 11, there was the worst 
commercial crash in Alaska since 1987 involving one of the largest regional operators in 
Alaska.  On October 19, there was a helicopter crash in Anchorage involving another of 
the largest regional carriers.  How and to what extent these events may have influenced 
pilots’ responses is unknown, but a series of events of this magnitude are likely to have 
affected public attitudes, perceptions, and business practices. 
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Survey Dispositions and Response Rates 
Table F-2 shows the response rates for Capstone operators and pilots.  Every operator 
and pilot selected for the NIOSH sample was ultimately assigned a disposition code: 
•  Refusals 
•  Respondent Unavailable During the Study 
•  Completed Interview 
The response rate is calculated as: 
Total # of completed interviews  
Number in the original sample  
For purposes of calculating the response rates, we did not include the 61 Capstone pilot 
modules obtained by Dr Daniels in Bethel and at Capstone training classes. 
Table F-2.  Response Rates for Capstone Operators and Pilots 




Capstone Operators 20 18 90% 
Pilots Employed by Capstone Operators* 62* 45 73% 
*We estimated the Capstone pilot response rate from large operators as being the same as the response 
rate for all pilots employed by Capstone operators.  Several large operators have both Capstone and non-
Capstone pilots.  We used the fraction of responding pilots who are Capstone pilots to estimate the number 
of non-responding Capstone pilots from large operators. 
Data Set 
A data editor reviewed the completed survey forms for completeness and consistency; 
whenever possible, our interviewers called back respondents to resolve any problems 
we found.  We reconfirmed our data entry programs to reject some types of incorrect 
data.  We entered a sample of the surveys twice and compared the two entries to 
measure the accuracy of data entry.  Once all the survey data was entered, we reviewed 
it and corrected for missing or unreasonable values. 
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Weighting  
We calculated two sets of weights for the pilot Capstone modules.  The first–pilotwt and 
normalized pilotwt–weighted sample pilots to represent all pilots flying for the 193 
operators whose pilots we interviewed. The second set–totalwt and normalized totalwt–
adjusts the first set of weights to represent all pilots in our universe: pilots employed by 
air taxi and commuter air operators and public agencies flying in Alaska. 
To weight to the operators represented in the survey, we calculated a separate weight 
for each company 
 Pilotwt=  Total pilots employed by company  
   Total Pilot Interviews completed from company 
This formula reflects the fact that the pilot’s probability of selection was different for each 
company size.  We then normalized this weight, so that the weighted total pilots equaled 
the number of respondents (261): 
 
Normalized Pilotwt=    Pilotwt * 106    
    Sum of Pilotwt for the full (106) sample 
 
To adjust the sample to represent all pilots in our universe, we needed to account 
for the operator’s probability of selection, as well.  We multiplied the (non-normalized) 
pilot weight by the (non-normalized) company weight4.  The calculation of the company 
weights is discussed in the methodology documentation for the operator survey. 
 
Totalwt = Pilotwt * Company Weight 
 
The normalized the total weight adjusts the weighted total of pilots to equal the 
number of respondents (106): 
 
Normalized Totalwt=   Totalwt * 106    
    Sum of Totalwt for the full (106) sample 
 
Use of normalized weights is appropriate to accurately calculate statistical significance 
and confidence intervals from the survey data.  Since the pilot sample was stratified by 
company there is a unique weight for each of the 133 air operators represented in the 
sample.  Consequently, the weights themselves are confidential. 
The following pages show the instrument with weighted frequencies included. 
                                            
3 Although we had only 18 completed operator interviews, we picked up one pilot interview from a 
company that refused the operator interview. 
4 For the company that had refused the operator interview, we used the appropriate company 
weight for that company’s stratum.  While it would be preferable to re-calculate all the company 
weights taking the additional company into account, the change is very small and does not affect 
the results measurably. 
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SURVEY INSTRUMENT WITH FREQUENCIES: CAPSTONE PILOT MODULE 
 
CP1. Have you received formal training to use the Capstone equipment? 
 
15 No  
 
90 Yes  1 no answer 
 
CP2. If you received Capstone classroom training, please tell me how many 
hours you received and who provided the training. If you received 
classroom with Capstone simulator training, how many hours did you 
receive? who provided the training? How about flight or Capstone-
equipped flight simulator training? 
 
Training was taught by 






Someone else  
(please specify) 
a. Classroom 
41 – none 
15 – 4 hr 
16 – 8 hr 
9 others 1–16 hr 
12 no answer 
22 25 
1- another company;  
2 – combination 
1 – no answer 
b. Classroom with  
Capstone simulator 
36 – none 
20 – 8 hr 
25 other 1–24 hr 
12 no answer 
32 20 1 – combination 4 – no answer 
c. Flight or Capstone-
equipped flight 
simulator 
40 – none 
24 – 1 or 2 hrs 
13 – 8 hr 
4 others .3–24 hr 
2 trainer @400hr 
10– no answer 
14 37 3 – no answer 
 
CP3. How useful is the GPS Capstone equipment? Is it very useful, somewhat useful, 




useful Not useful 
GPS 92 14 0 
MFD 87 17 1 
Radar-like services 65 11 22 
 
CP4. Which of the following functions of the Capstone avionics do you routinely 
use? Do you use flight planning? (CONTINUE READING LIST AND 
MARK ALL THAT APPLY) 
53 Flight Planning 104 Navigation  
88 Traffic Avoidance 80 Terrain avoidance 
51 Radar-Like Services 2 None 
9 Other (please specify): _data link, FIS, WX, GPS approaches 
Skip to Question CP3 
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CP7. How often do you use the new GPS-based instrument approaches at 
remote airports? Do you use it daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly, 
or never (IF NEVER, PROBE:) Is that because you don't fly to those airports or never 
use instrument approaches) (NOTE: NEW GPS-BASED APPROACHES ARE AT HOLY 
CROSS, KALSKAG, KIPNUK, KOLIGANEK, MOUNTAIN VILLAGE, PLATINUM, 
RUSSIAN MISSION, SCAMMON BAY, ST. MICHAEL) 
 
12 Daily 31 Weekly 19 Monthly 14 Less than 
monthly 
10 Never, we don’t fly to those airports 
20 Never, we never use instrument approaches 
 
CP8. I am going to read a list of possible benefits that you may have 
experienced from the Capstone program in the Bethel area. Please tell me 
if you have experienced fewer cancelled flights due to new instrument 
approaches at remote airports and, if so, was the benefit very small, of 
some benefit, significant, or a major benefit? (CONTINUE READING LIST 
AND MARK A BOX IN EACH ROW) 













a. Fewer cancelled flights due to new instrument 
approaches at remote airports 18 25 22 19 13 0 
b. Safer operations at remote airports due to new 
instrument approaches 18 18 21 24 16 0 
c. Safer flying in minimum legal VFR conditions 15 1 12 41 15 15 
d. Fewer near mid-air collisions 15 10 5 31 20 18 
e. More useful weather information 15 7 22 31 20 4 
f. Better knowledge of other aircraft and ground 
vehicle locations when taxiing 15 17 18 12 27 9 
g. Improved SVFR procedures due to better pilot 
and controller knowledge of aircraft locations 15 16 1 18 33 15 
h. Easier in-flight diversions or re-routes 15 4 28 30 16 5 
i. Time savings from more direct flight routes 15 5 33 17 19 9 
j. Improved terrain awareness for pilots 15 0 1 9 44 28 
k. Improved search and rescue capabilities 15 3 27 19 17 15 
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CP9. If you feel there are other benefits that Capstone provides, will you please 





CP10. You may have experienced some problems with the Capstone program 
in the Bethel area? Have you had less heads-up time? (IF R ANSWERS 
NO, MARK "NO PROBLEM" AND CONTINUE READING LIST. IF R 
ANSWERS YES, ASK THE FOLLOWING:) Was this a very small 
















a. Less heads-up time 16 25 19 18 20 0 
b. Heavier workload in the 
cockpit 15 29 18 27 0 8 
c. More aircraft flying in the 
same airspace because 
they are using GPS point-
to-point routing  
15 15 30 32 4 1 
 
CP11. If you feel there are other problems that Capstone may cause or add to, 








CP12. When you fly for <COMPANY>, how often is the aircraft Capstone-
equipped? Is there always, usually, sometimes, rarely, or never 
Capstone equipment installed? 
 




Skip to Question CP 15 
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CP13. When your aircraft is Capstone-equipped, how often do you use that 
equipment? Always, usually, sometimes, rarely, or never? 
 





CP14. How much does the Capstone equipment help you to make go/no go 
decisions under the following conditions? Under low-ceiling conditions, 
does it help you a small amount, a great deal, or not at all? (CONTINUE 
READING LIST AND MARK A RESPONSE FOR EACH.) 
 








a. Low ceilings 0 43 42 10 11 
b. Low visibility 0 44 38 13 11 
c. High winds 0 75 16 4 11 
d. Icing potential 0 78 10 5 13 
 
CP15. There might be some reasons why pilots choose not to use Capstone 
equipment? Would one reason be that it is too distracting? too difficult to 








a. Too distracting 37 51 18 
b. Too difficult to use 28 63 14 
c. Don’t want company watching aircraft 
location at all times 
52 30 24 
d. Don’t trust equipment to provide reliable 
information 
4 78 24 
e. Concerned that equipment might break 4 77 26 
Skip to Question CP 15 
Capstone Phase I Interim Safety Study, 2000/2001 Appendix F 
 Page F-12  
CP16. If there are other reasons you believe pilots might choose not to use 






The next five questions ask about potentially dangerous situations that pilots 
sometimes encounter.  Capstone equipment might be helpful in preventing or 
coping with these particular problems.  Therefore, we’re interested in how often 
pilots in the Yukon Kuskokwim Delta encounter these problems.  For each 
situation I read, think about how often in the last 12 months you’ve encountered 
it; has it been daily, weekly, monthly, less often than monthly, or never? (READ 




















































CP17. How many times during the past 
year have inaccurate weather 
forecasts caused you to encounter 
instrument meteorological 
conditions when you didn’t expect 
to? 
4 30 24 23 1 24 
CP18. How many times during the past 
year have deteriorating ceilings or 
visibility made you unsure of your 
own position relative to the 
surrounding terrain?  
2 14 13 27 15 35 
CP19. During the past year, how many 
times have you unexpectedly seen 
other aircraft close enough to you 
that you felt it created a collision 
hazard? 
0 10 20 43 4 29 
CP 20. During the past year, how many 
times have you been cleared into 
SVFR when the separation between 
aircraft in the pattern made you 
uncomfortable? 
0 10 14 36 10 36 
CP21. During the past year, how many 
times might your go/no go or routing 
decisions have been improved if you 
would have had access to real time 
weather or Special Use Airspace 
status? 
4 9 34 31 1 27 
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CP22. How do you think the Capstone program has affected flight safety in the 
Yukon Kuskokwim Delta? Has it made flying much less safe, somewhat 
less safe, had no effect on safety, made flying somewhat safer, or much 
safer? 
 
0 Much less safe 
8 Somewhat less safe 
17 No change in flight safety 
30 Somewhat safer 
38 Much safer 
14 No Answer 
 
CP23. And finally, is there anything else that you would like us to know about 













Thank you for your time.  All information you have provided is 














Capstone Phase I Interim Safety Study, 2000/2001 Appendix F 













Capstone Phase I Interim Safety Study, 2000/2001 Appendix G 
 Page G-1  
Appendix G Acronyms 
 
A & P Airframe and Powerplant (aviation mechanic certification) 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
ASOS Automated surface observing system 
ATC Air Traffic Control or Controller 
AWOS Automated weather observing system 
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CFIT controlled flight into terrain 
CTAF Common Traffic Advisory Frequency 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation 
FIS-B Flight Information System – Broadcast 
GBT Ground-based Transceiver 
GPS Global Positioning System 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
ISER Institute of Social and Economic Research, U Alaska Anchorage 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
METAR Meteorological Aviation Report 
MFD Multi-Function Display (of Capstone avionics) 
NDB Non Directional Beacon – a navigation aid 
NEXRAD Next generation Radar 
NIOSH National Institutes of Occupational Safety and Health 
NMAC Near Mid Air Collision 
NOTAM Notices to Airmen 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PIREP Pilot Report 
SVFR Special Visual Flight Rules 
TAF Terminal Aerodrome Forecast 
TAWS Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
TCF terrain clearance floor 
TIS-B Traffic Information System – Broadcast 
UAA-ATD University of Alaska Anchorage Aviation Technology Division 
UAT Universal Access Transceiver 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VOR Variable Omni-directional Radio – a navigation aid 
Wx Weather 
 
For detailed definitions of a wide variety of aviation terms, refer to the FAA’s 
Pilot/Controller Glossary, available at  
http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/PCG/ 
 
 
